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Python Encryption/Decryption for Polkadot Keypairs based on ECIES

This package provides simple encryption/decryption functions for Schnorrkel (SR25519) and Edwards (ED25519) types keypairs, that used in Polkadot, following Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES).

This scheme allows you to encrypt and decrypt data knowing only the public address of recipient and its keypair type.

Credits to SubMessage Dapp team for the base idea, implemented on JS.

Scheme explanation available here:

https://cryptobook.nakov.com/asymmetric-key-ciphers/ecies-public-key-encryption

Implementation Details

The encryption process consist following steps:

  1. Ephemeral key generation

Generate new keypair using the substrateinterface.Keypair.create_from_mnemonic() with a random seed and type of recipient address.

  1. Key agreement

For SR25519 keypair:

Use rbcl.crypto_scalarmult_ristretto255() function to create shared secret for the message private key and the recipient public key. Since keypairs are already in SR25519, they can be used as the scalar and the point for this operation.

For ED25519 keypair:

First, convert an ED25519 the message private key and the recipient public key to a Curve25519 keys. Then, use nacl.Box based on these keys to get shared_key().

  1. Key derivation

Use PBKDF2 (with random salt and 2048 rounds) to derive a new secret from the previous step output. The derived secret is split into:

  • MAC key (first 32 bytes)
  • encryption key (last 32 bytes)
  1. Message encryption

Use nacl.secret.secretbox symmetric encryption to encrypt the message with the encryption key generated at step 3. A nonce (24 bytes) is randomly generated.

  1. MAC Generation

Generate MAC data using HMAC SHA256 (using the MAC key from step 3) of the concatenation of the encryption nonce, message public key and encrypted message.

The encrypted message is the concatenation of the following elements:

  • nonce (24 bytes) : random generated nonce used for the symmetric encryption (step 4)
  • salt (32 bytes) : random generated salt used for the key derivation (step 3)
  • msg_public_key (32 bytes): public key of the message keypair (step 1)
  • mac_value (32 bytes): mac value computed at step 5
  • encrypted_message (remaining bytes): encrypted message (step 4)