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marx.txt
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Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Turgut Dincer and the Online
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file was produced from images generously made available
by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)
------------------------------------------------
Transcriber’s Note:
+Bold text+ is enclosed within plus signs.
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lines.
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A CONTRIBUTION TO
THE CRITIQUE OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY
BY
KARL MARX
Translated from the Second German Edition by N. I. Stone
With an Appendix Containing Marx’s Introduction to the Critique
Recently Published among His Posthumous Papers
CHICAGO
CHARLES H. KERR & COMPANY
Copyright, 1904
By the International Library Publishing Co.
TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE.
The present translation has been made from the second edition of the
“Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie,” published by Karl Kautsky in
1897 with slight changes from the original edition of 1859; changes
that had been indicated by Marx on the margins of his own copy of the
book.
As will be seen from the author’s preface, the work was originally
issued as the first instalment of a complete treatise of political
economy. As he went on with his work, however, Marx modified his plans
and eight years after the appearance of the “Zur Kritik” he published
the first volume of his Capital, whose scope was intended to cover the
entire field of political economy.
The plan to which Marx alludes in the preface to the present work
was thus abandoned in its formal aspects, but not in substance. The
subject matter treated here was reproduced or rather “summarized,” as
Marx himself puts it, in Capital. But that was done in so far as was
necessary to secure continuity of treatment. On the other hand, many
important matters are treated here more thoroughly than in Capital,
especially the part devoted to the discussion of money. This, as well
as the chapters on the history of the theories of value and of money,
which do not appear in Capital, make “Zur Kritik” a work practically
complete in itself.
The recent silver agitation in this country shows how timely and useful
this work still is, though written nearly half a century ago. That a
great part of the working-men employed in the cities were not carried
away by the Democratic-Populist agitation in 1896 and 1900 is probably
due in a greater measure than is commonly realized to the direct
and indirect influence of Marx, whose economic teachings guided the
socialists in their counter agitation. And since the conditions which
once gave rise to a demand for an inflated currency have by no means
disappeared beyond a possibility of return, this book has a wide field
before it, outside of the library of the college and of the student of
economics, which the author’s name and prestige with the working class
insures for it.
There is another reason, if any need be given why this book should
have been translated into English. Marx’s preface to the present work
contains the classic formulation of his historico-philosophic theory
known as the Materialistic Interpretation of History. This theory,
which until recently was entertained almost exclusively by socialist
writers and was hardly heard of outside of socialist circles in English
speaking countries, is at last receiving not only due recognition but
sympathetic appreciation at the hands of men of science.[1] It is
rather a significant coincidence that the work which for the first
time clearly formulated the law governing social evolution should have
seen the light of day in the same year in which Darwin gave to the
world his theory of organic evolution. And as the latter had to fight
its way to recognition in the teeth of religious prejudices, so has the
recognition of the former been retarded by even more powerful social
and political prejudices.
The Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy which is added
as a supplement to this book is for the first time published in book
form in any language. It was written by Marx in 1857, but for reasons
explained by him in the preface was not published and in fact was never
finished by him, since according to his changed plans it would have
fitted more into the last volume of Capital which was to contain a
history of political economy. The introduction has been published but
lately in the form of a magazine article by Karl Kautsky, editor of the
Neue Zeit and literary executor of Karl Marx.
A few explanations are here in order with reference to the work of
translation. No one is more keenly alive to the shortcomings of the
English rendering of the original than the translator himself. While
fully conscious that the translation might be greatly improved, he
has at times deliberately sacrificed literary finish to closeness to
the original. It will be found that many passages have been rendered
more clear and concise in Capital in which, according to Marx’s own
statement in the preface to that work, they were much simplified and
popularized. The Hegelian phraseology is more in evidence in the
present work rendering translation a more difficult task. Yet for
that very reason it seemed particularly desirable to give to English
speaking readers as close a version of the original as was possible. In
the few cases where certain passages from this work were reproduced by
Marx in Capital, the translation of the latter by Moore and Aveling was
freely drawn upon with slight modifications here and there.
About the only liberty taken with Marx’s terminology has been in
the case of the word “bürgerlich.” Marx speaks here of “bürgerliche
Produktion” and “bürgerlicher Reichthum” and “bürgerliche Arbeit” where
eight years later he used in corresponding passages in Capital the word
“kapitalistische.” As the English speaking reader is more accustomed to
hear of the “capitalist” system of production than of the “bourgeois”
system of production, etc., the translator considered Marx’s own change
of this term within a few years from the publication of “Zur Kritik”
a sufficient justification for rendering the word “bürgerlich” into
“capitalistic” wherever it seemed more likely to carry the meaning home
to the reader.
In view of the fact that the work is likely to be read in wide circles
it was thought desirable to translate the numerous quotations from
Italian, Greek, Latin and French writers, the translation being given
side by side with the original quotation. All English citations given
by Marx in German have been restored from the original sources, which
necessitated the use of four libraries, the Astor and the Columbia
University libraries in New York, the Congressional Library in
Washington, and the private library of Professor Seligman to whose
kindness the translator is indebted for the permission to use rare
works of the seventeenth century quoted by Marx. Several of Marx’s
references to the pages of the books quoted by him have been found to
be wrong and therefore differ here from those given in the original.
In two or three cases where the original English citations could not
be found they were retranslated from German with the quotation marks
omitted.
This statement would be incomplete if the translator failed to mention
the helpful participation in this work by his wife whose share in the
translation is equal to his own.
New York, October, 1903.
AUTHOR’S PREFACE.
I consider the system of bourgeois economy in the following order:
_Capital_, _landed property_, _wage labor_; _state_, _foreign trade_,
_world market_. Under the first three heads I examine the conditions
of the economic existence of the three great classes, which make up
modern bourgeois society; the connection of the three remaining heads
is self evident. The first part of the first book, treating of capital,
consists of the following chapters: 1. Commodity; 2. Money, or simple
circulation; 3. Capital in general. The first two chapters form the
contents of the present work. The entire material lies before me in the
form of monographs, written at long intervals not for publication, but
for the purpose of clearing up those questions to myself, and their
systematic elaboration on the plan outlined above will depend upon
circumstances.
I omit a general introduction which I had prepared, as on second
thought any anticipation of results that are still to be proven, seemed
to me objectionable, and the reader who wishes to follow me at all,
must make up his mind to pass from the special to the general. On the
other hand, some remarks as to the course of my own politico-economic
studies may be in place here.
The subject of my professional studies was jurisprudence, which I
pursued, however, in connection with and as secondary to the studies
of philosophy and history. In 1842-43, as editor of the “Rheinische
Zeitung,” I found myself embarrassed at first when I had to take part
in discussions concerning so-called material interests. The proceedings
of the Rhine Diet in connection with forest thefts and the extreme
subdivision of landed property; the official controversy about the
condition of the Mosel peasants into which Herr von Schaper, at that
time president of the Rhine Province, entered with the “Rheinische
Zeitung;” finally, the debates on free trade and protection, gave
me the first impulse to take up the study of economic questions. At
the same time a weak, quasi-philosophic echo of French socialism and
communism made itself heard in the “Rheinische Zeitung” in those days
when the good intentions “to go ahead” greatly outweighed knowledge of
facts. I declared myself against such botching, but had to admit at
once in a controversy with the “Allgemeine Augsburger Zeitung” that my
previous studies did not allow me to hazard an independent judgment as
to the merits of the French schools. When, therefore, the publishers
of the “Rheinische Zeitung” conceived the illusion that by a less
aggressive policy the paper could be saved from the death sentence
pronounced upon it, I was glad to grasp that opportunity to retire to
my study room from public life.
The first work undertaken for the solution of the question that
troubled me, was a critical revision of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Law”;
the introduction to that work appeared in the “Deutsch-Französische
Jahrbücher,” published in Paris in 1844. I was led by my studies to
the conclusion that legal relations as well as forms of state could
neither be understood by themselves, nor explained by the so-called
general progress of the human mind, but that they are rooted in the
material conditions of life, which are summed up by Hegel after the
fashion of the English and French of the eighteenth century under
the name “civic society;” the anatomy of that civic society is to
be sought in political economy. The study of the latter which I had
taken up in Paris, I continued at Brussels whither I emigrated on
account of an order of expulsion issued by Mr. Guizot. The general
conclusion at which I arrived and which, once reached, continued to
serve as the leading thread in my studies, may be briefly summed up as
follows: In the social production which men carry on they enter into
definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their
will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage
of development of their material powers of production. The sum total
of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure
of society―the real foundation, on which rise legal and political
superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social
consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the
general character of the social, political and spiritual processes
of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their
existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines
their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the
material forces of production in society come in conflict with the
existing relations of production, or―what is but a legal expression
for the same thing―with the property relations within which they
had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces
of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes
the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic
foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly
transformed. In considering such transformations the distinction should
always be made between the material transformation of the economic
conditions of production which can be determined with the precision
of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or
philosophic―in short ideological forms in which men become conscious of
this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual
is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such
a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary,
this consciousness must rather be explained from the contradictions of
material life, from the existing conflict between the social forces
of production and the relations of production. No social order ever
disappears before all the productive forces, for which there is room
in it, have been developed; and new higher relations of production
never appear before the material conditions of their existence have
matured in the womb of the old society. Therefore, mankind always
takes up only such problems as it can solve; since, looking at the
matter more closely, we will always find that the problem itself
arises only when the material conditions necessary for its solution
already exist or are at least in the process of formation. In broad
outlines we can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and
the modern bourgeois methods of production as so many epochs in the
progress of the economic formation of society. The bourgeois relations
of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of
production―antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but
of one arising from conditions surrounding the life of individuals in
society; at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb
of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution
of that antagonism. This social formation constitutes, therefore, the
closing chapter of the prehistoric stage of human society.
Frederick Engels, with whom I was continually corresponding and
exchanging ideas since the appearance of his ingenious critical essay
on economic categories (in the “Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher”),
came by a different road to the same conclusions as myself (see his
“Condition of the Working Classes in England”). When he, too, settled
in Brussels in the spring of 1845, we decided to work out together the
contrast between our view and the idealism of the German philosophy, in
fact to settle our accounts with our former philosophic conscience. The
plan was carried out in the form of a criticism of the post-Hegelian
philosophy. The manuscript in two solid octavo volumes had long
reached the publisher in Westphalia, when we received information
that conditions had so changed as not to allow of its publication. We
abandoned the manuscript to the stinging criticism of the mice the
more readily since we had accomplished our main purpose―the clearing
up of the question to ourselves. Of the scattered writings on various
subjects in which we presented our views to the public at that time, I
recall only the “Manifesto of the Communist Party” written by Engels
and myself, and the “Discourse on Free Trade” written by myself. The
leading points of our theory were first presented scientifically,
though in a polemic form, in my “Misère de la Philosophie, etc.”
directed against Proudhon and published in 1847. An essay on “Wage
Labor,” written by me in German, and in which I put together my
lectures on the subject delivered before the German Workmen’s Club at
Brussels, was prevented from leaving the hands of the printer by the
February revolution and my expulsion from Belgium which followed it as
a consequence.
The publication of the “Neue Rheinische Zeitung” in 1848 and 1849, and
the events which took place later on, interrupted my economic studies
which I could not resume before 1850 in London. The enormous material
on the history of political economy which is accumulated in the British
Museum; the favorable view which London offers for the observation of
bourgeois society; finally, the new stage of development upon which the
latter seemed to have entered with the discovery of gold in California
and Australia, led me to the decision to resume my studies from the
very beginning and work up critically the new material. These studies
partly led to what might seem side questions, over which I nevertheless
had to stop for longer or shorter periods of time. Especially was the
time at my disposal cut down by the imperative necessity of working
for a living. My work as contributor on the leading Anglo-American
newspaper, the “New York Tribune,” at which I have now been engaged for
eight years, has caused very great interruption in my studies, since
I engage in newspaper work proper only occasionally. Yet articles on
important economic events in England and on the continent have formed
so large a part of my contributions that I have been obliged to make
myself familiar with practical details which lie outside the proper
sphere of political economy.
This account of the course of my studies in political economy is simply
to prove that my views, whatever one may think of them, and no matter
how little they agree with the interested prejudices of the ruling
classes, are the result of many years of conscientious research. At the
entrance to science, however, the same requirement must be put as at
the entrance to hell:
Qui si convien lasciare ogni sospetto
Ogni viltà convien che qui sia morta.
Karl Marx.
London, January, 1859.
CONTENTS.
PAGE.
Translator’s Preface 3
Author’s Preface 9
BOOK I. CAPITAL IN GENERAL.
Chapter I. Commodities 19
A. Notes on the History of the Theory of Value 56
Chapter II. Money or Simple Circulation 73
1. The Measure of Value 74
B. Theories of the Unit of Measure of Money 91
2. The Medium of Circulation 107
a. The Metamorphosis of Commodities 108
b. The Circulation of Money 125
c. Coin and Symbols of Value 138
3. Money 162
a. Hoarding 166
b. Means of Payment 185
c. World Money 201
4. The Precious Metals 208
C. Theories of the Medium of Circulation and of
Money 215
Appendix. Introduction to the Critique of Political
Economy 264
1. Production in General 265
2. The General Relation of Production to Distribution,
Exchange, and Consumption 274
3. The Method of Political Economy 292
4. Production, Means of Production, and Conditions
of Production 306
Index 313
CAPITAL IN GENERAL.
BOOK I.
CHAPTER I.
COMMODITIES.
At first sight the wealth of society under the capitalist system
presents itself as an immense accumulation of commodities, its unit
being a single commodity. But every commodity has a twofold aspect,
that of _use value_ and _exchange value_.[2]
A commodity is first of all, in the language of English economists,
“any thing necessary, useful or pleasant in life,” an object of human
wants, a means of existence in the broadest sense of the word. This
property of commodities to serve as use-values coincides with their
natural palpable existence. Wheat e. g. is a distinct use-value
differing from the use-values cotton, glass, paper, etc. Use-value has
a value only in use and is realized only in the process of consumption.
The same use-value may be utilized in various ways. But the extent of
its possible applications is circumscribed by its distinct properties.
Furthermore, it is thus limited not only qualitatively but also
quantitatively. According to their natural properties the various
use-values have different measures, such as a bushel of wheat, a quire
of paper, a yard of linen, etc.
Whatever the social form of wealth may be, use-values always have a
substance of their own, independent of that form. One can not tell by
the taste of wheat whether it has been raised by a Russian serf, a
French peasant, or an English capitalist. Although the object of social
wants and, therefore, mutually connected in society, use-values do
not bear any marks of the relations of social production. Suppose, we
have a commodity whose use-value is that of a diamond. We can not tell
by looking at the diamond that it is a commodity. When it serves as a
use-value, aesthetic or mechanical, on the breast of a harlot, or in
the hand of a glasscutter, it is a diamond and not a commodity. It is
the necessary prerequisite of a commodity to be a use-value, but it is
immaterial to the use-value whether it is a commodity or not. Use-value
in this indifference to the nature of its economic destination, i. e.
use-value as such lies outside the sphere of investigation of political
economy.[3] It falls within the sphere of the latter only in so far
as it forms its own economic destination. It forms the material basis
which directly underlies a definite economic relation called _exchange
value_.
Exchange-value appears at first sight as a _quantitative relation_,
as a proportion in which use-values are exchanged for one another. In
such a relation they constitute equal exchangeable quantities. Thus,
a volume of Propercius and eight ounces of snuff may represent the
same exchange value, in spite of the dissimilar use-values of tobacco
and elegy. As exchange-value, one kind of use-value is worth as much
as another kind, if only taken in right proportion. The exchange
value of a palace can be expressed in a certain number of boxes of
shoe-blacking. On the contrary, London manufacturers of shoe-blacking
have expressed the exchange value of their many boxes of blacking,
in palaces. Thus, entirely apart from their natural forms and
without regard to the specific kind of wants for which they serve as
use-values, commodities in certain quantities equal each other, take
each other’s place in exchange, pass as equivalents, and in spite of
their variegated appearance, represent the same entity.
Use-values are primarily means of existence. These means of existence,
however, are themselves products of social life, the result of expended
human vital power, _materialized labor_. As the embodiment of social
labor, all commodities are the crystallization of the same substance.
Let us now consider the nature of this substance, i. e., of labor,
which is expressed in exchange value.
Let one ounce of gold, one ton of iron, one quarter of wheat and
twenty yards of silk represent equal exchange values. As equivalents,
in which the qualitative difference between their use-values has been
eliminated, they represent equal volumes of the same kind of labor.
The labor which is equally embodied in all of them must be uniform,
homogeneous, simple labor. It matters as little in the case of labor
whether it be embodied in gold, iron, wheat, or silk, as it does in
the case of oxygen, whether it appears in the rust of iron, in the
atmosphere, in the juice of a grape, or in the blood of a human being.
But the digging of gold, the extraction of iron from a mine, the
raising of wheat and the weaving of silk are so many kinds of labor,
differing in quality. As a matter of fact, what in reality appears as a
difference in use-values, is in the process of production, a difference
in the work creating those use-values. Just as labor, which creates
exchange value, is indifferent to the material of use-values, so it
is to the special form of labor itself. Furthermore, the different
use-values are the products of the work of different individuals,
consequently the result of various kinds of labor differing
individually from one another. But as exchange values, they represent
the same homogeneous labor, i. e., labor from which the individuality
of the workers is eliminated. Labor creating exchange value is,
therefore, _abstract general labor_.
If one ounce of gold, one ton of iron, one quarter of wheat, and twenty
yards of silk are exchange values of equal magnitude or equivalents;
then one ounce of gold, half a ton of iron, three bushels of wheat
and five yards of silk are exchange values of different magnitudes,
and this quantitative difference is the only difference of which
they are capable as exchange values. As exchange values of different
magnitudes, they represent greater or smaller quantities of that
simple, homogeneous, abstract, general labor, which forms the substance
of exchange value. The question arises, how are these quantities to be
measured? Or, rather what constitutes the substance of labor, which
makes it capable of quantitative measurement, since the quantitative
differences of commodities in their capacity of exchange values are
but quantitative differences of labor embodied in them. Just as motion
is measured by time, so is labor measured by _labor-time_. Given
the quality of labor, the difference in its duration is the only
property by which it can be distinguished. As labor-time, labor has
the same standard of measurement as the natural time measures, viz.,
hours, days, weeks, etc. Labor-time is the vital substance of labor,
independent of its form, composition, individuality; it is its vital
substance quantitatively, having at the same time its own inherent
measure. Labor-time embodied in the use-values of commodities is the
substance which makes exchange values and, therefore, commodities of
them and at the same time serves to measure definite quantities of
their value. Corresponding quantities of different use-values, in which
the same quantity of labor-time is embodied, are equivalents; or, to
put it in another form, all use-values are equivalents when taken in
proportions containing the same quantity of expended, materialized
labor-time. As exchange values, all commodities are but definite
measures of _congealed labor-time_.
To understand how exchange value is determined by labor-time, the
following main points must be kept in mind: The reduction of labor to
simple labor, devoid of any quality, so to speak; the specific ways
and means by which exchange―value-creating, i. e., commodity producing
labor becomes _social labor_; finally, the difference between labor as
the producer of use-values, and labor as the creator of exchange values.
In order to measure commodities by the labor-time contained in them,
the different kinds of labor must be reduced to uniform, homogeneous,
simple labor, in short, to labor which is qualitatively the same, and,
therefore, differs only in quantity.
This reduction appears to be an abstraction; but it is an abstraction
which takes place daily in the social process of production. The
conversion of all commodities into labor-time is no greater abstraction
nor a less real process than the chemical reduction of all organic
bodies to air. Labor, thus measured by time, does not appear in reality
as the labor of different individuals. but on the contrary, the
various working individuals rather appear as mere organs of labor; or,
in so far as labor is represented by exchange values, it may be defined
as human labor in general. This abstraction of human labor in general
virtually exists in the average labor which the average individual
of a given society can perform―a certain productive expenditure of
human muscles, nerves, brain, etc. It is unskilled labor to which the
average individual can be put and which he has to perform in one way
or another. The character of this average labor varies in different
countries and at different stages of civilization, but appears fixed in
a particular society. Unskilled labor constitutes the bulk of all labor
performed in capitalist society, as may be seen from all statistics.
It is obvious that if A spends six hours in the production of iron
and six hours on linen, and B also produces iron during six hours and
linen during another six hours, it is but a different application
of _the same_ labor time that would be expended, if A produced iron
during twelve hours, while B worked twelve hours on linen. But how
about skilled labor which rises above the level of average labor by its
higher intensity, by its greater specific gravity? This kind of labor
resolves itself into unskilled labor composing it; it is simple labor
of a higher intensity, so that one day of skilled labor, e. g., may
equal three days of unskilled labor. This is not the place to consider
the laws regulating this reduction. It is clear, however, that such
reduction does take place, for, as exchange value, the product of the
most skilled labor is, when taken in a certain proportion, equivalent
to the product of unskilled average labor, or equal to a definite
quantity of that unskilled labor.
The determination of exchange-value by means of labor-time implies,
further, the fact that an equal quantity of labor is embodied in any
given commodity, e. g., a ton of iron, no matter whether it is the work
of A or B, that is to say, various individuals expend an equal amount
of labor-time for the production of the same use-value of a given
quality and quantity. It is thus assumed that the labor-time contained
in a commodity is the labor-time _necessary_ for its production, i. e.,
it is the labor-time which is required for the production of another
specimen of the same commodity under the same general conditions of
production.
The conditions of labor, which creates exchange value, as shown by the
analysis of the latter, are _social conditions_ of labor or conditions
of _social labor_. Social, not in the ordinary, but in a special
sense. It is a specific form of the social process. The homogeneous
simplicity of labor means first of all _equality_ of the labors of
various individuals, a reciprocal relation of equality of their labors
determined by the actual reduction of all kinds of labor to uniform
labor. The labor of every individual, as far as it is expressed in
exchange value possesses this social character of equality and finds
expression in exchange value only in so far as it is a relation of
equality with the labor of all other individuals.
Furthermore, the labor-time of a single individual is directly
expressed in exchange value as _universal labor-time_, and this
_universal character_ of individual labor is the manifestation of its
_social character_. The labor-time represented by exchange value is the
labor-time of an individual, but of an individual undistinguished from
other individuals in so far as they perform the same labor; therefore,
the time required by one individual for the production of a certain
commodity is the _necessary_ labor-time which any other individual
would have to spend on the production of the same commodity. It is the
labor-time of an individual, _his_ labor-time, but only as labor-time
common to all, regardless as to which particular individual’s
labor-time it is. As universal labor-time it is represented in a
universal product, in a _universal equivalent_, in a definite quantity
of materialized labor-time: the latter is indifferent as to the
particular form of use-value in which it appears directly as the
product of an individual, and may be turned at will into any other
form of use-value to represent the product of any other individual.
Only as such a _universal_ quantity, is it a _social_ quantity. In
order to result in exchange value, the labor of an individual must
be turned into a _universal equivalent_, i. e., the labor-time of an
individual must be expressed as universal labor-time, or universal
labor-time as that of an individual. It is the same as though different
individuals had put together their labor-time and contributed the
different quantities of labor-time at their common disposal in the form
of different use-values. The labor-time of the individual is thus,
in fact, the labor time which society requires for the production of
a certain use-value, i. e., for the satisfaction of a certain want.
But the question that interests us here is as to the specific form in
which labor acquires a social character. Let us suppose that a certain
quantity of labor-time of a spinner is realized in 100 lbs. of yarn.
Suppose 100 yards of linen, the product of the weaver, represent the
same quantity of labor-time. Inasmuch as these two products represent
equal quantities of universal labor-time and, hence, are equivalents of
_every_ use-value which contains the same amount of labor-time, they
are also equivalent to each other. Only because the labor-time of the
spinner and that of the weaver take the form of universal labor-time
and their products appear as universal equivalents, is the labor of
the weaver realized for the spinner, and that of the spinner, for the
weaver, the labor of one takes the place of the labor of the other, i.
e., the social character of their labors is realized for both. Quite
different it was under the patriarchal system of production, when
spinner and weaver lived under the same roof, when the female members
of the family did the spinning, and the male members did the weaving to
supply the wants of their own family; then yarn and linen were _social_
products, spinning and weaving were _social_ labor within the limits of
the family. But their social character did not manifest itself in the
fact that yarn, as a universal equivalent, could be exchanged for linen
as a universal equivalent, or that one was exchanged for another, as
identical and equivalent expressions of the same universal labor-time.
It was rather the family organization with its natural division of
labor that impressed its peculiar social stamp on the product of
labor. Or, let us take the services and payments in kind of the Middle
Ages. It was the specific kind of labor performed by each individual in
its natural form, the particular and not the universal aspect of labor,
that constituted then the social tie. Or, let us finally take labor
carried on in common in its primitive natural form, as we find it at
the dawn of history of all civilized races.[4] It is clear that in this
case labor does not acquire its social character from the fact that the
labor of the individual takes on the abstract form of universal labor
or that his product assumes the form of a universal equivalent. The
very nature of production under a communal system makes it impossible
for the labor of the individual to be private labor and his product
to be a private product; on the contrary, it makes individual labor
appear as the direct function of a member of a social organism. On the
contrary, labor, which is expressed in exchange value, at once appears
as the labor of a separate individual. It becomes social labor only
by taking on the form of its direct opposite, the form of abstract
universal labor.
Labor, which creates exchange value, is, finally, characterized by the
fact that even the social relations of men appear in the reversed form
of a social relation of things. Only in so far as two use-values are
in a mutual relation of exchange values does the labor of different
persons possess the common property of being identical universal labor.
Hence, if it be correct to say that exchange value is a relation
between persons,[5] it must be added that it is a relation disguised
under a material cover. Just as a pound of iron and a pound of gold
represent the _same_ weight in spite of their different physical and
chemical properties, so do two use-values, as commodities containing
the same quantity of labor-time, represent the _same exchange value_.
Exchange value thus appears as the natural social destination of
use-values, a property which they possess by virtue of being things and
in consequence of which they are exchanged for one another in definite
proportions, or form equivalents, just as chemical elements combine in
certain proportions, forming chemical equivalents. It is only through
the habit of everyday life that we come to think it perfectly plain and
commonplace, that a social relation of production should take on the
form of a thing, so that the relation of persons in their work appears
in the form of a mutual relation between things, and between things
and persons.
In commodities this mystification is as yet very simple. It is more
or less plain to everybody that a relation of commodities as exchange
values is nothing but a mutual relation between persons in their
productive activity. This semblance of simplicity disappears in higher
productive relations. All the illusions in regard to the monetary
system are due to the fact that money is not regarded as something
representing a social relation of production, but as a product of
nature endowed with certain properties. The modern economists who sneer
at the illusions of the monetary system, betray the same illusion
as soon as they have to deal with higher economic forms, as, e. g.,
capital.[6] It breaks forth in their confession of naive surprise, when
what they have just thought to have defined with great difficulty as a
thing suddenly appears as a social relation and then reappears to tease
them again as a thing, before they have barely managed to define it as
a social relation.
Since the exchange value of commodities is, in fact, nothing but a
mutual relation of the labors of individuals―labors which are similar
and universal―nothing but a material expression of a specific social
form of labor, it is a tautology to say that labor is the _only_
source of exchange value and consequently of wealth, in so far as the
latter consists of exchange values. Similarly, it is a tautology to
say that matter in its natural state has no exchange value, because
it does not contain any labor, and that exchange value as such does
not contain matter. But when William Petty calls “labor the father and
earth the mother of wealth,” or when Bishop Berkeley asks “whether
the four elements and man’s labour therein, be not the true source of
wealth,”[7] or when the American, Thomas Cooper puts it popularly:
“Take away from a piece of bread the labour bestowed by the baker on
the flour, by the miller on the grain brought to him, by the farmer
in ploughing, sowing, tending, gathering, threshing, cleaning and
transporting the seed, and what will remain? A few grains of grass,
growing wild in the woods, and unfit for any human purpose”[8]―then all
these views do not refer to abstract labor as the source of exchange
value, but to concrete labor as the source of material wealth; in
short, to labor in so far as it produces use-values. In assuming
that a commodity has use-value we assume the special usefulness
and distinct fitness of the labor absorbed by it, but that is all
there is to the view of labor as useful labor from the standpoint of
commodity. Considering bread as a use-value, we are interested in its
properties as an article of food and not at all in the different kinds
of labor of the farmer, miller, baker, etc. If by some invention
nineteen-twentieths of this labor could be saved, the loaf of bread
would still render the same service as before. If it fell ready-made
from the sky it would not lose a single atom of its use-value. While
labor which creates exchange value is realized in the equality of
commodities as universal equivalents, labor as a productive activity
with a useful purpose is realized in the endless variety of use-values
created by it. While labor which creates exchange values is _abstract_,
_universal_ and _homogeneous_, labor which produces use-values is
concrete and special and is made up of an endless variety of kinds of
labor according to the way in which and the material to which it is
applied.
It is wrong to speak of labor in so far as it is applied to the
production of use-values as of _the only_ source of wealth, namely,
the material wealth produced by it. Being an activity intended to
adapt materials to this or that purpose, it requires matter as a
prerequisite. In different use-values the proportion between labor
and raw material varies greatly, but use-value always has a natural
substratum. Labor, as an activity, directed to the adaptation of raw
material in one form or another, is a natural condition of human
existence, a condition of exchange of matter between man and nature,
independent of all social forms. On the contrary, labor producing
exchange value is a specifically social form of labor. Tailoring, e.
g., in its material manifestation as a distinct productive activity,
produces a coat, but not the exchange value of the coat. The latter
is produced not by the labor of the tailor as such, but by abstract
universal labor, and that belongs to a certain organization of society
which has not been brought about by the tailor. Thus, the women under
the ancient system of house industry made coats without producing the
exchange value of the coats. Labor as a source of material wealth was
known to Moses, the legislator, as well as to Adam Smith, the customs
official.[9]
Let us consider now some propositions which follow from the
determination of exchange value by labor-time.
As a use-value, every commodity owes its usefulness to itself. Wheat,
e. g., serves as an article of food. A machine saves labor to a certain
extent. This function of a commodity by virtue of which it serves only
as use-value, as an article of consumption, may be called its service,
the service which it renders as use-value. But as an exchange value,
a commodity is always regarded as a result; the question in this case
is not as to the service which it renders, but as to the service[10]
which it has been rendered in its production. Thus, the exchange value
of a machine is determined not by the quantity of labor-time which it
saves, but by the quantity of labor-time which has been expended on
its own production and which is, therefore, required to produce a new
machine of the same kind.
If, therefore, the quantity of labor-time required for the production
of commodities remained constant, their exchange value would remain
the same. But the ease and the difficulty of production are constantly
changing. If the productivity of labor increases, the same use-value
will be produced in less time. If the productivity of labor declines,
more time will be required for the production of the same use-value.
Thus, the labor-time contained in a commodity or its exchange-value is
a variable quantity, increasing or diminishing in an inverse ratio to
the rise and fall of the productivity of labor. The productive power of
labor which is applied in the manufacturing industry on a predetermined
scale depends in the agricultural and extractive industries also on
natural conditions which are beyond human control. _The same labor_
will yield a greater or less output of various metals, according to
their more or less close occurrence in the earth’s crust. _The same
labor_ may be embodied in two bushels of wheat in a favorable season,
and only in one in an unfavorable season. In this case, scarcity or
abundance, as natural conditions, seem to determine the exchange value
of commodities, because they determine the productivity of certain
kinds of labor which depend upon natural conditions.
Unequal volumes of different use-value contain the same quantity of
labor-time or the same exchange value. The smaller the volume of a
use-value containing a certain quantity of labor-time as compared with
other use-values, the greater its _specific exchange-value_. If we find
that certain use-values, such as, e. g., gold, silver, copper and iron,
or wheat, rye, barley and oats, form a series of specific exchange
values which, though not retaining exactly the same numerical ratio,
still retain through widely remote epochs of civilization the same
rough proportion of relatively larger and smaller quantities, we may
draw the conclusion that the progressive development of the productive
powers of society has equally, or approximately so, affected the
labor-time necessary for the production of the various commodities.
The exchange value of a commodity is not revealed in its own use-value.
But, as the embodiment universal social labor-time, the use-value
of one commodity bears a certain ratio to the use-values of other
commodities. Thus, the exchange value of one commodity is manifested
in the use-values of other commodities. An equivalent is, in fact, the
exchange value of one commodity expressed in the use-value of another
commodity. If I say, e. g., that one yard of linen is worth two pounds
of coffee, then the exchange value of linen is expressed in terms of
the use-value of coffee, viz., in a certain quantity of that use-value.
This ratio being given, I can express the value of any quantity of
linen in coffee. It is clear that the exchange value of one commodity,
say linen, is not confined to the ratio of any one commodity, e. g.
coffee, as its equivalent. The quantity of universal labor-time which
is represented in one yard of linen is at the same time embodied in
an endless variety of volumes of use-values of all other commodities.
The use-value of any other commodity forms the equivalent of one yard
of linen, in the proportion in which it represents the same quantity of
labor-time as that yard of linen. The exchange value of _this single
commodity_ is, therefore, fully expressed in the endless number of
equations in which the use-values of all other commodities form its
equivalents. Not until the exchange value of a commodity is expressed
in the sum total of these equations or of the different proportions in
which one commodity is exchanged for every other commodity, does it
find an exhaustive expression as a _universal equivalent_; e. g., the
series of equations:
1 yard of linen = 1/2 lb. of tea,
1 yard of linen = 2 lbs. of coffee,
1 yard of linen = 8 lbs. of bread,
1 yard of linen = 6 yards of calico,
may be represented as follows:
1 yard of linen = 1/8 lb. of tea + 1/2 lb. of coffee + 2 lbs. of bread
+ 1-1/2 yards of calico.
Therefore, if we had before us the sum total of the equations, in
which the value of a yard of linen is exhaustively expressed, we could
represent its exchange value in the form of a series. As a matter of
fact, the series is an endless one, since the circle of commodities,
constantly expanding, can never be closed up. But while the exchange
value of one commodity is thus measured by the use-values of all other
commodities, the exchange values of all the other commodities are, in
their turn, measured by the use-value of this one commodity.[11]
If the exchange value of one yard of linen is expressed in 1/2 lb. of
tea, or 2 lbs. of coffee, or 6 yards of calico, or 8 lbs. of bread,
etc., it follows that coffee, tea, calico, bread, etc., are equal to
each other if taken in the same proportion in which they are equal to
the third article, linen; consequently, linen serves as the common
measure of their exchange values. Every commodity, as the embodiment
of universal labor-time, i. e., as a certain quantity of universal
labor-time, expresses in turn its exchange value in definite quantities
of the use-values of all other commodities, and the exchange values
of all the other commodities are, on the other hand, measured by the
use-value of this one exclusive commodity. But as an exchange value,
every commodity is at the same time the one exclusive commodity
that serves as a common measure of the exchange values of all other
commodities; and, on the other hand, it is but one of the many
commodities in the entire series of which every commodity expresses
directly its exchange value.
The value of a commodity is not affected by the number of commodities
of other kinds. But the length of the series of equations in which
its exchange value is realized does depend upon the greater or less
variety of other commodities. The series of equations in which the
value of coffee, e. g., is represented, indicates the extent to which
it is exchangeable, the limits within which it performs the function of
an exchange value. The exchange value of a commodity as an embodiment
of universal social labor-time is expressed in its equivalence to an
endless variety of use-values.
We have seen that the exchange value of a commodity varies with the
quantity of labor-time directly contained in it. Its realized exchange
value, i. e., its exchange value expressed in the use-values of other
commodities, must also depend on the proportion in which the labor-time
spent on the production of all other commodities is changing. If, e.
g., the labor-time required for the production of a bushel of wheat
remained constant, while that required for the production of all other
commodities doubled, the exchange value of a bushel of wheat expressed
in its equivalents would become half as large as before. The result
would be practically the same as if the amount of time necessary for
the production of one bushel of wheat had been reduced by one-half,
and that required for all other commodities had remained unchanged.
The value of commodities is determined by the proportion in which they
can be produced in the same labor-time. In order to see what possible
changes this proportion may undergo, let us take two commodities, A and
B.
_First case._ Let the labor-time required for the production of
commodity B remain unchanged. In that case the exchange value of A,
expressed in terms of B, rises and falls with the rise and fall of the
labor-time required for the production of A.
_Second case._ Let the labor-time required for the production of
commodity A remain constant. Then the exchange value of A, expressed in
terms of B, falls and rises in an inverse ratio with the rise and fall
of the labor-time required for the production of B.
_Third case._ Let the labor-time required for the production of
commodities A and B rise and fall in equal proportion. Then the
expression of equivalence of A and B remains unchanged. If through some
cause the productivity of all kinds of labor were to decline uniformly,
so that the production of all commodities would require an equally
increased quantity of labor-time, then the value of all commodities
would rise, though the expression of their exchange values would remain
unchanged, and the actual wealth of society would decrease, because
it would have to expend more labor-time on the production of the same
stock of use-values.
_Fourth case._ Let the labor-time required for the production of A and
B rise and fall, but not uniformly; that is to say, the labor-time
required for the production of A may rise, while that required for B
may fall, or vice versa. All of which can be reduced to the simple
case where the labor-time required for the production of one commodity
remains unchanged, while that required for the other rises or falls.
The exchange value of any commodity is expressed in the use-value of
any other commodity, be it in integral units or in fractions thereof.
As exchange value, every commodity is capable of subdivision, like
the labor-time embodied in it. The equivalence of commodities is
independent of their physical divisibility as use-values, just as the
sum of the exchange values of commodities is indifferent to the change
of form which use-values have to undergo when converted into a _single_
new commodity.
So far we have considered commodities from a twofold point of view,
as use-values and exchange values alternately. But a commodity as such
is a direct combination of use-value and exchange value; and it is a
commodity only in relation to other commodities. The _actual_ relation
between commodities constitutes the _process of their exchange_. It is
a social process participated in by individuals independent of each
other but the part they take in it is that of owners of commodities
only. Their mutual relations are those of their commodities, and thus
they really appear as conscious factors of the process of exchange.
A commodity _is_ a use-value, wheat, linen, a diamond, a machine,
etc., but as a commodity it is, at the same time, _not_ a use-value.
If it were a use-value for its owner, i. e., a direct means for the
satisfaction of his own wants, then it would not be a commodity. To him
it is rather _a non-use-value_; it is merely the material depository of
exchange-value, or simply a _means of exchange_; as an active bearer of
exchange value, use-value becomes a means of exchange. To the owner it
is a use-value only in so far as it constitutes exchange value.[12]
It has yet _to become_ a use-value, viz., to others. Not being a
use-value to its owner, it is a use-value to the owners of other
commodities. If it is not, then the labor expended on it was useless
labor, and the result of that labor is not a commodity. On the other
hand, the commodity must become a use-value _to the owner himself_,
because his means of existence lie outside of it in the use-values of
commodities not belonging to him. In order to become a use-value, the
commodity must meet the particular want of which it is the means of
satisfaction. Use-values of commodities are thus _realized_ use-values
through a universal change of hands by passing from the hands in which
they were held as means of exchange into those where they become use
values. Only through this universal transfer of commodities does the
labor contained in them become useful labor. In this process of their
mutual interchange as use-values, commodities do not acquire any new
economic forms. On the contrary, even the form which marked them as
commodities disappears. Bread, e. g., by changing hands from the baker
to the consumer does not change its identity as bread. On the contrary,
it is only the consumer that begins to regard it as a use-value, as a
certain article of food, while in the hands of the baker it was only
the bearer of an economic relation, a palpable yet transcendental
object. Thus, the only change of form that commodities undergo while
becoming use-values, consists in the fact that they cease to be, as
a matter of form, non-use-values to their owners, and use-values to
those who do not own them. To become use-values commodities must be
universally alienated; they must enter the sphere of exchange; but
they are subject to exchange in their capacity of exchange values.
Hence, in order to be realized as use-values, they must be realized as
exchange values.
While the single commodity appeared from the standpoint of use-value as
something independent, as exchange value it was regarded first of all
in its relation to all other commodities. This relation was, however,
merely theoretical, imaginary. It becomes real only in the process of
exchange. On the other hand, a commodity _is_ an exchange value in so
far as a certain quantity of labor-time has been expended on it, and
it consequently represents _materialized labor-time_. But of itself it
is only materialized individual labor-time of a particular kind, and
not _universal_ labor-time. Therefore, it _is not_ directly an exchange
value, but must first _become_ such. First of all, it is an embodiment