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-What kinds of properties matter most in categorization? And does the way in which properties are attributed, either in generic (e.g., ``Bees are striped'') or specific (e.g., ``This bee is striped'') statements, matter in categorization. A great deal of research indicates that generic statements are especially important in that they promote generalization, create stronger links between properties and categories, and suggest that properties are causally central to categories. This has been taken to suggest that generics might serve as a central vehicle by which essentialist beliefs --- beliefs that category members share some true, underlying nature which makes them what they are and is responsible for similarities among category members --- are transmitted. But in most work investigating the effects that generics have on categorization, a mix of different property types are used. And the type of property might end up playing an important role in categorization. Our main question then is whether some property types might matter more in categorization when being attributed to things in generic and specific statement. To test this, we utilized classic tests of essentialist thinking --- transformation, induction and offspring tasks -- and focused on biological, behavioral, social and teleological properties in categorizing novel animals. In Experiment~1, participants categorized properties as being either behavioral, biological, social, or teleological. In Experiment~2, we used the top four properties from each group to describe a generic noun or a specific individual. Utilizing a transformation tasks, participants then categorized creatures that had one of their properties transformed. We found that changes to teleological properties had the strongest impact on categorization judgments. Whether the statement was generic or specific made no difference. In Experiment~3, which involved an induction task, we also found that teleological properties mattered more and that whether the statement was generic or specific didn't make a difference in people's categorization judgments. In our final experiment, Experiment~4, we used an offspring task and found that teleological properties mattered more in categorizing offspring. And here we found that generic statements mattered more than specific ones in people's categorization judgments. Our findings add to work suggesting that generics may not specifically promote essentialism. But they do suggest that the type of property might matter in essentializing. Indeed, we suggest that teleological properties might play this privileged role in categorization because they are treated as essential properties.
+What kinds of properties matter most in categorization? And does the way in which properties are attributed, either in generic (e.g., ``Bees are striped'') or specific (e.g., ``This bee is striped'') statements, matter in categorization. A great deal of research indicates that generic statements are especially important in that they promote generalization, create stronger links between properties and categories, and suggest that properties are causally central to categories. This has been taken to suggest that generics might serve as a central vehicle by which essentialist beliefs --- beliefs that category members share some true, underlying nature which makes them what they are and is responsible for similarities among category members --- are transmitted. But in most work investigating the effects that generics have on categorization, a mix of different property types are used. And the type of property might end up playing an important role in categorization. Our main question then is whether some property types might matter more in categorization when being attributed to things in generic and specific statement. To test this, we utilized classic tests of essentialist thinking --- transformation, induction and offspring tasks -- and focused on biological, behavioral, social and teleological properties in categorizing novel animals. In Experiment 1, participants categorized properties as being either behavioral, biological, social, or teleological. In Experiment 2, we used the top four properties from each group to describe a generic noun or a specific individual. Utilizing a transformation tasks, participants then categorized creatures that had one of their properties transformed. We found that changes to teleological properties had the strongest impact on categorization judgments. Whether the statement was generic or specific made no difference. In Experiment 3, which involved an induction task, we also found that teleological properties mattered more and that whether the statement was generic or specific didn't make a difference in people's categorization judgments. In our final experiment, Experiment 4, we used an offspring task and found that teleological properties mattered more in categorizing offspring. And here we found that generic statements mattered more than specific ones in people's categorization judgments. Our findings add to work suggesting that generics may not specifically promote essentialism. But they do suggest that the type of property might matter in essentializing. Indeed, we suggest that teleological properties might play this privileged role in categorization because they are treated as essential properties.