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biblioteca.bib
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@misc{center_for_history_and_new_media_zotero_nodate,
title = {Zotero {Quick} {Start} {Guide}},
url = {http://zotero.org/support/quick_start_guide},
author = {{Center for History and New Media}},
annote = {Welcome to Zotero!View the Quick Start Guide to learn how to begin collecting, managing, citing, and sharing your research sources.Thanks for installing Zotero.}
}
@article{freitas_unboxing_2016,
title = {Unboxing the {Active} {Role} of the {Legislative} {Power} in {Brazil}},
volume = {10},
issn = {1981-3821},
url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&pid=S1981-38212016000200206&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en},
doi = {10.1590/1981-38212016000200004},
abstract = {The main purpose of this article is to show the relevance of the legislative branch participation in formatting bills originating in the executive. It shows that a strong executive is not necessarily accompanied by a weak legislature. By analyzing the changes the legislative made to executive bills through substitute bills and amendments to the legislation, the study shows that the legislative branch actively participates in drafting policies. By such means, the legislative branch is responsible for nearly 40 percent of the content of the laws promulgated in Brazil. Even when the executive takes steps aiming at controlling the legislative agenda, such as provisional decrees or urgency requests, the rates of legislative change do not decrease. As a result, in spite of the president institutional resources to place its own bills on the agenda, the legislative branch do discuss, analyze and modify the proposals advanced by the executive. An active instead of a passive legislative power emerges from the data shown in this article.Key words: Executive; legislative branch; presidential success; lawmaking},
number = {2},
urldate = {2016-10-14},
journal = {Brazilian Political Science Review},
author = {Freitas, Andréa Marcondes de and Freitas, Andréa Marcondes de},
year = {2016},
file = {Full Text PDF:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/TTET6Z9V/Freitas e Freitas - 2016 - Unboxing the Active Role of the Legislative Power .pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/KD8KR6B6/scielo.html:text/html}
}
@phdthesis{moreira_com_2016,
title = {Com a palavra os nobres deputados: frequência e ênfase temática dos discursos dos parlamentares brasileiros},
shorttitle = {Com a palavra os nobres deputados},
abstract = {Reconhecendo que o discurso é um dos meios pelos quais a política se materializa, essa tese tem o objetivo de responder a seguinte questão: há indícios suficientes para afirmar que a comunicação parlamentar no âmbito da Câmara dos Deputados é governada pela relação governo-oposição, assim como cons- tatado em sua atuação no processo decisório? Para respondê-la, foi feito o uso de técnicas computacionais e modelos estatísticos com a aplicação do expressed agenda model para análise do conteúdo de mais de 127 mil pronunciamentos realizados por mais de 2 mil oradores diferentes ao longo de mais de 15 anos de atividade parlamentar na Câmara dos Deputados. Com a apresentação de evidências robustas sobre a frequência dos discursos proferidos no Pequeno Expediente, a estratégia de concentração temática dos Deputados Federais e a ênfase por eles atribuída às agendas econômica e social, a resposta é que não. Há, na atividade parlamentar, muito mais do que a tarefa de produzir e apro- var leis. As conclusões apresentadas aprimoram o conhecimento a respeito do comportamento parlamentar no âmbito da Câmara dos Deputados e indicam a influência de outras variáveis sobre sua atuação como, por exemplo: a ideologia, o gênero, senioridade e a sua popularidade.},
school = {Universidade de São Paulo},
author = {Moreira, Davi Cordeiro},
year = {2016},
file = {Moreira - 2016 - Com a palavra os nobres deputados frequência e ên.pdf:/Users/davi/Google Drive/Academico/Doutorado/Moreira - 2016 - Com a palavra os nobres deputados frequência e ên.pdf:application/pdf}
}
@book{cox_making_1997,
title = {Making {Votes} {Count}: {Strategic} {Coordination} in the {World}'s {Electoral} {Systems}},
isbn = {978-0-521-58527-9},
shorttitle = {Making {Votes} {Count}},
abstract = {Popular elections are at the heart of representative democracy. Thus, understanding the laws and practices that govern such elections is essential to understanding modern democracy. In this book, Cox views electoral laws as posing a variety of coordination problems that political forces must solve. Coordination problems - and with them the necessity of negotiating withdrawals, strategic voting, and other species of strategic coordination - arise in all electoral systems. This book employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws. This book also considers not just what happens when political forces succeed in solving the coordination problems inherent in the electoral system they face but also what happens when they fail.},
language = {en},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
author = {Cox, Gary W.},
month = mar,
year = {1997},
keywords = {Elections, Political Science / General, Political Science / Political Process / Elections, Comparative government, Political Science / Comparative Politics, Political Science / Public Policy / Economic Policy, Voting, Voting models}
}
@article{samuels_money_2001,
title = {Money, {Elections}, and {Democracy} in {Brazil}},
volume = {43},
copyright = {© 2001 University of Miami},
issn = {1548-2456},
url = {http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2001.tb00398.x/abstract},
doi = {10.1111/j.1548-2456.2001.tb00398.x},
abstract = {Brazil̂s 1993 law requiring candidates to report their campaign contributions has generated a new source of data to explore the supposition that Brazilian elections are extraordinarily expensive. An examination of these data from Brazil̂s 1994 and 1998 general elections reveals that most money for Brazilian electoral campaigns comes from business sources and that leftist candidates have extremely limited access to such financing. The effect on democracy is that Brazil̂s largely unregulated campaign finance system tends to decrease the scope of interest representation.},
language = {en},
number = {2},
urldate = {2014-07-16},
journal = {Latin American Politics and Society},
author = {Samuels, David},
month = jul,
year = {2001},
pages = {27--48},
file = {Samuels - 2001 - Money, Elections, and Democracy in Brazil.pdf:/Users/davi/Google Drive/Academico/Biblioteca/Samuels - 2001 - Money, Elections, and Democracy in Brazil.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/I9QTCIT3/abstract.html:text/html}
}
@book{thomas_research_2004,
address = {Westport, Conn},
title = {Research {Guide} to {U}.{S}. and {International} {Interest} {Groups}},
isbn = {978-0-313-29543-0},
abstract = {Interest groups influence every government around the world, but what exactly are they, and how do they go about their work? This compilation of the major research, literature, and possible future directions of the study of interest groups is an excellent introductory resource for scholars and students in political science and related fields. Thoroughly cross-referenced and thematically organized, more than 200 entries detail the main topics of interest group activity in the United States and around the world.Following an introductory chapter that explains the format and content of the book, and a review of the development of interest group research, the entries are organized into 14 distinct chapters, each of which focuses on an area of significant research on various facets of group activity. A number of chapters deal with how interest groups form, dissolve, and work. More theoretically oriented chapters provide a wealth of information about the greater role interest groups play in society, and the various stances on whether those roles benefit or harm political life. Uniquely, special attention is paid to interest group activity in other countries, and to group activity that crosses international boundaries and political systems. A comprehensive bibliography concludes this useful volume.},
language = {English},
publisher = {Praeger},
author = {Thomas, Clive S.},
month = mar,
year = {2004}
}
@article{grossman_electoral_1996,
title = {Electoral {Competition} and {Special} {Interest} {Politics}},
volume = {63},
copyright = {Copyright © 1996 The Review of Economic Studies, Ltd.},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2297852},
doi = {10.2307/2297852},
abstract = {We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a legislature. The parties have fixed positions on some issues, but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions. In this context, we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving, and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms. We show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups. The party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests.},
number = {2},
urldate = {2014-07-16},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
author = {Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan},
month = apr,
year = {1996},
pages = {265--286},
file = {JSTOR Full Text PDF:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/8FF7Z6Q7/Grossman and Helpman - 1996 - Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politic.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/UWKQRK6P/265.html:text/html}
}
@article{andres_business_1985,
title = {Business {Involvement} in {Campaign} {Finance}: {Factors} {Influencing} the {Decision} to {Form} a {Corporate} {PAC}},
volume = {18},
issn = {00308269},
shorttitle = {Business {Involvement} in {Campaign} {Finance}},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/419098?uid=40529&uid=3737664&uid=2134&uid=40528&uid=5909624&uid=2&uid=70&uid=3&uid=67&uid=5910200&uid=62&sid=21104496385233},
doi = {10.2307/419098},
number = {2},
urldate = {2014-07-16},
journal = {PS},
author = {Andres, Gary J.},
year = {1985},
pages = {213},
file = {JSTOR\: PS, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring, 1985), pp. 213-220:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/GI4AA6PS/419098.html:text/html}
}
@article{potters_interest_1996,
title = {Interest groups: {A} survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence},
volume = {12},
shorttitle = {Interest groups},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/poleco/v12y1996i3p403-442.html},
abstract = {No abstract is available for this item.},
number = {3},
urldate = {2014-07-16},
journal = {European Journal of Political Economy},
author = {Potters, Jan and Sloof, Randolph},
year = {1996},
pages = {403--442},
file = {RePEc Snapshot:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/3FFFC2IH/v12y1996i3p403-442.html:text/html}
}
@article{samuels_pork_2002,
title = {Pork barreling is not credit claiming or advertising: {Campaign} finance and the sources of the personal vote in {Brazil}},
volume = {64},
number = {03},
journal = {The journal of Politics},
author = {Samuels, David J},
year = {2002},
pages = {845--863}
}
@article{wright_pacs_1985,
title = {{PACs}, contributions, and roll calls: {An} organizational perspective},
shorttitle = {{PACs}, contributions, and roll calls},
journal = {The American Political Science Review},
author = {Wright, J. R},
year = {1985},
pages = {400--414}
}
@article{samuels_incentives_1999,
title = {Incentives to {Cultivate} a {Party} {Vote} in {Candidate}-centric {Electoral} {Systems}: {Evidence} from {Brazil}},
volume = {32},
shorttitle = {Incentives to {Cultivate} a {Party} {Vote} in {Candidate}-centric {Electoral} {Systems}},
doi = {10.1177/0010414099032004004},
number = {4},
journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
author = {Samuels, D J},
year = {1999},
pages = {487--518}
}
@article{gopoian_what_1984,
title = {What makes {PACs} tick? {An} analysis of the allocation patterns of economic interest groups},
shorttitle = {What makes {PACs} tick?},
journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
author = {Gopoian, J. D and Smith, H. and Smith, W.},
year = {1984},
pages = {259--281}
}
@article{ansolabehere_money_1998,
title = {Money and {Institutional} {Power}},
volume = {77},
url = {http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/tlr77&id=1689&div=&collection=journals},
journal = {Texas Law Review},
author = {Ansolabehere, Stephen and Snyder, James M. Jr},
year = {1998},
pages = {1673}
}
@article{pereira_theory_2000,
title = {A theory of executive preponderance: the committee system in the {Brazilian} {Congress}},
volume = {15},
issn = {0102-6909},
shorttitle = {A theory of executive preponderance},
url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-69092000000200004&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=pt},
doi = {10.1590/S0102-69092000000200004},
number = {43},
journal = {Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais},
author = {Pereira, Carlos and Mueller, Bernardo},
month = jun,
year = {2000},
pages = {45--67}
}
@book{manin_principles_1997,
title = {The {Principles} of {Representative} {Government}},
isbn = {0-521-45891-9},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
author = {Manin, Bernard},
month = feb,
year = {1997}
}
@book{cain_personal_1990,
title = {The {Personal} {Vote}: {Constituency} {Service} and {Electoral} {Independence}},
isbn = {0-674-66318-7},
shorttitle = {The {Personal} {Vote}},
publisher = {Harvard University Press},
author = {Cain, Bruce and Ferejohn, John and Fiorina, Morris},
month = mar,
year = {1990}
}
@book{dahl_preface_1963,
edition = {First},
title = {A {Preface} to {Democratic} {Theory}},
isbn = {0-226-13426-1},
publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
author = {Dahl, Robert A.},
month = apr,
year = {1963}
}
@incollection{couto_uma_2009,
address = {São Paulo},
title = {Uma {Constituição} {Incomum}},
booktitle = {A {Constituição} de 1988: passado e futuro},
publisher = {Editora Hucitec},
author = {Couto, Cláudio Gonçalves and Arantes, Rogério Bastos},
editor = {Carvalho, Maria Alice Rezende de and Araújo, Cícero and Simões, Julio Assis},
year = {2009}
}
@article{azevedo_politica_1997,
title = {A {Política} da {Reforma} {Tributária}: {Federalismo} e {Mudança} {Constitucional}},
volume = {12},
issn = {0102-6909},
shorttitle = {A {Política} da {Reforma} {Tributária}},
url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-69091997000300006},
doi = {10.1590/S0102-69091997000300006},
number = {35},
journal = {Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais},
author = {Azevedo, Sérgio de and Melo, Marcus André},
month = oct,
year = {1997}
}
@book{noauthor_erroneous_nodate,
title = {Erroneous analyses of interactions in neuroscience: a problem of significance},
url = {http://dl.dropbox.com/u/1018886/Temp/NieuwenhuisEtAl2011.pdf},
keywords = {estatística, p-valor, p-value, significance, significância}
}
@article{delgado_empresariado_2005,
title = {Empresariado e {Política} {Industrial} no {Governo} {Lula}.},
journal = {Trabalho apresentado no XXIX Encontro Anual da ANPOCS},
author = {Delgado, Ignácio José Godinho},
year = {2005}
}
@book{neyman_proceedings_1967,
title = {Proceedings of the {Fifth} {Berkeley} {Symposium} on {Mathematical} {Statistics} and {Probability}},
publisher = {University of California Press},
author = {Neyman, Lucien Marie Le Cam, Jerzy},
year = {1967}
}
@article{cintra_as_2004,
title = {As assimetrias distributivas e os impactos tributários da não-cumulatividade},
journal = {Texto para Discussão},
author = {Cintra, Marcos},
year = {2004}
}
@book{noauthor_reference_nodate,
title = {Reference {Card} 1.pdf},
keywords = {estatística, card, R}
}
@article{grenzke_candidate_1989,
title = {Candidate attributes and {PAC} contributions},
volume = {42},
number = {2},
journal = {Political Research Quarterly},
author = {Grenzke, J.},
year = {1989},
pages = {245}
}
@article{grier_allocation_1990,
title = {Allocation patterns of {PAC} monies: {The} {US} {Senate}},
volume = {67},
shorttitle = {Allocation patterns of {PAC} monies},
number = {2},
journal = {Public Choice},
author = {Grier, K. B and Munger, M. C and Torrent, G. M},
year = {1990},
pages = {111--128}
}
@article{bednar_jenna_political_2011,
title = {Political {Geography}, {Campaign} {Contributions}, and {Representation}},
journal = {University of Michigan},
author = {{Bednar, Jenna} and {Gerber, Elisabeth R.}},
year = {2011}
}
@article{ames_electoral_1995,
title = {Electoral {Strategy} under {Open}-{List} {Proportional} {Representation}},
volume = {39},
doi = {10.2307/2111619},
number = {2},
journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
author = {Ames, Barry},
year = {1995},
pages = {406--433},
file = {JSTOR Full Text PDF:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/U8UJR57A/Ames - 1995 - Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Re.pdf:application/pdf}
}
@article{arbix_policies_2002,
title = {Policies of waste and desiquilibrium between the public and the private spheres in the brazilian automobile industry},
volume = {17},
issn = {0102-6909},
url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0102-69092002000100008&script=sci_arttext},
doi = {10.1590/S0102-69092002000100008},
number = {48},
journal = {Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais},
author = {Arbix, Glauco},
month = feb,
year = {2002},
pages = {109--129}
}
@book{arnold_logic_1990,
title = {The {Logic} of {Congressional} {Action}},
isbn = {0-300-05659-1},
publisher = {Yale University Press},
author = {Arnold, R. Douglas},
year = {1990},
keywords = {Political Science / General, Legislators, Legislators/ United States, Political Science / American Government / Legislative Branch, Political Science / American Government / National, United States}
}
@article{grier_comparing_1993,
title = {Comparing interest group {PAC} contributions to {House} and {Senate} incumbents, 1980–1986},
volume = {55},
number = {03},
journal = {The Journal of Politics},
author = {Grier, K. B and Munger, M. C},
year = {1993},
pages = {615--643}
}
@article{lohmann_representative_2003,
title = {Representative {Government} and {Special} {Interest} {Politics} ({We} {Have} {Met} the {Enemy} and {He} is {Us})},
volume = {15},
issn = {0951-6298, 1460-3667},
url = {http://jtp.sagepub.com/content/15/3/299},
doi = {10.1177/0951692803015003004},
abstract = {In any society characterized by diversity and specialization, each citizen - the butcher, the baker, the candlestick-maker - is a special interest on some dimensions of public policy and a member of the general public on many other dimensions. Each citizen enjoys being at the receiving end of special interest handouts even at the expense of inefficiencies imposed on general public. But relative to the status quo involving inefficient redistribution on most dimensions of public policy, including many dimensions on which the citizen is a member of the general public, the vast majority of citizens would surely be better off if the government did not cater to special interests at all. With this common interest in place, why do democratic societies have such a hard time ridding themselves of special interest politics? This article argues that the driving force underlying special interest politics is an information asymmetry: each citizen has a precise idea about the special interest handouts she is receiving and a vague idea about the price she is paying, as a member of the general public, for inefficient redistribution. I explain why special interest politics are ultimately impervious to reform (though we can tame them at the margin); I examine the trade-offs inherent in reform efforts (what it costs to tame them); and I spell out why special interest politics can be a Good Thing (why we should not tame them all the way even if we could).},
number = {3},
journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
author = {Lohmann, Susanne},
month = jul,
year = {2003},
keywords = {collective dilemma, government spending, information asymmetry, Mancur Olson, special interests},
pages = {299--319},
file = {Snapshot:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/QEHEU5N6/299.html:text/html}
}
@article{pereira_strategic_2002,
title = {Strategic {Behavior} in a {Coalition}-{Based} {Presidential} {System}: {Executive}-{Legislative} {Relations} in the {Budgetary} {Process} in {Brazil}},
volume = {45},
issn = {0011-5258},
shorttitle = {Strategic {Behavior} in a {Coalition}-{Based} {Presidential} {System}},
url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0011-52582002000200004&script=sci_arttext},
doi = {10.1590/S0011-52582002000200004},
number = {2},
journal = {Dados},
author = {Pereira, Carlos and Mueller, Bernardo},
month = jan,
year = {2002},
pages = {265--301}
}
@article{k.s.narendra_identification_1990,
title = {Identification and {Control} of {Dynamical} {System} using {Neural} {Networks}},
volume = {1},
number = {1},
journal = {IEENN},
author = {{K.S.Narendra} and {K.Parthsarathy}},
year = {1990},
pages = {4--27}
}
@article{figueiredo_electoral_2002,
title = {Electoral {Incentives}, {Parties}, and {Budget} {Policy}},
volume = {45},
issn = {0011-5258},
url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582002000200005&lng=en&nrm=iso},
doi = {10.1590/S0011-52582002000200005},
number = {2},
journal = {Dados},
author = {Figueiredo, Argelina Cheibub and Limongi, Fernando},
month = jan,
year = {2002},
pages = {303--344},
file = {Full Text PDF:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/R9GZ4BAS/Figueiredo e Limongi - 2002 - Electoral Incentives, Parties, and Budget Policy.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/6DQDX5CX/scielo.html:text/html}
}
@article{brambor_understanding_2006,
title = {Understanding {Interaction} {Models}: {Improving} {Empirical} {Analyses}},
volume = {14},
issn = {1047-1987, 1476-4989},
shorttitle = {Understanding {Interaction} {Models}},
url = {http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/content/14/1/63},
doi = {10.1093/pan/mpi014},
abstract = {Multiplicative interaction models are common in the quantitative political science literature. This is so for good reason. Institutional arguments frequently imply that the relationship between political inputs and outcomes varies depending on the institutional context. Models of strategic interaction typically produce conditional hypotheses as well. Although conditional hypotheses are ubiquitous in political science and multiplicative interaction models have been found to capture their intuition quite well, a survey of the top three political science journals from 1998 to 2002 suggests that the execution of these models is often flawed and inferential errors are common. We believe that considerable progress in our understanding of the political world can occur if scholars follow the simple checklist of dos and don'ts for using multiplicative interaction models presented in this article. Only 10\% of the articles in our survey followed the checklist.},
number = {1},
journal = {Political Analysis},
author = {Brambor, Thomas and Clark, William Roberts and Golder, Matt},
month = dec,
year = {2006},
pages = {63--82},
file = {Brambor et al. - 2006 - Understanding Interaction Models Improving Empiri.pdf:/Users/davi/Google Drive/Academico/Biblioteca/Brambor et al. - 2006 - Understanding Interaction Models Improving Empiri.pdf:application/pdf}
}
@article{pereira_what_2001,
title = {What are reelected legislators all about? {Local} and national political and institutional dynamics in the 1998 elections to the {Brazilian} {House} of {Representatives}},
volume = {44},
issn = {0011-5258},
shorttitle = {What are reelected legislators all about?},
url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582001000200004&lng=en&nrm=iso},
doi = {10.1590/S0011-52582001000200004},
number = {2},
journal = {Dados},
author = {Pereira, Carlos and Rennó, Lucio},
month = jan,
year = {2001},
pages = {133--172}
}
@article{steenbergen_modeling_2002,
title = {Modeling {Multilevel} {Data} {Structures}},
volume = {46},
issn = {0092-5853},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3088424},
doi = {10.2307/3088424},
abstract = {Multilevel data are structures that consist of multiple units of analysis, one nested within the other. Such data are becoming quite common in political science and provide numerous opportunities for theory testing and development. Unfortunately, this type of data typically generates a number of statistical problems, of which clustering is particularly important. To exploit the opportunities offered by multilevel data, and to solve the statistical problems inherent in them, special statistical techniques are required. In this article, we focus on a technique that has become popular in educational statistics and sociology-multilevel analysis. In multilevel analysis, researchers build models that capture the layered structure of multilevel data, and determine how layers interact and impact a dependent variable of interest. Our objective in this article is to introduce the logic and statistical theory behind multilevel models, to illustrate how such models can be applied fruitfully in political science, and to call attention to some of the pitfalls in multilevel analysis.},
number = {1},
journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
author = {Steenbergen, Marco R. and Jones, Bradford S.},
month = jan,
year = {2002},
note = {ArticleType: research-article / Full publication date: Jan., 2002 / Copyright © 2002 Midwest Political Science Association},
pages = {218--237}
}
@article{li_donuts_2005,
title = {Donuts, scratches and blanks: robust model-based segmentation of microarray images},
volume = {21},
issn = {1367-4803, 1460-2059},
shorttitle = {Donuts, scratches and blanks},
url = {http://www.stat.washington.edu/raftery/Research/mbc.html},
doi = {10.1093/bioinformatics/bti447},
number = {12},
journal = {Bioinformatics},
author = {Li, Q. and Fraley, C. and Bumgarner, R. E. and Yeung, K. Y. and Raftery, A. E.},
month = apr,
year = {2005},
pages = {2875--2882}
}
@article{lohmann_information_1998,
title = {An {Information} {Rationale} for the {Power} of {Special} {Interests}},
volume = {92},
issn = {0003-0554},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2586305},
doi = {10.2307/2586305},
abstract = {Political decisions are often biased in favor of special interests at the expense of the general public, and they are frequently inefficient in the sense that the losses incurred by the majority exceed the gains enjoyed by the minority. This article explains the bias in terms of information asymmetries and the free-rider problem. First, incumbents increase their reelection prospects by biasing policy toward groups that are better able to monitor their activities. Second, because smaller groups are better able to overcome the free-rider problem of costly monitoring, policy will be biased in their favor. Third, the effect of asymmetric monitoring on voter welfare is ambiguous. The inefficiencies created by the policy bias are offset by a positively valued selection bias: Incumbents of above-average quality are more likely to survive voter scrutiny than are low-quality types.},
number = {4},
journal = {The American Political Science Review},
author = {Lohmann, Susanne},
month = dec,
year = {1998},
note = {ArticleType: research-article / Full publication date: Dec., 1998 / Copyright © 1998 American Political Science Association},
pages = {809--827}
}
@article{ricci_medida_2003,
title = {A {Medida} das {Leis}: {Do} uso de {Noções} {Genéricas} à {Mensuração} do {Imponderável}},
number = {54},
journal = {BIB: Boletim Bibliográfico de Ciências Sociais},
author = {Ricci, Paolo},
year = {2003},
pages = {101:123}
}
@book{lamport_latex_1986,
title = {Ł{aTeX} {\textbackslash}textbackslashrm: {A} {Document} {Preparation} {System}},
publisher = {Addison-Wesley},
author = {Lamport, Leslie},
year = {1986}
}
@article{fraley_model-based_2002,
title = {Model-based clustering, discriminant analysis, and density estimation},
volume = {97},
number = {458},
journal = {Journal of the american statistical association},
author = {Fraley, C. and Raftery, A. E},
year = {2002},
pages = {611--631}
}
@article{nicolau_open-list_2006,
title = {The open-list of electoral system in {Brazil}},
volume = {49},
issn = {0011-5258},
url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582006000400002&lng=en&nrm=iso},
doi = {10.1590/S0011-52582006000400002},
number = {4},
journal = {Dados},
author = {Nicolau, Jairo},
month = jan,
year = {2006},
pages = {689--720}
}
@book{center_for_history_and_new_media_guia_nodate,
title = {Guia de {Início} {Rápido}},
url = {http://zotero.org/support/quick_start_guide},
author = {{Center for History and New Media}},
annote = {Bem-vindo(a) a Zotero!View the Quick Start Guide to learn how to begin collecting, managing, citing, and sharing your research sources.Obrigado por instalar Zotero.},
annote = {Bem-vindo(a) a Zotero!View the Quick Start Guide to learn how to begin collecting, managing, citing, and sharing your research sources.Obrigado por instalar Zotero.},
annote = {Bem-vindo(a) a Zotero!View the Quick Start Guide to learn how to begin collecting, managing, citing, and sharing your research sources.Obrigado por instalar Zotero.}
}
@article{arretche_agenda_2007,
title = {A agenda institucional},
volume = {22},
issn = {0102-6909},
url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-69092007000200011},
doi = {10.1590/S0102-69092007000200011},
number = {64},
journal = {Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais},
author = {Arretche, Marta},
month = jun,
year = {2007},
pages = {147--151}
}
@techreport{fraley_mclust_2006,
title = {{MCLUST} version 3 for {R}: {Normal} mixture modeling and model-based clustering},
shorttitle = {{MCLUST} version 3 for {R}},
institution = {Technical report},
author = {Fraley, C. and Raftery, A. E.},
year = {2006}
}
@article{gelman_why_1993,
title = {Why are {American} {Presidential} {Election} {Campaign} {Polls} so {Variable} when {Votes} are so {Predictable}?},
volume = {23},
abstract = {As most political scientists know, the outcome of the U.S. Presidential election can be predicted within a few percentage points (in the popular vote), based on information available months before the election. Thus, the general election campaign for president seems irrelevant to the outcome (except in very close elections), despite all the media coverage of campaign strategy. However, it is also well known that the pre-election opinion polls can vary wildly over the campaign, and this variation is generally attributed to events in the campaign. How can campaign events affect people’s opinions on whom they plan to vote for, and yet not affect the outcome of the election? For that matter, why do voters consistently increase their support for a candidate during his nominating convention, even though the conventions are almost entirely predictable events whose effects can be rationally forecast? In this exploratory study, we consider several intuitively appealing, but ultimately wrong, resolutions to this puzzle, and discuss our current understanding of what causes opinion polls to fluctuate and yet reach a predictable outcome. Our evidence is based on graphical presentation and analysis of over 67,000 individual-level responses from forty-nine commercial polls during the 1988 campaign and many other aggregate poll results from the 1952–1992 campaigns. We show that responses to pollsters during the campaign are not generally informed or even, in a sense we describe, "rational." In contrast, voters decide which candidate to eventually support based on their enlightened preferences, as formed by the information they have learned during the campaign, as well as basic political cues such as ideology and party identification. We cannot prove this conclusion, but we do show that it is consistent with the aggregate forecasts and individual-level opinion poll responses. Based on the enlightened preferences hypothesis, we conclude that the news media have an important effect on the outcome of Presidential elections–-not due to misleading advertisements, sound bites, or spin doctors, but rather by conveying candidates’ positions on important issues.},
number = {1},
journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
author = {Gelman, Andrew and King, Gary},
month = oct,
year = {1993},
pages = {409--451}
}
@article{suzigan_industrial_2006,
title = {Industrial policy and development},
volume = {26},
issn = {0101-3157},
url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572006000200001},
doi = {10.1590/S0101-31572006000200001},
number = {2},
journal = {Revista de Economia Política},
author = {Suzigan, Wilson and Furtado, João},
month = jun,
year = {2006},
pages = {163--185}
}
@article{milesi-ferretti_electoral_2002,
title = {Electoral {Systems} and {Public} {Spending}},
volume = {117},
issn = {0033-5533},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2696437},
abstract = {We study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries. We emphasize the distinction between purchases of goods and services, which are easier to target geographically, and transfers, which are easier to target across social groups. We present a theoretical model in which voters anticipating government policymaking under different electoral systems have an incentive to elect representatives more prone to transfer (public good) spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems. The model also predicts higher total primary spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems when the share of transfer spending is high (low). After defining rigorous measures of proportionality to be used in the empirical investigation, we find considerable support for our predictions.},
number = {2},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
author = {Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria and Perotti, Roberto and Rostagno, Massimo},
month = may,
year = {2002},
note = {ArticleType: research-article / Full publication date: May, 2002 / Copyright © 2002 Oxford University Press},
pages = {609--657}
}
@article{samuels_gubernatorial_2000,
title = {The {Gubernatorial} {Coattails} {Effect}: {Federalism} and {Congressional} {Elections} in {Brazil}},
volume = {62},
shorttitle = {The {Gubernatorial} {Coattails} {Effect}},
doi = {10.1111/0022-3816.00012},
abstract = {Competition for executive-level offices can influence competition for legislative office, and federal institutions can provide an “opportunity structure” that shapes partisan competition. In Brazil, unlike in systems where the presidential election might drive congressional elections, electoral incentives are state-centered. Candidates for Congress focus on the gubernatorial race, not the presidential race. Specifically, the effective number of candidates competing in the gubernatorial race in each state (electoral district) determines the effective number of lists competing in congressional elections in each state in Brazil. In this article, I use OLS regression analysis of electoral data from Brazil's democratic elections to test this proposition. Regression analysis confirms that the effective number of candidates for governor, and not the effective number of candidates for president, drives the effective number of lists competing in the legislative election.},
number = {01},
journal = {The Journal of Politics},
author = {Samuels, David J.},
year = {2000},
pages = {240--253},
file = {Samuels - 2000 - The Gubernatorial Coattails Effect Federalism and.pdf:/Users/davi/Google Drive/Academico/Biblioteca/Samuels - 2000 - The Gubernatorial Coattails Effect Federalism and.pdf:application/pdf}
}
@phdthesis{pereira_neto_determinantes_2011,
address = {São Paulo},
title = {Determinantes da adesão a tratados de patentes, 1970-2000: a {Convenção} de {Paris} e o {Tratado} de {Cooperação} de patentes},
abstract = {Neste trabalho investigamos os determinantes da adesão de países a dois tratados internacionais de patentes: A Convenção de Paris e o Tratado de Cooperação de Patentes (TCP). Por meio de um modelo hierárquico Bayesiano, apresentamos evidências de que fatores domésticos são importantes para predizer adesão aos tratados estudados. Porém, quais fatores são importantes dependem do tipo de tratado. Para o TCP, que é um tratado que visa reduzir custos de transação, a legislação doméstica de patentes não é relevante. Para a Convenção de Paris, que limita as opções de política na área de patente, a legislação doméstica é fator relevante. Nós mostramos também que os ganhos diretos de participar dos tratados, medido pelo número de patentes no exterior, é uma variável importante e positivamente associada à probabilidade de adesão a ambos os acordos. Apresentamos ainda evidências de que variáveis sistêmicas são importantes e que as mudanças no sistema internacional nos últimos 30 anos são fatores importantes para explicar a adesão.},
school = {Universidade de São Paulo},
author = {Pereira Neto, Manoel Galdino},
year = {2011}
}
@article{mancuso_beneficios_2010,
title = {Benefícios tributários valem a pena? {Um} estudo sobre a presença de medidas que atestam a eficácia, a eficiência e a efetividade dos dispositivos legais que concedem benefícios tributários a empresas no {Brasil}.},
journal = {Trabalho apresentado no 34º Encontro Anual da Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Ciências Sociais.},
author = {Mancuso, Wagner P. and Moreira, D. C.},
year = {2010}
}
@article{fraley_c._model-based_2002,
title = {Model-based clustering, discriminant analysis, and density estimation},
number = {97},
journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association},
author = {{Fraley, C.} and {Raftery, A. E.}},
year = {2002},
pages = {611 631}
}
@article{lowi_american_1964,
title = {American {Business}, {Public} {Policy}, {Case}-{Studies}, and {Political} {Theory}},
volume = {16},
issn = {0043-8871},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009452},
doi = {10.2307/2009452},
number = {4},
journal = {World Politics},
author = {Lowi, Theodore J.},
month = jul,
year = {1964},
note = {ArticleType: book-review / Full publication date: Jul., 1964 / Copyright © 1964 Trustees of Princeton University},
pages = {677--715}
}
@phdthesis{moreira_beneficios_2011,
address = {São Paulo},
type = {Dissertação de {Mestrado}},
title = {Benefícios {Tributários} {Federais} e {Conexão} {Eleitoral}: a concessão de benefícios referentes ao {PIS}, à {COFINS} e à {CSLL}},
school = {Universidade de São Paulo},
author = {Moreira, D. C.},
year = {2011},
file = {Full Text PDF:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/X4EK6NCG/Moreira - 2011 - Benefícios tributários federais e conexão eleitora.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/RRGUJK3M/pt-br.html:text/html}
}
@article{mignozzetti_um_2012,
title = {Um {Modelo} para {Explicar} as {Coligações} {Eleitorais} para a {Câmara} {Federal} {Brasileira} (1998-2006)},
volume = {20},
issn = {0104-7094},
url = {http://www.politicahoje.ufpe.br/index.php/politica/article/view/132},
number = {2},
journal = {Revista Política Hoje},
author = {Mignozzetti, Umberto Guarnier and Galdino, Manoel and Bernabel, Rodolpho Talaisys},
month = mar,
year = {2012}
}
@book{noauthor_carga_tributaria_nacional_marcio_pochmann_nodate,
title = {Carga\_Tributária\_Nacional\_Marcio\_Pochmann},
url = {http://www.anfip.org.br/Fundacao_ANFIP/publicacoes/publicacoes/artigos/Marcio_Pochmann_18SET08.pdf},
keywords = {carga tributária, impostos, tributos}
}
@article{fraley_how_1998,
title = {How {Many} {Clusters}? {Which} {Clustering} {Method}? {Answers} {Via} {Model}-{Based} {Cluster} {Analysis}},
volume = {41},
issn = {0010-4620, 1460-2067},
shorttitle = {How {Many} {Clusters}?},
url = {http://comjnl.oxfordjournals.org/content/41/8/578.full.pdf+html},
doi = {10.1093/comjnl/41.8.578},
number = {8},
journal = {The Computer Journal},
author = {Fraley, C.},
month = aug,
year = {1998},
pages = {578--588}
}
@article{herndon_access_1982,
title = {Access, {Record}, and {Competition} as {Influences} on {Interest} {Group} {Contributions} to {Congressional} {Campaigns}},
volume = {44},
doi = {10.2307/2130670},
abstract = {Interviews with representatives of business and labor interest groups led to hypotheses concerning the relative emphasis placed on securing (or maintaining) access to decision makers, candidates' records, and levels of competition in decisions to make monetary contributions to congressional campaigns. These hypotheses were tested with campaign finance data, resulting in identification of differential strategies followed by business and labor respectively. New hypotheses were derived from efforts to generalize findings to groups similarly advantaged or disadvantaged by political and social processes.},
number = {04},
journal = {The Journal of Politics},
author = {Herndon, James F.},
year = {1982},
pages = {996--1019}
}
@book{cox_efficient_2005,
title = {The {Efficient} {Secret}: {The} {Cabinet} and the {Development} of {Political} {Parties} in {Victorian} {England}},
isbn = {0-521-01901-X},
shorttitle = {The {Efficient} {Secret}},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
author = {Cox, Gary W.},
month = sep,
year = {2005}
}
@book{diniz_dificil_2007,
address = {Belo Horizonte},
title = {A difícil rota do desenvolvimento: {Empresários} e a agenda {Pós}-{Neoliberal}.},
publisher = {Editora UFMG},
author = {Diniz, Eli and Boschi, Renato},
year = {2007}
}
@article{almeida_renuncia_2001,
title = {A renúncia de receita como fonte alternativa de recursos orçamentários},
volume = {4},
journal = {Revista do Tribunal de Contas do Estado de Minas Gerais},
author = {Almeida, Francisco Carlos R. de},
year = {2001}
}
@book{wilson_political_1995,
edition = {Upd Sub},
title = {Political {Organizations}},
isbn = {0-691-04385-X},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
author = {Wilson, James Q.},
month = aug,
year = {1995}
}
@article{mainwaring_politicos_1991,
title = {Políticos, {Partidos} e {Sistemas} {Eleitorais}},
number = {29},
journal = {Novos Estudos Cebrap},
author = {Mainwaring, Scott},
year = {1991},
pages = {34:58}
}
@book{dahl_preface_2006,
title = {A {Preface} to {Democratic} {Theory}},
isbn = {978-0-226-13434-5},
abstract = {Robert Dahl’s Preface helped launch democratic theory fifty years ago as a new area of study in political science, and it remains the standard introduction to the field. Exploring problems that had been left unsolved by traditional thought on democracy, Dahl here examines two influential models—the Madisonian, which represents prevailing American doctrine, and its recurring challenger, populist theory—arguing that they do not accurately portray how modern democracies operate. He then constructs a model more consistent with how contemporary democracies actually function, and, in doing so, develops some original views of popular sovereignty and the American constitutional system. For this fiftieth-anniversary edition, Dahl has written an extensive new afterword that reevaluates Madisonian theory in light of recent research. And in a new foreword, he reflects back on his influential volume and the ways his views have evolved since he wrote it. For any student or scholar of political science, this new material is an essential update on a gold standard in the evolving field of democratic theory. “A Preface to Democratic Theory is well worth the devoted attention of anyone who cares about democracy.”—Political Science Quarterly},
publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
author = {Dahl, Robert Alan},
month = sep,
year = {2006},
keywords = {Political Science / General, Democracy, Political Science / History \& Theory, Political Science / Political Ideologies / Democracy}
}
@article{carey_incentives_1995,
title = {Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: {A} rank ordering of electoral formulas},
volume = {14},
issn = {0261-3794},
shorttitle = {Incentives to cultivate a personal vote},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0261379494000352},
doi = {10.1016/0261-3794(94)00035-2},
abstract = {Seat allocation formulas affect candidates' incentives to campaign on a personal rather than party reputation. Variables that enhance personal vote-seeking include: (1) lack of party leadership control over access to and rank on ballots, (2) degree to which candidates are elected on individual votes independent of co-partisans, and (3) whether voters cast a single intra-party vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote. District magnitude has the unusual feature that, as it increases, the value of a personal reputation rises if the electoral formula itself fosters personal vote-seeking, but falls if the electoral formula fosters party reputation-seeking.},
number = {4},
journal = {Electoral Studies},
author = {Carey, John M and Shugart, Matthew Soberg},
month = dec,
year = {1995},
pages = {417--439}
}
@article{romer_empirical_1994,
title = {An {Empirical} {Investigation} of the {Dynamics} of {PAC} {Contributions}},
volume = {38},
doi = {10.2307/2111605},
number = {3},
journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
author = {Romer, Thomas and Snyder Jr., James M},
year = {1994},
pages = {745--769}
}
@book{mainwaring_rethinking_1999,
title = {Rethinking {Party} {Systems} in the {Third} {Wave} of {Democratization}: {The} {Case} of {Brazil}},
isbn = {978-0-8047-3059-4},
shorttitle = {Rethinking {Party} {Systems} in the {Third} {Wave} of {Democratization}},
abstract = {Among the many countries that underwent transitions to democracy in recent decades, only Russia is as important to the United States and the world as Brazil. The fifth-largest country and population in the world, with nearly one-half the inhabitants of Latin America, Brazil has the world’s ninth-richest economy. Given the nation’s size and influence, its capacity to achieve stable democracy and economic growth will have global impact. Understanding democracy in Brazil is therefore a crucial task, one which this book undertakes.Theoretically, the author argues that most party systems in the third wave of democratization, after 1974, have distinctive features that require us to reformulate theories about party systems generally; previous works have paid scant attention to the importance of variance in the degree of institutionalization of party systems. The author also argues that many third-wave cases underscore the need to focus on the capacity of the state and political elites to structure and restructure party systems from below.Empirically, the author studies the Brazilian party system and democratization, with particular reference to the 1979-96 period. He underscores the weakness of the party system and the resulting problems of democratization. He argues that the party system is poorly institutionalized, explores the reasons for the difficulties of party building, and addresses the consequences of weak institutionalization, which leads him to reaffirm the central significance of parties in the face of widespread skepticism about their importance.},
publisher = {Stanford University Press},
author = {Mainwaring, Scott},
month = apr,
year = {1999},
keywords = {Brazil, Political Science / General, Democracy, Political Science / Political Ideologies / Democracy, Brazil - Politics and government - 1964-1985, Brazil - Politics and government - 1985-2002, Democracy - Brazil, Democracy/ Brazil, Elite (Social sciences), Elite (Social sciences) - Brazil, History / Latin America / South America, Political culture, Political culture - Brazil, Political culture/ Brazil, Political Parties, Political parties - Brazil, Political parties/ Brazil, Political Science / Political Process / Political Parties, Political sociology, Social Science / Sociology / General}
}
@article{maciel_politica_2010,
title = {Política de {Incentivos} {Fiscais}: quem recebe isenção por setores e regiões do país.},
journal = {Consultoria Legislativa da Câmara dos Deputados},
author = {Maciel, Marcelo Sobreiro},
year = {2010}
}
@book{mancuso_o_2007,
address = {São Paulo},
title = {O {Lobby} da {Indústria} no {Congresso} {Nacional}: {Empresariado} e {Política} no {Brasil} {Contemporâneo}},
publisher = {EDUSP/HUMANITAS/FAPESP},
author = {Mancuso, Wagner P.},
year = {2007}
}
@article{peixoto_financiamento_2010,
title = {Financiamento de campanhas: o {Brasil} em perspectiva comparada},
volume = {35},
shorttitle = {Financiamento de campanhas},
url = {http://seer.fclar.unesp.br/perspectivas/article/view/2289/1857},
abstract = {Financiamento de campanhas: o Brasil em perspectiva comparada},
journal = {Perspectivas: Revista de Ciências Sociais},
author = {Peixoto, Vitor de Moraes},
month = nov,
year = {2010},
note = {The objective of this study is to analyze aspects of the system of financing of political parties in Brazil in comparative perspective. For this, we used data provided by International IDEA in order to classify the systems of financing of political parties from 96 countries in two main areas, namely: first, regarding the transfer of public resources to the parties and, secondly, as to control those countries have on the financing of parties. Both, therefore, refer to the degree of regulatory intervention by the State electoral competition. Finally, it looks up to the factors of democratic political systems that are associated with different degrees of electoral regulation.},
keywords = {Political Parties, Competição eleitoral, Electoral competition, Finance campaign, Financiamento de campanha, Partidos políticos, Regulação estatal, State regulation}
}
@article{hallerberg_electoral_1997,
title = {Electoral {Institutions}, {Cabinet} {Negotiations} and {Budget} {Deficits} in the {European} {Union}},
journal = {NBER Working Paper Series},
author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Von Hagen, Jurgen},
year = {1997}
}
@article{baron_electoral_1994,
title = {Electoral {Competition} with {Informed} and {Uniformed} {Voters}},
volume = {88},
issn = {0003-0554},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944880},
doi = {10.2307/2944880},
abstract = {I present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies. Informed voters, however, vote based on those policies, so candidates face a trade-off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote. Electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies: particularistic and collective. In the case of particularistic policies, the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high, and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion. The model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages. For the case of collective policies, the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters, and contributions are zero.},
number = {1},
journal = {The American Political Science Review},
author = {Baron, David P.},
month = mar,
year = {1994},
note = {ArticleType: research-article / Full publication date: Mar., 1994 / Copyright © 1994 American Political Science Association},
pages = {33--47}
}
@incollection{figueiredo_poder_2010,
title = {Poder de {Agenda} e {Políticas} {Substantivas}},
booktitle = {Legislativo {Brasileiro} em {Perspectiva} {Comparada}},
publisher = {Editora UFMG},
author = {Figueiredo, Argelina and Limongi, Fernando},
editor = {Inacio, Magna and Rennó, Lucio},
year = {2010}
}
@article{pereira_weak_2003,
title = {Weak parties in the electoral arena, strong parties in the legislative arena: the electoral connection in {Brazil}},
volume = {46},
issn = {0011-5258},
shorttitle = {Weak parties in the electoral arena, strong parties in the legislative arena},
url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582003000400004},
doi = {10.1590/S0011-52582003000400004},
number = {4},
journal = {Dados},
author = {Pereira, Carlos and Mueller, Bernardo},
month = jan,
year = {2003},
pages = {735--771},
file = {Full Text PDF:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/BVHGZJDZ/Pereira e Mueller - 2003 - Weak parties in the electoral arena, strong partie.pdf:application/pdf;Full Text PDF:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/CIIVHRGU/Pereira e Mueller - 2003 - Weak parties in the electoral arena, strong partie.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/4IHQCXGE/scielo.html:text/html;Snapshot:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/5WQ7UP96/scielo.html:text/html}
}
@book{olson_logic_1971,
edition = {Revised},
title = {The {Logic} of {Collective} {Action}: {Public} {Goods} and the {Theory} of {Groups}, {Second} printing with new preface and appendix},
isbn = {0-674-53751-3},
shorttitle = {The {Logic} of {Collective} {Action}},
publisher = {Harvard University Press},
author = {Olson, Mancur},
month = jan,
year = {1971}
}
@article{fernando_limongi_as_2010,
title = {As eleições de 2010 e o quadro partidário},
url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-33002010000300002&lng=pt&nrm=iso},
abstract = {As eleições presidenciais têm se resumido a uma disputa entre PT e PSDB. Nenhuma candidatura alternativa foi capaz de ameaçar o controle desses partidos sobre a maioria dos eleitores. A estruturação das eleições presidenciais repercute sobre as disputas pelos governos estaduais, fazendo com que estas obedeçam à mesma clivagem básica. A estratégia dos partidos, negociando o lançamento e a retirada de candidaturas, é a chave para se entender a dinâmica da competição eleitoral no Brasil.},
number = {88},
journal = {Novos Estudos - CEBRAP},
author = {{Fernando Limongi} and {Rafael Cortez}},
year = {2010},
keywords = {democracia, Eleições 2010, partidos, sistema partidário},
pages = {21--37}
}
@article{limongi_institutional_1998,
title = {Institutional foundations of coalition presidentialism},
issn = {0102-6445},
url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0102-64451998000200005&script=sci_arttext},
doi = {10.1590/S0102-64451998000200005},
number = {44},
journal = {Lua Nova: Revista de Cultura e Política},
author = {Limongi, Fernando and Figueiredo, Argelina},
month = jan,
year = {1998},
pages = {81--106},
file = {Full Text PDF:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/9E78XPAG/Limongi e Figueiredo - 1998 - Institutional foundations of coalition presidentia.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:/Users/davi/Zotero/storage/CCPF97M5/scielo.html:text/html}
}
@book{mccombs_setting_2004,
edition = {1},
title = {Setting the {Agenda}: {The} {Mass} {Media} and {Public} {Opinion}},
isbn = {0-7456-2313-1},
shorttitle = {Setting the {Agenda}},
publisher = {Polity},
author = {McCombs, Maxwell},
month = nov,
year = {2004}
}
@article{pereira_what_2007,
title = {What does the reelected have?{The} return: the outline of a reelection theory in {Brazil}},
volume = {27},
issn = {0101-3157},
shorttitle = {What does the reelected have?},
url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572007000400010&lng=en&nrm=iso},
doi = {10.1590/S0101-31572007000400010},
number = {4},
journal = {Revista de Economia Política},
author = {Pereira, Carlos and Rennó, Lucio},
month = dec,
year = {2007},
pages = {664--683}
}
@book{dahl_polyarchy:_1972,
title = {Polyarchy: {Participation} and {Opposition}},
isbn = {0-300-01565-8},
shorttitle = {Polyarchy},
publisher = {Yale University Press},
author = {Dahl, Robert A.},
month = sep,
year = {1972}
}
@book{johnson_applied_2001,
edition = {5},
title = {Applied {Multivariate} {Statistical} {Analysis}},
isbn = {0-13-092553-5},
publisher = {Prentice Hall},
author = {Johnson, Richard A. and Wichern, Dean W.},
month = dec,
year = {2001}
}
@book{mancuso_lobby_2008,
title = {Lobby e {Renúncia} {Tributária} da {União}: {Contribuições} para uma análise da política de concessão de benefícios tributários ao empresariado industrial no {Brasil} (1988-2006)},
publisher = {CNPQ},
author = {Mancuso, Wagner P. and Gonçalves, Maetê P. and Mencarini, Fabrízio},
year = {2008}
}
@book{dahl_who_1963,
title = {Who {Governs}?: {Democracy} and {Power} in the {American} {City}},
isbn = {0-300-00051-0},
shorttitle = {Who {Governs}?},
publisher = {Yale University Press},
author = {Dahl, Professor Robert A.},
month = sep,
year = {1963}
}
@phdthesis{maciel_dependencia_2009,
address = {Rio de Janeiro},
type = {Dissertação de {Mestrado}},
title = {Dependência de trajetória nos incentivos fiscais: fragmentação do empresariados na reforma tributária.},
school = {Instituto de Pesquisa Universitárias do Rio de Janeiro},
author = {Maciel, Marcelo Sobreiro},
year = {2009}
}
@article{dixit_determinants_1996,
title = {The {Determinants} of {Success} of {Special} {Interests} in {Redistributive} {Politics}},
volume = {58},
issn = {0022-3816},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2960152},
doi = {10.2307/2960152},
abstract = {We examine what determines whether an interest group will receive favors in pork-barrel politics, using a model of majority voting with two competing parties. Each group's membership is heterogeneous in its ideological affinity for the parties. Individuals face a trade-off between party affinity and their own transfer receipts. The model is general enough to yield two often-discussed but competing theories as special cases. If the parties are equally effective in delivering transfers to any group, then the outcome of the process conforms to the "swing voter" theory: both parties woo the groups that are politically central, and most willing to switch their votes in response to economic favors. If groups have party affinities, and each party is more effective in delivering favors to its own support group, then we can get the "machine politics" outcome, where each party favors its core support group. We derive these results theoretically, and illustrate their operation in particular examples.},
number = {4},
journal = {The Journal of Politics},
author = {Dixit, Avinash and Londregan, John},
month = nov,
year = {1996},
note = {ArticleType: research-article / Full publication date: Nov., 1996 / Copyright © 1996 Southern Political Science Association},
pages = {1132--1155}