From 9413607ad857abeb4d112d34568f0f3bca17c6bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Forshtat Date: Sun, 6 Oct 2024 12:26:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] AA-306: Add warning on changed expectations for 7712 and 7702 combination --- RIPS/rip-7712.md | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/RIPS/rip-7712.md b/RIPS/rip-7712.md index 20c1b53..2e58c72 100644 --- a/RIPS/rip-7712.md +++ b/RIPS/rip-7712.md @@ -128,6 +128,16 @@ Smart Contract Accounts could access the `uint256 nonce` value in the `Transacti higher 192 bits assuming nonce cannot exceed 64 bits. This assumption is wrong and is broken by the proposed change. +### EIP-7702 authorization revocation with a nonce bump + +In EIP-7702 the EOA is able to revoke an "authorization tuple" it has previously signed as long as it has not been +included on-chain. +This can be done by incrementing the EOAs `nonce`, which in turn can only be done by sending a new transaction. +With RIP-7712, however, there exists a new way of sending a transaction without affecting the legacy `nonce` field. +Such a transaction will not invalidate the previously signed "authorization tuple" either. +Users who are unaware of this change may not expect an "authorization tuple" to remain valid after sending a different +transaction and should be aware of the existence of RIP-7712 and multidimensional nonces. + ## Security Considerations Smart Contract Accounts that need to enforce the sequence of transaction execution must apply appropriate restrictions