From bd06f7839324bb85da6026d32762f1bf82231b93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Holger Graef <holger.graef@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2023 09:57:32 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] fix path traversal vulnerability (#156)
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* add test for issue #129
* A path traversal attack (also known as directory traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the web root folder. By manipulating variables that reference files with “dot-dot-slash (../)” sequences and its variations or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system including application source code or configuration and critical system files. This attack is also known as “dot-dot-slash”, “directory traversal”, “directory climbing” and “backtracking”.

The `os.path.join` call is unsafe for use with untrusted input. When the `os.path.join` call encounters an absolute path, it ignores all the parameters it has encountered till that point and starts working with the new absolute path.  Please see the example below.
```
>>> import os.path
>>> static = "path/to/mySafeStaticDir"
>>> malicious = "/../../../../../etc/passwd"
>>> os.path.join(t,malicious)
'/../../../../../etc/passwd'
```
Since the "malicious" parameter represents an absolute path, the result of `os.path.join` ignores the static directory completely. Hence, untrusted input is passed via the `os.path.join` call to `flask.send_file` can lead to path traversal attacks.

In this case, the problems occurs due to the following code :
https://github.com/HolgerGraef/MSM/blob/6dd2c9557e0285e1270c84375ebd6f8d10e422a4/app/main/views.py#L544

Here, the `path` parameter is attacker controlled. This parameter passes through the unsafe `os.path.join` call making the effective directory and filename passed to the `send_file` call attacker controlled. This leads to a path traversal attack.

The bug can be verified using a proof of concept similar to the one shown below.

```
curl --path-as-is 'http://<domain>/plugins//../../../../etc/passwd"'
```

This can be fixed by preventing flow of untrusted data to the vulnerable `send_file` function. In case the application logic necessiates this behaviour, one can either use the `flask.safe_join` to join untrusted paths or replace `flask.send_file` calls with `flask.send_from_directory` calls.

* [OWASP Path Traversal](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path_Traversal)
* github/securitylab#669

* coding style: black
* backport to old werkzeug version
* cleanup

---------

Co-authored-by: Porcupiney Hairs <porucpiney.hairs@protonmail.com>
---
 app/config.py          |  3 +++
 app/main/views.py      |  8 ++++++--
 app/tests/test_main.py | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/app/config.py b/app/config.py
index 90cf228e8..b4e8f47fc 100644
--- a/app/config.py
+++ b/app/config.py
@@ -45,10 +45,13 @@ class ProductionConfig(Config):
 
 
 class TestingConfig(Config):
+    DEBUG = True
     SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI = os.environ.get("DATABASE_URL") or "sqlite:///" + os.path.join(
         basedir, "database/testing.sqlite"
     )
     LOG_EXCEPTIONS = True
+    TESTING = True
+    WTF_CSRF_ENABLED = False
 
 
 config = {
diff --git a/app/main/views.py b/app/main/views.py
index 4070e7dea..ab6eb765d 100644
--- a/app/main/views.py
+++ b/app/main/views.py
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 from flask import render_template, redirect, request, jsonify, send_file, abort, current_app
+from werkzeug.security import safe_join
 from flask_login import current_user, login_required, login_user, logout_user
 from .. import db
 from .. import plugins
@@ -678,8 +679,11 @@ def swapactionorder():  # TODO: sort out permissions for this (e.g. who has the
 @main.route("/plugins/<path:path>")
 @login_required
 def static_file(path):
-    # TODO: this looks a bit unsafe to me
-    return send_file("../plugins/" + path)
+    path = safe_join("../plugins/", path)
+    if path is None:
+        abort(404)
+    else:
+        return send_file(path)
 
 
 def str_to_bool(str):
diff --git a/app/tests/test_main.py b/app/tests/test_main.py
index 51fcc5d90..999874564 100644
--- a/app/tests/test_main.py
+++ b/app/tests/test_main.py
@@ -10,6 +10,32 @@ def test_instantiate_app():
     assert app is not None
 
 
+def test_issue129():
+    """Test that the issue #129 is fixed."""
+    app = create_app("testing")
+    migrate = Migrate()
+
+    # make sure that testing DB does not exist
+    db_path = app.config.get("SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI").replace("sqlite:///", "")
+    if os.path.exists(db_path):
+        os.remove(db_path)
+
+    with app.app_context():
+        db.init_app(app)
+        migrate.init_app(app, db)
+        upgrade()
+
+    # recreate app to initialize activity table
+    app = create_app("testing")
+
+    with app.test_client() as c:
+        # log in via HTTP
+        r = c.post("/auth/login", data={"username": "admin", "password": "admin"})
+        assert r.status_code == 302
+        r = c.get("/plugins/../README.md")
+        assert r.status_code == 404
+
+
 def test_db_migrations():
     """Test that the database migrations can be run."""
     app = create_app("testing")