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urn: urn:intuitem:risk:library:dora
locale: en
ref_id: DORA
name: Digital Operational Resilience Act
description: REGULATION (EU) 2022/2554 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector and
amending Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU)
No 909/2014 and (EU) 2016/1011
copyright: European Union law
version: 1
provider: EU
packager: intuitem
objects:
framework:
urn: urn:intuitem:risk:framework:dora
ref_id: DORA
name: Digital Operational Resilience Act
description: REGULATION (EU) 2022/2554 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector
and amending Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014,
(EU) No 909/2014 and (EU) 2016/1011
requirement_nodes:
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
assessable: false
depth: 1
name: Preamble
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-1
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 1
description: In the digital age, information and communication technology (ICT)
supports complex systems used for everyday activities. It keeps our economies
running in key sectors, including the financial sector, and enhances the functioning
of the internal market. Increased digitalisation and interconnectedness also
amplify ICT risk, making society as a whole, and the financial system in particular,
more vulnerable to cyber threats or ICT disruptions. While the ubiquitous
use of ICT systems and high digitalisation and connectivity are today core
features of the activities of Union financial entities, their digital resilience
has yet to be better addressed and integrated into their broader operational
frameworks.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-2
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 2
description: The use of ICT has in the past decades gained a pivotal role in
the provision of financial services, to the point where it has now acquired
a critical importance in the operation of typical daily functions of all financial
entities. Digitalisation now covers, for instance, payments, which have increasingly
moved from cash and paper-based methods to the use of digital solutions, as
well as securities clearing and settlement, electronic and algorithmic trading,
lending and funding operations, peer-to-peer finance, credit rating, claim
management and back-office operations. The insurance sector has also been
transformed by the use of ICT, from the emergence of insurance intermediaries
offering their services online operating with InsurTech, to digital insurance
underwriting. Finance has not only become largely digital throughout the whole
sector, but digitalisation has also deepened interconnections and dependencies
within the financial sector and with third-party infrastructure and service
providers.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-3
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 3
description: "The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) reaffirmed in a 2020 report\
\ addressing systemic cyber risk how the existing high level of interconnectedness\
\ across financial entities, financial markets and financial market infrastructures,\
\ and particularly the interdependencies of their ICT systems, could constitute\
\ a systemic vulnerability because localised cyber incidents could quickly\
\ spread from any of the approximately 22 000 Union financial entities to\
\ the entire financial system, unhindered by geographical boundaries. Serious\
\ ICT breaches that occur in the financial sector do not merely affect financial\
\ entities taken in isolation. They also smooth the way for the propagation\
\ of localised vulnerabilities across the financial transmission channels\
\ and potentially trigger adverse consequences for the stability of the Union\u2019\
s financial system, such as generating liquidity runs and an overall loss\
\ of confidence and trust in financial markets."
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-4
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 4
description: In recent years, ICT risk has attracted the attention of international,
Union and national policy makers, regulators and standard-setting bodies in
an attempt to enhance digital resilience, set standards and coordinate regulatory
or supervisory work. At international level, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, the Financial
Stability Board, the Financial Stability Institute, as well as the G7 and
G20 aim to provide competent authorities and market operators across various
jurisdictions with tools to bolster the resilience of their financial systems.
That work has also been driven by the need to duly consider ICT risk in the
context of a highly interconnected global financial system and to seek more
consistency of relevant best practices.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-5
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 5
description: "Despite Union and national targeted policy and legislative initiatives,\
\ ICT risk continues to pose a challenge to the operational resilience, performance\
\ and stability of the Union financial system. The reforms that followed the\
\ 2008 financial crisis primarily strengthened the financial resilience of\
\ the Union financial sector and aimed to safeguard the competitiveness and\
\ stability of the Union from economic, prudential and market conduct perspectives.\
\ Although ICT security and digital resilience are part of operational risk,\
\ they have been less in the focus of the post- financial crisis regulatory\
\ agenda and have developed in only some areas of the Union\u2019s financial\
\ services policy and regulatory landscape, or in only a few Member States."
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-6
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 6
description: "In its Communication of 8 March 2018 entitled \u2018FinTech Action\
\ plan: For a more competitive and innovative European financial sector\u2019\
, the Commission highlighted the paramount importance of making the Union\
\ financial sector more resilient, including from an operational perspective\
\ to ensure its technological safety and good functioning, its quick recovery\
\ from ICT breaches and incidents, ultimately enabling the effective and smooth\
\ provision of financial services across the whole Union, including under\
\ situations of stress, while also preserving consumer and market trust and\
\ confidence."
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-7
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 7
description: "In April 2019, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking\
\ Authority), (EBA) established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European\
\ Parliament and of the Council (4), the European Supervisory Authority (European\
\ Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), (\u2018EIOPA\u2019) established\
\ by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council\
\ (5) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets\
\ Authority), (\u2018ESMA\u2019) established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010\
\ of the European Parliament and of the Council (6) (known collectively as\
\ \u2018European Supervisory Authorities\u2019 or \u2018ESAs\u2019) jointly\
\ issued technical advice calling for a coherent approach to ICT risk in finance\
\ and recommending to strengthen, in a proportionate way, the digital operational\
\ resilience of the financial services industry through a sector-specific\
\ initiative of the Union."
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-8
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 8
description: The Union financial sector is regulated by a Single Rulebook and
governed by a European system of financial supervision. Nonetheless, provisions
tackling digital operational resilience and ICT security are not yet fully
or consistently harmonised, despite digital operational resilience being vital
for ensuring financial stability and market integrity in the digital age,
and no less important than, for example, common prudential or market conduct
standards. The Single Rulebook and system of supervision should therefore
be developed to also cover digital operational resilience, by strengthening
the mandates of competent authorities to enable them to supervise the management
of ICT risk in the financial sector in order to protect the integrity and
efficiency of the internal market, and to facilitate its orderly functioning.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-9
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 9
description: Legislative disparities and uneven national regulatory or supervisory
approaches with regard to ICT risk trigger obstacles to the functioning of
the internal market in financial services, impeding the smooth exercise of
the freedom of establishment and the provision of services for financial entities
operating on a cross-border basis. Competition between the same type of financial
entities operating in different Member States could also be distorted. This
is the case, in particular, for areas where Union harmonisation has been very
limited, such as digital operational resilience testing, or absent, such as
the monitoring of ICT third-party risk. Disparities stemming from developments
envisaged at national level could generate further obstacles to the functioning
of the internal market to the detriment of market participants and financial
stability.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-10
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 10
description: To date, due to the ICT risk related provisions being only partially
addressed at Union level, there are gaps or overlaps in important areas, such
as ICT-related incident reporting and digital operational resilience testing,
and inconsistencies as a result of emerging divergent national rules or cost-ineffective
application of overlapping rules. This is particularly detrimental for an
ICT-intensive user such as the financial sector since technology risks have
no borders and the financial sector deploys its services on a wide cross-border
basis within and outside the Union. Individual financial entities operating
on a cross-border basis or holding several authorisations (e.g. one financial
entity can have a banking, an investment firm, and a payment institution licence,
each issued by a different competent authority in one or several Member States)
face operational challenges in addressing ICT risk and mitigating adverse
impacts of ICT incidents on their own and in a coherent cost-effective way.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-11
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 11
description: As the Single Rulebook has not been accompanied by a comprehensive
ICT or operational risk framework, further harmonisation of key digital operational
resilience requirements for all financial entities is required. The development
of ICT capabilities and overall resilience by financial entities, based on
those key requirements, with a view to withstanding operational outages, would
help preserve the stability and integrity of the Union financial markets and
thus contribute to ensuring a high level of protection of investors and consumers
in the Union. Since this Regulation aims to contribute to the smooth functioning
of the internal market, it should be based on the provisions of Article 114
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as interpreted
in accordance with the consistent case law of the Court of Justice of the
European Union (Court of Justice).
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-12
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 12
description: This Regulation aims to consolidate and upgrade ICT risk requirements
as part of the operational risk requirements that have, up to this point,
been addressed separately in various Union legal acts. While those acts covered
the main categories of financial risk (e.g. credit risk, market risk, counterparty
credit risk and liquidity risk, market conduct risk), they did not comprehensively
tackle, at the time of their adoption, all components of operational resilience.
The operational risk rules, when further developed in those Union legal acts,
often favoured a traditional quantitative approach to addressing risk (namely
setting a capital requirement to cover ICT risk) rather than targeted qualitative
rules for the protection, detection, containment, recovery and repair capabilities
against ICT-related incidents, or for reporting and digital testing capabilities.
Those acts were primarily meant to cover and update essential rules on prudential
supervision, market integrity or conduct. By consolidating and upgrading the
different rules on ICT risk, all provisions addressing digital risk in the
financial sector should for the first time be brought together in a consistent
manner in one single legislative act. Therefore, this Regulation fills in
the gaps or remedies inconsistencies in some of the prior legal acts, including
in relation to the terminology used therein, and explicitly refers to ICT
risk via targeted rules on ICT risk-management capabilities, incident reporting,
operational resilience testing and ICT third-party risk monitoring. This Regulation
should thus also raise awareness of ICT risk and acknowledge that ICT incidents
and a lack of operational resilience have the possibility to jeopardise the
soundness of financial entities.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-13
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 13
description: Financial entities should follow the same approach and the same
principle-based rules when addressing ICT risk taking into account their size
and overall risk profile, and the nature, scale and complexity of their services,
activities and operations. Consistency contributes to enhancing confidence
in the financial system and preserving its stability especially in times of
high reliance on ICT systems, platforms and infrastructures, which entails
increased digital risk. Observing basic cyber hygiene should also avoid imposing
heavy costs on the economy by minimising the impact and costs of ICT disruptions.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-14
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 14
description: A Regulation helps reduce regulatory complexity, fosters supervisory
convergence and increases legal certainty, and also contributes to limiting
compliance costs, especially for financial entities operating across borders,
and to reducing competitive distortions. Therefore, the choice of a Regulation
for the establishment of a common framework for the digital operational resilience
of financial entities is the most appropriate way to guarantee a homogenous
and coherent application of all components of ICT risk management by the Union
financial sector.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-15
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 15
description: Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the
Council (7) was the first horizontal cybersecurity framework enacted at Union
level, applying also to three types of financial entities, namely credit institutions,
trading venues and central counterparties. However, since Directive (EU) 2016/1148
set out a mechanism of identification at national level of operators of essential
services, only certain credit institutions, trading venues and central counterparties
that were identified by the Member States, have been brought into its scope
in practice, and hence required to comply with the ICT security and incident
notification requirements laid down in it. Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the
European Parliament and of the Council (8) sets a uniform criterion to determine
the entities falling within its scope of application (size-cap rule) while
also keeping the three types of financial entities in its scope.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-16
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 16
description: However, as this Regulation increases the level of harmonisation
of the various digital resilience components, by introducing requirements
on ICT risk management and ICT-related incident reporting that are more stringent
in comparison to those laid down in the current Union financial services law,
this higher level constitutes an increased harmonisation also in comparison
with the requirements laid down in Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Consequently,
this Regulation constitutes lex specialis with regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555.
At the same time, it is crucial to maintain a strong relationship between
the financial sector and the Union horizontal cybersecurity framework as currently
laid out in Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to ensure consistency with the cyber
security strategies adopted by Member States and to allow financial supervisors
to be made aware of cyber incidents affecting other sectors covered by that
Directive.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-17
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 17
description: In accordance with Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union
and without prejudice to the judicial review by the Court of Justice, this
Regulation should not affect the responsibility of Member States with regard
to essential State functions concerning public security, defence and the safeguarding
of national security, for example concerning the supply of information which
would be contrary to the safeguarding of national security.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-18
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 18
description: "To enable cross-sector learning and to effectively draw on experiences\
\ of other sectors in dealing with cyber threats, the financial entities referred\
\ to in Directive (EU) 2022/2555 should remain part of the \u2018ecosystem\u2019\
\ of that Directive (for example, Cooperation Group and computer security\
\ incident response teams (CSIRTs)).The ESAs and national competent authorities\
\ should be able to participate in the strategic policy discussions and the\
\ technical workings of the Cooperation Group under that Directive, and to\
\ exchange information and further cooperate with the single points of contact\
\ designated or established in accordance with that Directive. The competent\
\ authorities under this Regulation should also consult and cooperate with\
\ the CSIRTs. The competent authorities should also be able to request technical\
\ advice from the competent authorities designated or established in accordance\
\ with Directive (EU) 2022/2555 and establish cooperation arrangements that\
\ aim to ensure effective and fast-response coordination mechanisms."
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-19
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 19
description: Given the strong interlinkages between the digital resilience and
the physical resilience of financial entities, a coherent approach with regard
to the resilience of critical entities is necessary in this Regulation and
Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and the Council (9). Given
that the physical resilience of financial entities is addressed in a comprehensive
manner by the ICT risk management and reporting obligations covered by this
Regulation, the obligations laid down in Chapters III and IV of Directive
(EU) 2022/2557 should not apply to financial entities falling within the scope
of that Directive.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-20
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 20
description: "Cloud computing service providers are one category of digital\
\ infrastructure covered by Directive (EU) 2022/2555. The Union Oversight\
\ Framework (\u2018Oversight Framework\u2019) established by this Regulation\
\ applies to all critical ICT third-party service providers, including cloud\
\ computing service providers providing ICT services to financial entities,\
\ and should be considered complementary to the supervision carried out pursuant\
\ to Directive (EU) 2022/ 2555. Moreover, the Oversight Framework established\
\ by this Regulation should cover cloud computing service providers in the\
\ absence of a Union horizontal framework establishing a digital oversight\
\ authority."
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-21
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 21
description: In order to maintain full control over ICT risk, financial entities
need to have comprehensive capabilities to enable a strong and effective ICT
risk management, as well as specific mechanisms and policies for handling
all ICT-related incidents and for reporting major ICT-related incidents. Likewise,
financial entities should have policies in place for the testing of ICT systems,
controls and processes, as well as for managing ICT third-party risk. The
digital operational resilience baseline for financial entities should be increased
while also allowing for a proportionate application of requirements for certain
financial entities, particularly microenterprises, as well as financial entities
subject to a simplified ICT risk management framework. To facilitate an efficient
supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision that is
proportionate and addresses the need to reduce administrative burdens on the
competent authorities, the relevant national supervisory arrangements in respect
of such financial entities should take into account their size and overall
risk profile, and the nature, scale and complexity of their services, activities
and operations even when the relevant thresholds established in Article 5
of Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council
(10) are exceeded. In particular, supervisory activities should focus primarily
on the need to address serious risks associated with the ICT risk management
of a particular entity.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-22
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 22
description: ICT-related incident reporting thresholds and taxonomies vary significantly
at national level. While common ground may be achieved through the relevant
work undertaken by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) established
by Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council
(11) and the Cooperation Group under Directive (EU) 2022/2555, divergent approaches
on setting the thresholds and use of taxonomies still exist, or can emerge,
for the remainder of financial entities. Due to those divergences, there are
multiple requirements that financial entities must comply with, especially
when operating across several Member States and when part of a financial group.
Moreover, such divergences have the potential to hinder the creation of further
uniform or centralised Union mechanisms that speed up the reporting process
and support a quick and smooth exchange of information between competent authorities,
which is crucial for addressing ICT risk in the event of large-scale attacks
with potentially systemic consequences.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-23
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 23
description: To reduce the administrative burden and potentially duplicative
reporting obligations for certain financial entities, the requirement for
the incident reporting pursuant to Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European
Parliament and of the Council (12) should cease to apply to payment service
providers that fall within the scope of this Regulation. Consequently, credit
institutions, e-money institutions, payment institutions and account information
service providers, as referred to in Article 33(1) of that Directive, should,
from the date of application of this Regulation, report pursuant to this Regulation,
all operational or security payment-related incidents which have been previously
reported pursuant to that Directive, irrespective of whether such incidents
are ICT-related.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-24
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 24
description: To enable competent authorities to fulfil supervisory roles by
acquiring a complete overview of the nature, frequency, significance and impact
of ICT-related incidents and to enhance the exchange of information between
relevant public authorities, including law enforcement authorities and resolution
authorities, this Regulation should lay down a robust ICT-related incident
reporting regime whereby the relevant requirements address current gaps in
financial services law, and remove existing overlaps and duplications to alleviate
costs. It is essential to harmonise the ICT-related incident reporting regime
by requiring all financial entities to report to their competent authorities
through a single streamlined framework as set out in this Regulation. In addition,
the ESAs should be empowered to further specify relevant elements for the
ICT-related incident reporting framework, such as taxonomy, timeframes, data
sets, templates and applicable thresholds. To ensure full consistency with
Directive (EU) 2022/2555, financial entities should be allowed, on a voluntary
basis, to notify significant cyber threats to the relevant competent authority,
when they consider that the cyber threat is of relevance to the financial
system, service users or clients.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-25
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 25
description: Digital operational resilience testing requirements have been developed
in certain financial subsectors setting out frameworks that are not always
fully aligned. This leads to a potential duplication of costs for cross-border
financial entities and makes the mutual recognition of the results of digital
operational resilience testing complex which, in turn, can fragment the internal
market.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-26
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 26
description: In addition, where no ICT testing is required, vulnerabilities
remain undetected and result in exposing a financial entity to ICT risk and
ultimately create a higher risk to the stability and integrity of the financial
sector. Without Union intervention, digital operational resilience testing
would continue to be inconsistent and would lack a system of mutual recognition
of ICT testing results across different jurisdictions. In addition, as it
is unlikely that other financial subsectors would adopt testing schemes on
a meaningful scale, they would miss out on the potential benefits of a testing
framework, in terms of revealing ICT vulnerabilities and risks, and testing
defence capabilities and business continuity, which contributes to increasing
the trust of customers, suppliers and business partners. To remedy those overlaps,
divergences and gaps, it is necessary to lay down rules for a coordinated
testing regime and thereby facilitate the mutual recognition of advanced testing
for financial entities meeting the criteria set out in this Regulation.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-27
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 27
description: "Financial entities\u2019 reliance on the use of ICT services is\
\ partly driven by their need to adapt to an emerging competitive digital\
\ global economy, to boost their business efficiency and to meet consumer\
\ demand. The nature and extent of such reliance has been continuously evolving\
\ in recent years, driving cost reduction in financial intermediation, enabling\
\ business expansion and scalability in the deployment of financial activities\
\ while offering a wide range of ICT tools to manage complex internal processes."
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-28
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 28
description: The extensive use of ICT services is evidenced by complex contractual
arrangements, whereby financial entities often encounter difficulties in negotiating
contractual terms that are tailored to the prudential standards or other regulatory
requirements to which they are subject, or otherwise in enforcing specific
rights, such as access or audit rights, even when the latter are enshrined
in their contractual arrangements. Moreover, many of those contractual arrangements
do not provide for sufficient safeguards allowing for the fully-fledged monitoring
of subcontracting processes, thus depriving the financial entity of its ability
to assess the associated risks. In addition, as ICT third- party service providers
often provide standardised services to different types of clients, such contractual
arrangements do not always cater adequately for the individual or specific
needs of financial industry actors.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-29
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 29
description: "Even though Union financial services law contains certain general\
\ rules on outsourcing, monitoring of the contractual dimension is not fully\
\ anchored into Union law. In the absence of clear and bespoke Union standards\
\ applying to the contractual arrangements concluded with ICT third-party\
\ service providers, the external source of ICT risk is not comprehensively\
\ addressed. Consequently, it is necessary to set out certain key principles\
\ to guide financial entities\u2019 management of ICT third-party risk, which\
\ are of particular importance when financial entities resort to ICT third-party\
\ service providers to support their critical or important functions. Those\
\ principles should be accompanied by a set of core contractual rights in\
\ relation to several elements in the performance and termination of contractual\
\ arrangements with a view to providing certain minimum safeguards in order\
\ to strengthen financial entities\u2019 ability to effectively monitor all\
\ ICT risk emerging at the level of third-party service providers. Those principles\
\ are complementary to the sectoral law applicable to outsourcing."
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-30
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 30
description: "A certain lack of homogeneity and convergence regarding the monitoring\
\ of ICT third-party risk and ICT third-party dependencies is evident today.\
\ Despite efforts to address outsourcing, such as EBA Guidelines on outsourcing\
\ of 2019 and ESMA Guidelines on outsourcing to cloud service providers of\
\ 2021 the broader issue of counteracting systemic risk which may be triggered\
\ by the financial sector\u2019s exposure to a limited number of critical\
\ ICT third- party service providers is not sufficiently addressed by Union\
\ law. The lack of rules at Union level is compounded by the absence of national\
\ rules on mandates and tools that allow financial supervisors to acquire\
\ a good understanding of ICT third-party dependencies and to monitor adequately\
\ risks arising from the concentration of ICT third-party dependencies."
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-31
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 31
description: Taking into account the potential systemic risk entailed by increased
outsourcing practices and by the ICT third- party concentration, and mindful
of the insufficiency of national mechanisms in providing financial supervisors
with adequate tools to quantify, qualify and redress the consequences of ICT
risk occurring at critical ICT third-party service providers, it is necessary
to establish an appropriate Oversight Framework allowing for a continuous
monitoring of the activities of ICT third-party service providers that are
critical ICT third-party service providers to financial entities, while ensuring
that the confidentiality and security of customers other than financial entities
is preserved. While intra-group provision of ICT services entails specific
risks and benefits, it should not be automatically considered less risky than
the provision of ICT services by providers outside of a financial group and
should therefore be subject to the same regulatory framework. However, when
ICT services are provided from within the same financial group, financial
entities might have a higher level of control over intra-group providers,
which ought to be taken into account in the overall risk assessment.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-32
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 32
description: With ICT risk becoming more and more complex and sophisticated,
good measures for the detection and prevention of ICT risk depend to a great
extent on the regular sharing between financial entities of threat and vulnerability
intelligence. Information sharing contributes to creating increased awareness
of cyber threats. In turn, this enhances the capacity of financial entities
to prevent cyber threats from becoming real ICT-related incidents and enables
financial entities to more effectively contain the impact of ICT-related incidents
and to recover faster. In the absence of guidance at Union level, several
factors seem to have inhibited such intelligence sharing, in particular uncertainty
about its compatibility with data protection, anti-trust and liability rules.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-33
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 33
description: In addition, doubts about the type of information that can be shared
with other market participants, or with non- supervisory authorities (such
as ENISA, for analytical input, or Europol, for law enforcement purposes)
lead to useful information being withheld. Therefore, the extent and quality
of information sharing currently remains limited and fragmented, with relevant
exchanges mostly being local (by way of national initiatives) and with no
consistent Union-wide information-sharing arrangements tailored to the needs
of an integrated financial system. It is therefore important to strengthen
those communication channels.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-34
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 34
description: "Financial entities should be encouraged to exchange among themselves\
\ cyber threat information and intelligence, and to collectively leverage\
\ their individual knowledge and practical experience at strategic, tactical\
\ and operational levels with a view to enhancing their capabilities to adequately\
\ assess, monitor, defend against, and respond to cyber threats, by participating\
\ in information sharing arrangements. It is therefore necessary to enable\
\ the emergence at Union level of mechanisms for voluntary information-sharing\
\ arrangements which, when conducted in trusted environments, would help the\
\ community of the financial industry to prevent and collectively respond\
\ to cyber threats by quickly limiting the spread of ICT risk and impeding\
\ potential contagion throughout the financial channels. Those mechanisms\
\ should comply with the applicable competition law rules of the Union set\
\ out in the Communication from the Commission of 14 January 2011 entitled\
\ \u2018Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the\
\ Functioning of the European Union to horizontal cooperation agreements\u2019\
, as well as with Union data protection rules, in particular Regulation (EU)\
\ 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (13). They should\
\ operate based on the use of one or more of the legal bases that are laid\
\ down in Article 6 of that Regulation, such as in the context of the processing\
\ of personal data that is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interest\
\ pursued by the controller or by a third party, as referred to in Article\
\ 6(1), point (f), of that Regulation, as well as in the context of the processing\
\ of personal data necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which\
\ the controller is subject, necessary for the performance of a task carried\
\ out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested\
\ in the controller, as referred to in Article 6(1), points (c) and (e), respectively,\
\ of that Regulation."
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-35
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 35
description: "In order to maintain a high level of digital operational resilience\
\ for the whole financial sector, and at the same time to keep pace with technological\
\ developments, this Regulation should address risk stemming from all types\
\ of ICT services. To that end, the definition of ICT services in the context\
\ of this Regulation should be understood in a broad manner, encompassing\
\ digital and data services provided through ICT systems to one or more internal\
\ or external users on an ongoing basis. That definition should, for instance,\
\ include so called \u2018over the top\u2019 services, which fall within the\
\ category of electronic communications services. It should exclude only the\
\ limited category of traditional analogue telephone services qualifying as\
\ Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) services, landline services, Plain\
\ Old Telephone Service (POTS), or fixed-line telephone services."
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-36
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 36
description: Notwithstanding the broad coverage envisaged by this Regulation,
the application of the digital operational resilience rules should take into
account the significant differences between financial entities in terms of
their size and overall risk profile. As a general principle, when distributing
resources and capabilities for the implementation of the ICT risk management
framework, financial entities should duly balance their ICT-related needs
to their size and overall risk profile, and the nature, scale and complexity
of their services, activities and operations, while competent authorities
should continue to assess and review the approach of such distribution.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-37
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 37
description: Account information service providers, referred to in Article 33(1)
of Directive (EU) 2015/2366, are explicitly included in the scope of this
Regulation, taking into account the specific nature of their activities and
the risks arising therefrom. In addition, electronic money institutions and
payment institutions exempted pursuant to Article 9(1) of Directive 2009/110/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council (14) and Article 32(1) of Directive
(EU) 2015/2366 are included in the scope of this Regulation even if they have
not been granted authorisation in accordance Directive 2009/110/EC to issue
electronic money, or if they have not been granted authorisation in accordance
with Directive (EU) 2015/2366 to provide and execute payment services. However,
post office giro institutions, referred to in Article 2(5), point (3), of
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (15), are
excluded from the scope of this Regulation. The competent authority for payment
institutions exempted pursuant to Directive (EU) 2015/2366, electronic money
institutions exempted pursuant to Directive 2009/110/EC and account information
service providers as referred to in Article 33(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366,
should be the competent authority designated in accordance with Article 22
of Directive (EU) 2015/2366.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-38
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 38
description: As larger financial entities might enjoy wider resources and can
swiftly deploy funds to develop governance structures and set up various corporate
strategies, only financial entities that are not microenterprises in the sense
of this Regulation should be required to establish more complex governance
arrangements. Such entities are better equipped in particular to set up dedicated
management functions for supervising arrangements with ICT third-party service
providers or for dealing with crisis management, to organise their ICT risk
management according to the three lines of defence model, or to set up an
internal risk management and control model, and to submit their ICT risk management
framework to internal audits.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-39
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 39
description: Some financial entities benefit from exemptions or are subject
to a very light regulatory framework under the relevant sector-specific Union
law. Such financial entities include managers of alternative investment funds
referred to in Article 3(2) of Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council (16), insurance and reinsurance undertakings referred to
in Article 4 of Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council (17), and institutions for occupational retirement provision which
operate pension schemes which together
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-40
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 40
description: Since the entities referred to in Article 2(5), points (4) to (23),
of Directive 2013/36/EU are excluded from the scope of that Directive, Member
States should consequently be able to choose to exempt from the application
of this Regulation such entities located within their respective territories.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-41
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 41
description: Similarly, in order to align this Regulation to the scope of Directive
2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (18), it is also
appropriate to exclude from the scope of this Regulation natural and legal
persons referred in Articles 2 and 3 of that Directive which are allowed to
provide investment services without having to obtain an authorisation under
Directive 2014/65/EU. However, Article 2 of Directive 2014/65/EU also excludes
from the scope of that Directive entities which qualify as financial entities
for the purposes of this Regulation such as, central securities depositories,
collective investment undertakings or insurance and reinsurance undertakings.
The exclusion from the scope of this Regulation of the persons and entities
referred to in Articles 2 and 3 of that Directive should not encompass those
central securities depositories, collective investment undertakings or insurance
and reinsurance undertakings.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-42
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 42
description: Under sector-specific Union law, some financial entities are subject
to lighter requirements or exemptions for reasons associated with their size
or the services they provide. That category of financial entities includes
small and non- interconnected investment firms, small institutions for occupational
retirement provision which may be excluded from the scope of Directive (EU)
2016/2341 under the conditions laid down in Article 5 of that Directive by
the Member State concerned and operate pension schemes which together do not
have more than 100 members in total, as well as institutions exempted pursuant
to Directive 2013/36/EU. Therefore, in accordance with the principle of proportionality
and to preserve the spirit of sector-specific Union law, it is also appropriate
to subject those financial entities to a simplified ICT risk management framework
under this Regulation. The proportionate character of the ICT risk management
framework covering those financial entities should not be altered by the regulatory
technical standards that are to be developed by the ESAs. Moreover, in accordance
with the principle of proportionality, it is appropriate to also subject payment
institutions referred to in Article 32(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 and
electronic money institutions referred to in Article 9 of Directive 2009/110/EC
exempted in accordance with national law transposing those Union legal acts
to a simplified ICT risk management framework under this Regulation, while
payment institutions and electronic money institutions which have not been
exempted in accordance with their respective national law transposing sectoral
Union law should comply with the general framework laid down by this Regulation.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-43
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 43
description: "Similarly, financial entities which qualify as microenterprises\
\ or are subject to the simplified ICT risk management framework under this\
\ Regulation should not be required to establish a role to monitor their arrangements\
\ concluded with ICT third-party service providers on the use of ICT services;\
\ or to designate a member of senior management to be responsible for overseeing\
\ the related risk exposure and relevant documentation; to assign the responsibility\
\ for managing and overseeing ICT risk to a control function and ensure an\
\ appropriate level of independence of such control function in order to avoid\
\ conflicts of interest; to document and review at least once a year the ICT\
\ risk management framework; to subject to internal audit on a regular basis\
\ the ICT risk management framework; to perform in-depth assessments after\
\ major changes in their network and information system infrastructures and\
\ processes; to regularly conduct risk analyses on legacy ICT systems; to\
\ subject the implementation of the ICT Response and Recovery plans to independent\
\ internal audit reviews; to have a crisis management function, to expand\
\ the testing of business continuity and response and recovery plans to capture\
\ switchover scenarios between primary ICT infrastructure and redundant facilities;\
\ to report to competent authorities, upon their request, an estimation of\
\ aggregated annual costs and losses caused by major ICT-related incidents,\
\ to maintain redundant ICT capacities; to communicate to national competent\
\ authorities implemented changes following post ICT-related incident reviews;\
\ to monitor on a continuous basis relevant technological developments, to\
\ establish a comprehensive digital operational resilience testing programme\
\ as an integral part of the ICT risk management framework provided for in\
\ this Regulation, or to adopt and regularly review a strategy on ICT third-party\
\ risk. In addition, microenterprises should only be required to assess the\
\ need to maintain such redundant ICT capacities based on their risk profile.\
\ Microenterprises should benefit from a more flexible regime as regards digital\
\ operational resilience testing programmes. When considering the type and\
\ frequency of testing to be performed, they should properly balance the objective\
\ of maintaining a high digital operational resilience, the available resources\
\ and their overall risk profile. Microenterprises and financial entities\
\ subject to the simplified ICT risk management framework under this Regulation\
\ should be exempted from the requirement to perform advanced testing of ICT\
\ tools, systems and processes based on threat-led penetration testing (TLPT),\
\ as only financial entities meeting the criteria set out in this Regulation\
\ should be required to carry out such testing. In light of their limited\
\ capabilities, microenterprises should be able to agree with the ICT third-party\
\ service provider to delegate the financial entity\u2019s rights of access,\
\ inspection and audit to an independent third-party, to be appointed by the\
\ ICT third-party service provider, provided that the financial entity is\
\ able to request, at any time, all relevant information and assurance on\
\ the ICT third-party service provider\u2019s performance from the respective\
\ independent third-party."
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-44
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 44
description: As only those financial entities identified for the purposes of
the advanced digital resilience testing should be required to conduct threat-led
penetration tests, the administrative processes and financial costs entailed
in the performance of such tests should be borne by a small percentage of
financial entities.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-45
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 45
description: "To ensure full alignment and overall consistency between financial\
\ entities\u2019 business strategies, on the one hand, and the conduct of\
\ ICT risk management, on the other hand, the financial entities\u2019 management\
\ bodies should be required to maintain a pivotal and active role in steering\
\ and adapting the ICT risk management framework and the overall digital operational\
\ resilience strategy. The approach to be taken by management bodies should\
\ not only focus on the means of ensuring the resilience of the ICT systems,\
\ but should also cover people and processes through a set of policies which\
\ cultivate, at each corporate layer, and for all staff, a strong sense of\
\ awareness about cyber risks and a commitment to observe a strict cyber hygiene\
\ at all levels. The ultimate responsibility of the management body in managing\
\ a financial entity\u2019s ICT risk should be an overarching principle of\
\ that comprehensive approach, further translated into the continuous engagement\
\ of the management body in the control of the monitoring of the ICT risk\
\ management."
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-46
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 46
description: "Moreover, the principle of the management body\u2019s full and\
\ ultimate responsibility for the management of the ICT risk of the financial\
\ entity goes hand in hand with the need to secure a level of ICT-related\
\ investments and an overall budget for the financial entity that would enable\
\ the financial entity to achieve a high level of digital operational resilience."
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-47
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 47
description: Inspired by relevant international, national and industry best
practices, guidelines, recommendations and approaches to the management of
cyber risk, this Regulation promotes a set of principles that facilitate the
overall structure of ICT risk management. Consequently, as long as the main
capabilities which financial entities put in place address the various functions
in the ICT risk management (identification, protection and prevention, detection,
response and recovery, learning and evolving and communication) set out in
this Regulation, financial entities should remain free to use ICT risk management
models that are differently framed or categorised.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-48
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 48
description: To keep pace with an evolving cyber threat landscape, financial
entities should maintain updated ICT systems that are reliable and capable,
not only for guaranteeing the processing of data required for their services,
but also for ensuring sufficient technological resilience to allow them to
deal adequately with additional processing needs due to stressed market conditions
or other adverse situations.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-49
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 49
description: Efficient business continuity and recovery plans are necessary
to allow financial entities to promptly and quickly resolve ICT-related incidents,
in particular cyber-attacks, by limiting damage and giving priority to the
resumption of activities and recovery actions in accordance with their back-up
policies. However, such resumption should in no way jeopardise the integrity
and security of the network and information systems or the availability, authenticity,
integrity or confidentiality of data.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-50
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 50
description: While this Regulation allows financial entities to determine their
recovery time and recovery point objectives in a flexible manner and hence
to set such objectives by fully taking into account the nature and the criticality
of the relevant functions and any specific business needs, it should nevertheless
require them to carry out an assessment of the potential overall impact on
market efficiency when determining such objectives.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-51
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 51
description: The propagators of cyber-attacks tend to pursue financial gains
directly at the source, thus exposing financial entities to significant consequences.
To prevent ICT systems from losing integrity or becoming unavailable, and
hence to avoid data breaches and damage to physical ICT infrastructure, the
reporting of major ICT-related incidents by financial entities should be significantly
improved and streamlined. ICT-related incident reporting should be harmonised
through the introduction of a requirement for all financial entities to report
directly to their relevant competent authorities. Where a financial entity
is subject to supervision by more than one national competent authority, Member
States should designate a single competent authority as the addressee of such
reporting. Credit institutions classified as significant in accordance with
Article 6(4) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (19) should submit such
reporting to the national competent authorities, which should subsequently
transmit the report to the European Central Bank (ECB).
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-52
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 52
description: 'The direct reporting should enable financial supervisors to have
immediate access to information about major ICT- related incidents. Financial
supervisors should in turn pass on details of major ICT-related incidents
to public non- financial authorities (such as competent authorities and single
points of contact under Directive (EU) 2022/2555, national data protection
authorities, and to law enforcement authorities for major ICT-related incidents
of a criminal nature) in order to enhance such authorities awareness of such
incidents and, in the case of CSIRTs, to facilitate prompt assistance that
may be given to financial entities, as appropriate. Member States should,
in addition, be able to determine that financial entities themselves should
provide such information to public authorities outside the financial services
area. Those information flows should allow financial entities to swiftly benefit
from any relevant technical input, advice about remedies, and subsequent follow-up
from such authorities. The information on major ICT-related incidents should
be mutually channelled: financial supervisors should provide all necessary
feedback or guidance to the financial entity, while the ESAs should share
anonymised data on cyber threats and vulnerabilities relating to an incident,
to aid wider collective defence.'
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-53
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 53
description: While all financial entities should be required to carry out incident
reporting, that requirement is not expected to affect all of them in the same
manner. Indeed, relevant materiality thresholds, as well as reporting timelines,
should be duly adjusted, in the context of delegated acts based on the regulatory
technical standards to be developed by the ESAs, with a view to covering only
major ICT-related incidents. In addition, the specificities of financial entities
should be taken into account when setting timelines for reporting obligations.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-54
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 54
description: "This Regulation should require credit institutions, payment institutions,\
\ account information service providers and electronic money institutions\
\ to report all operational or security payment-related incidents \u2013 previously\
\ reported under Directive (EU) 2015/2366 \u2013 irrespective of the ICT nature\
\ of the incident."
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-55
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 55
description: The ESAs should be tasked with assessing the feasibility and conditions
for a possible centralisation of ICT-related incident reports at Union level.
Such centralisation could consist of a single EU Hub for major ICT-related
incident reporting either directly receiving relevant reports and automatically
notifying national competent authorities, or merely centralising relevant
reports forwarded by the national competent authorities and thus fulfilling
a coordination role. The ESAs should be tasked with preparing, in consultation
with the ECB and ENISA, a joint report exploring the feasibility of setting
up a single EU Hub.
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-56
assessable: false
depth: 2
parent_urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:node2
ref_id: Recital 56
description: "In order to achieve a high level of digital operational resilience,\
\ and in line with both the relevant international standards (e.g. the G7\
\ Fundamental Elements for Threat-Led Penetration Testing) and with the frameworks\
\ applied in the Union, such as the TIBER-EU, financial entities should regularly\
\ test their ICT systems and staff having ICT- related responsibilities with\
\ regard to the effectiveness of their preventive, detection, response and\
\ recovery capabilities, to uncover and address potential ICT vulnerabilities.\
\ To reflect differences that exist across, and within, the various financial\
\ subsectors as regards financial entities\u2019 level of cybersecurity preparedness,\
\ testing should include a wide variety of tools and actions, ranging from\
\ the assessment of basic requirements (e.g. vulnerability assessments and\
\ scans, open source analyses, network security assessments, gap analyses,\
\ physical security reviews, questionnaires and scanning software solutions,\
\ source code reviews where feasible, scenario-based tests, compatibility\
\ testing, performance testing or end-to-end testing) to more advanced testing\
\ by means of TLPT. Such advanced testing should be required only of financial\
\ entities that are mature enough from an ICT perspective to reasonably carry\
\ it out. The digital operational resilience testing required by this Regulation\
\ should thus be more demanding for those financial entities meeting the criteria\
\ set out in this Regulation (for example, large, systemic and ICT-mature\
\ credit institutions, stock exchanges, central securities depositories and\
\ central counterparties) than for other financial entities. At the same time,\
\ the digital operational resilience testing by means of TLPT should be more\
\ relevant for financial entities operating in core financial services subsectors\
\ and playing a systemic role (for example, payments, banking, and clearing\
\ and settlement), and less relevant for other subsectors (for example, asset\
\ managers and credit rating agencies)."
- urn: urn:intuitem:risk:req_node:dora:recital-57