forked from chenshuo/libevent
-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 0
/
arc4random.c
556 lines (496 loc) · 12.8 KB
/
arc4random.c
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
/* Portable arc4random.c based on arc4random.c from OpenBSD.
* Portable version by Chris Davis, adapted for Libevent by Nick Mathewson
* Copyright (c) 2010 Chris Davis, Niels Provos, and Nick Mathewson
* Copyright (c) 2010-2012 Niels Provos and Nick Mathewson
*
* Note that in Libevent, this file isn't compiled directly. Instead,
* it's included from evutil_rand.c
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <[email protected]>
* Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <[email protected]>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/*
* Arc4 random number generator for OpenBSD.
*
* This code is derived from section 17.1 of Applied Cryptography,
* second edition, which describes a stream cipher allegedly
* compatible with RSA Labs "RC4" cipher (the actual description of
* which is a trade secret). The same algorithm is used as a stream
* cipher called "arcfour" in Tatu Ylonen's ssh package.
*
* Here the stream cipher has been modified always to include the time
* when initializing the state. That makes it impossible to
* regenerate the same random sequence twice, so this can't be used
* for encryption, but will generate good random numbers.
*
* RC4 is a registered trademark of RSA Laboratories.
*/
#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT
#define ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT
#endif
#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_UINT32
#define ARC4RANDOM_UINT32 uint32_t
#endif
#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NO_INCLUDES
#include "evconfig-private.h"
#ifdef _WIN32
#include <wincrypt.h>
#include <process.h>
#else
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#ifdef EVENT__HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#endif
#endif
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#endif
/* Add platform entropy 32 bytes (256 bits) at a time. */
#define ADD_ENTROPY 32
/* Re-seed from the platform RNG after generating this many bytes. */
#define BYTES_BEFORE_RESEED 1600000
struct arc4_stream {
unsigned char i;
unsigned char j;
unsigned char s[256];
};
#ifdef _WIN32
#define getpid _getpid
#define pid_t int
#endif
static int rs_initialized;
static struct arc4_stream rs;
static pid_t arc4_stir_pid;
static int arc4_count;
static int arc4_seeded_ok;
static inline unsigned char arc4_getbyte(void);
static inline void
arc4_init(void)
{
int n;
for (n = 0; n < 256; n++)
rs.s[n] = n;
rs.i = 0;
rs.j = 0;
}
static inline void
arc4_addrandom(const unsigned char *dat, int datlen)
{
int n;
unsigned char si;
rs.i--;
for (n = 0; n < 256; n++) {
rs.i = (rs.i + 1);
si = rs.s[rs.i];
rs.j = (rs.j + si + dat[n % datlen]);
rs.s[rs.i] = rs.s[rs.j];
rs.s[rs.j] = si;
}
rs.j = rs.i;
}
#ifndef _WIN32
static ssize_t
read_all(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t count)
{
size_t numread = 0;
ssize_t result;
while (numread < count) {
result = read(fd, buf+numread, count-numread);
if (result<0)
return -1;
else if (result == 0)
break;
numread += result;
}
return (ssize_t)numread;
}
#endif
#ifdef _WIN32
#define TRY_SEED_WIN32
static int
arc4_seed_win32(void)
{
/* This is adapted from Tor's crypto_seed_rng() */
static int provider_set = 0;
static HCRYPTPROV provider;
unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
if (!provider_set) {
if (!CryptAcquireContext(&provider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL,
CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) {
if (GetLastError() != (DWORD)NTE_BAD_KEYSET)
return -1;
}
provider_set = 1;
}
if (!CryptGenRandom(provider, sizeof(buf), buf))
return -1;
arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf));
evutil_memclear_(buf, sizeof(buf));
arc4_seeded_ok = 1;
return 0;
}
#endif
#if defined(EVENT__HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H) && defined(EVENT__HAVE_SYSCTL)
#if EVENT__HAVE_DECL_CTL_KERN && EVENT__HAVE_DECL_KERN_RANDOM && EVENT__HAVE_DECL_RANDOM_UUID
#define TRY_SEED_SYSCTL_LINUX
static int
arc4_seed_sysctl_linux(void)
{
/* Based on code by William Ahern, this function tries to use the
* RANDOM_UUID sysctl to get entropy from the kernel. This can work
* even if /dev/urandom is inaccessible for some reason (e.g., we're
* running in a chroot). */
int mib[] = { CTL_KERN, KERN_RANDOM, RANDOM_UUID };
unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
size_t len, n;
unsigned i;
int any_set;
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
for (len = 0; len < sizeof(buf); len += n) {
n = sizeof(buf) - len;
if (0 != sysctl(mib, 3, &buf[len], &n, NULL, 0))
return -1;
}
/* make sure that the buffer actually got set. */
for (i=0,any_set=0; i<sizeof(buf); ++i) {
any_set |= buf[i];
}
if (!any_set)
return -1;
arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf));
evutil_memclear_(buf, sizeof(buf));
arc4_seeded_ok = 1;
return 0;
}
#endif
#if EVENT__HAVE_DECL_CTL_KERN && EVENT__HAVE_DECL_KERN_ARND
#define TRY_SEED_SYSCTL_BSD
static int
arc4_seed_sysctl_bsd(void)
{
/* Based on code from William Ahern and from OpenBSD, this function
* tries to use the KERN_ARND syscall to get entropy from the kernel.
* This can work even if /dev/urandom is inaccessible for some reason
* (e.g., we're running in a chroot). */
int mib[] = { CTL_KERN, KERN_ARND };
unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
size_t len, n;
int i, any_set;
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
len = sizeof(buf);
if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1) {
for (len = 0; len < sizeof(buf); len += sizeof(unsigned)) {
n = sizeof(unsigned);
if (n + len > sizeof(buf))
n = len - sizeof(buf);
if (sysctl(mib, 2, &buf[len], &n, NULL, 0) == -1)
return -1;
}
}
/* make sure that the buffer actually got set. */
for (i=any_set=0; i<sizeof(buf); ++i) {
any_set |= buf[i];
}
if (!any_set)
return -1;
arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf));
evutil_memclear_(buf, sizeof(buf));
arc4_seeded_ok = 1;
return 0;
}
#endif
#endif /* defined(EVENT__HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H) */
#ifdef __linux__
#define TRY_SEED_PROC_SYS_KERNEL_RANDOM_UUID
static int
arc4_seed_proc_sys_kernel_random_uuid(void)
{
/* Occasionally, somebody will make /proc/sys accessible in a chroot,
* but not /dev/urandom. Let's try /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid.
* Its format is stupid, so we need to decode it from hex.
*/
int fd;
char buf[128];
unsigned char entropy[64];
int bytes, n, i, nybbles;
for (bytes = 0; bytes<ADD_ENTROPY; ) {
fd = evutil_open_closeonexec_("/proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid", O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd < 0)
return -1;
n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
close(fd);
if (n<=0)
return -1;
memset(entropy, 0, sizeof(entropy));
for (i=nybbles=0; i<n; ++i) {
if (EVUTIL_ISXDIGIT_(buf[i])) {
int nyb = evutil_hex_char_to_int_(buf[i]);
if (nybbles & 1) {
entropy[nybbles/2] |= nyb;
} else {
entropy[nybbles/2] |= nyb<<4;
}
++nybbles;
}
}
if (nybbles < 2)
return -1;
arc4_addrandom(entropy, nybbles/2);
bytes += nybbles/2;
}
evutil_memclear_(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
evutil_memclear_(buf, sizeof(buf));
arc4_seeded_ok = 1;
return 0;
}
#endif
#ifndef _WIN32
#define TRY_SEED_URANDOM
static char *arc4random_urandom_filename = NULL;
static int arc4_seed_urandom_helper_(const char *fname)
{
unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
int fd;
size_t n;
fd = evutil_open_closeonexec_(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd<0)
return -1;
n = read_all(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
close(fd);
if (n != sizeof(buf))
return -1;
arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf));
evutil_memclear_(buf, sizeof(buf));
arc4_seeded_ok = 1;
return 0;
}
static int
arc4_seed_urandom(void)
{
/* This is adapted from Tor's crypto_seed_rng() */
static const char *filenames[] = {
"/dev/srandom", "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", NULL
};
int i;
if (arc4random_urandom_filename)
return arc4_seed_urandom_helper_(arc4random_urandom_filename);
for (i = 0; filenames[i]; ++i) {
if (arc4_seed_urandom_helper_(filenames[i]) == 0) {
return 0;
}
}
return -1;
}
#endif
static int
arc4_seed(void)
{
int ok = 0;
/* We try every method that might work, and don't give up even if one
* does seem to work. There's no real harm in over-seeding, and if
* one of these sources turns out to be broken, that would be bad. */
#ifdef TRY_SEED_WIN32
if (0 == arc4_seed_win32())
ok = 1;
#endif
#ifdef TRY_SEED_URANDOM
if (0 == arc4_seed_urandom())
ok = 1;
#endif
#ifdef TRY_SEED_PROC_SYS_KERNEL_RANDOM_UUID
if (arc4random_urandom_filename == NULL &&
0 == arc4_seed_proc_sys_kernel_random_uuid())
ok = 1;
#endif
#ifdef TRY_SEED_SYSCTL_LINUX
/* Apparently Linux is deprecating sysctl, and spewing warning
* messages when you try to use it. */
if (!ok && 0 == arc4_seed_sysctl_linux())
ok = 1;
#endif
#ifdef TRY_SEED_SYSCTL_BSD
if (0 == arc4_seed_sysctl_bsd())
ok = 1;
#endif
return ok ? 0 : -1;
}
static int
arc4_stir(void)
{
int i;
if (!rs_initialized) {
arc4_init();
rs_initialized = 1;
}
arc4_seed();
if (!arc4_seeded_ok)
return -1;
/*
* Discard early keystream, as per recommendations in
* "Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4" by
* Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin, and Adi Shamir.
* http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/Rc4_ksa.ps
*
* Ilya Mironov's "(Not So) Random Shuffles of RC4" suggests that
* we drop at least 2*256 bytes, with 12*256 as a conservative
* value.
*
* RFC4345 says to drop 6*256.
*
* At least some versions of this code drop 4*256, in a mistaken
* belief that "words" in the Fluhrer/Mantin/Shamir paper refers
* to processor words.
*
* We add another sect to the cargo cult, and choose 12*256.
*/
for (i = 0; i < 12*256; i++)
(void)arc4_getbyte();
arc4_count = BYTES_BEFORE_RESEED;
return 0;
}
static void
arc4_stir_if_needed(void)
{
pid_t pid = getpid();
if (arc4_count <= 0 || !rs_initialized || arc4_stir_pid != pid)
{
arc4_stir_pid = pid;
arc4_stir();
}
}
static inline unsigned char
arc4_getbyte(void)
{
unsigned char si, sj;
rs.i = (rs.i + 1);
si = rs.s[rs.i];
rs.j = (rs.j + si);
sj = rs.s[rs.j];
rs.s[rs.i] = sj;
rs.s[rs.j] = si;
return (rs.s[(si + sj) & 0xff]);
}
static inline unsigned int
arc4_getword(void)
{
unsigned int val;
val = arc4_getbyte() << 24;
val |= arc4_getbyte() << 16;
val |= arc4_getbyte() << 8;
val |= arc4_getbyte();
return val;
}
#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NOSTIR
ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT int
arc4random_stir(void)
{
int val;
ARC4_LOCK_();
val = arc4_stir();
ARC4_UNLOCK_();
return val;
}
#endif
#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NOADDRANDOM
ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT void
arc4random_addrandom(const unsigned char *dat, int datlen)
{
int j;
ARC4_LOCK_();
if (!rs_initialized)
arc4_stir();
for (j = 0; j < datlen; j += 256) {
/* arc4_addrandom() ignores all but the first 256 bytes of
* its input. We want to make sure to look at ALL the
* data in 'dat', just in case the user is doing something
* crazy like passing us all the files in /var/log. */
arc4_addrandom(dat + j, datlen - j);
}
ARC4_UNLOCK_();
}
#endif
#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NORANDOM
ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT ARC4RANDOM_UINT32
arc4random(void)
{
ARC4RANDOM_UINT32 val;
ARC4_LOCK_();
arc4_count -= 4;
arc4_stir_if_needed();
val = arc4_getword();
ARC4_UNLOCK_();
return val;
}
#endif
ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT void
arc4random_buf(void *buf_, size_t n)
{
unsigned char *buf = buf_;
ARC4_LOCK_();
arc4_stir_if_needed();
while (n--) {
if (--arc4_count <= 0)
arc4_stir();
buf[n] = arc4_getbyte();
}
ARC4_UNLOCK_();
}
#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NOUNIFORM
/*
* Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound
* avoiding "modulo bias".
*
* Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one
* returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound). This
* guarantees the selected random number will be inside
* [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound)
* after reduction modulo upper_bound.
*/
ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT unsigned int
arc4random_uniform(unsigned int upper_bound)
{
ARC4RANDOM_UINT32 r, min;
if (upper_bound < 2)
return 0;
#if (UINT_MAX > 0xffffffffUL)
min = 0x100000000UL % upper_bound;
#else
/* Calculate (2**32 % upper_bound) avoiding 64-bit math */
if (upper_bound > 0x80000000)
min = 1 + ~upper_bound; /* 2**32 - upper_bound */
else {
/* (2**32 - (x * 2)) % x == 2**32 % x when x <= 2**31 */
min = ((0xffffffff - (upper_bound * 2)) + 1) % upper_bound;
}
#endif
/*
* This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
* p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
* number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
* to re-roll.
*/
for (;;) {
r = arc4random();
if (r >= min)
break;
}
return r % upper_bound;
}
#endif