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title abstract layout series publisher issn id month tex_title firstpage lastpage page order cycles bibtex_author author date address container-title volume genre issued pdf extras
Learning Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibria in Two-Player Zero-Sum Sequential Games
Designing efficient algorithms for computing refinements of the Nash equilibrium (NE) in two-player zero-sum sequential games is of paramount importance, since the NE may prescribe sub-optimal actions off the equilibrium path. The extensive-form perfect equilibrium (EFPE) amends such a weakness by accounting for the possibility that players may make mistakes. This is crucial in the real world, which involves humans with bounded rationality, and it is also key in boosting superhuman agents for games like Poker. Nevertheless, there are only few algorithms for computing NE refinements, which either lack convergence guarantees to exact equilibria or do not scale to large games. We provide the first efficient iterative algorithm that provably converges to an EFPE in two-player zero-sum sequential games. Our algorithm works by tracking a sequence of equilibria of regularized-perturbed games, by using a procedure that is specifically tailored to converge last iterate to such equilibria. The procedure can be implemented efficiently by visiting the game tree, making our method computationally appealing. We also empirically evaluate our algorithm, showing that its strategies are much more robust to players’ mistakes than those of state-of-the-art algorithms.
inproceedings
Proceedings of Machine Learning Research
PMLR
2640-3498
bernasconi24a
0
Learning Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibria in Two-Player Zero-Sum Sequential Games
2152
2160
2152-2160
2152
false
Bernasconi, Martino and Marchesi, Alberto and Trov\`{o}, Francesco
given family
Martino
Bernasconi
given family
Alberto
Marchesi
given family
Francesco
Trovò
2024-04-18
Proceedings of The 27th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics
238
inproceedings
date-parts
2024
4
18