diff --git a/packages/next/src/server/app-render/action-handler.ts b/packages/next/src/server/app-render/action-handler.ts
index 1c9a998b9ac2d..84fe9ccbf2c60 100644
--- a/packages/next/src/server/app-render/action-handler.ts
+++ b/packages/next/src/server/app-render/action-handler.ts
@@ -208,6 +208,29 @@ async function createRedirectRenderResult(
   return new RenderResult(JSON.stringify({}))
 }
 
+// Used to compare Host header and Origin header.
+const enum HostType {
+  XForwardedHost = 'x-forwarded-host',
+  Host = 'host',
+}
+type Host =
+  | {
+      type: HostType.XForwardedHost
+      value: string
+    }
+  | {
+      type: HostType.Host
+      value: string
+    }
+  | undefined
+
+/**
+ * Ensures the value of the header can't create long logs.
+ */
+function limitUntrustedHeaderValueForLogs(value: string) {
+  return value.length > 100 ? value.slice(0, 100) + '...' : value
+}
+
 export async function handleAction({
   req,
   res,
@@ -269,7 +292,22 @@ export async function handleAction({
     typeof req.headers['origin'] === 'string'
       ? new URL(req.headers['origin']).host
       : undefined
-  const host = req.headers['x-forwarded-host'] || req.headers['host']
+
+  const forwardedHostHeader = req.headers['x-forwarded-host'] as
+    | string
+    | undefined
+  const hostHeader = req.headers['host']
+  const host: Host = forwardedHostHeader
+    ? {
+        type: HostType.XForwardedHost,
+        value: forwardedHostHeader,
+      }
+    : hostHeader
+    ? {
+        type: HostType.Host,
+        value: hostHeader,
+      }
+    : undefined
 
   // This is to prevent CSRF attacks. If `x-forwarded-host` is set, we need to
   // ensure that the request is coming from the same host.
@@ -279,19 +317,31 @@ export async function handleAction({
     console.warn(
       'Missing `origin` header from a forwarded Server Actions request.'
     )
-  } else if (!host || originHostname !== host) {
+  } else if (!host || originHostname !== host.value) {
     // If the customer sets a list of allowed hosts, we'll allow the request.
     // These can be their reverse proxies or other safe hosts.
     if (
-      typeof host === 'string' &&
-      serverActions?.allowedForwardedHosts?.includes(host)
+      host &&
+      typeof host.value === 'string' &&
+      serverActions?.allowedForwardedHosts?.includes(host.value)
     ) {
       // Ignore it
     } else {
-      // This is an attack. We should not proceed the action.
-      console.error(
-        '`x-forwarded-host` and `host` headers do not match `origin` header from a forwarded Server Actions request. Aborting the action.'
-      )
+      if (host) {
+        // This is an attack. We should not proceed the action.
+        console.error(
+          `\`${!host.type}\` header with value \`${limitUntrustedHeaderValueForLogs(
+            host.value
+          )}\` does not match \`origin\` header with value \`${limitUntrustedHeaderValueForLogs(
+            originHostname
+          )}\` from a forwarded Server Actions request. Aborting the action.`
+        )
+      } else {
+        // This is an attack. We should not proceed the action.
+        console.error(
+          `\`x-forwarded-host\` or \`host\` headers are not provided. One of these is needed to compare the \`origin\` header from a forwarded Server Actions request. Aborting the action.`
+        )
+      }
 
       const error = new Error('Invalid Server Actions request.')