diff --git a/index.html b/index.html
index 7863d2f00..07346266c 100644
--- a/index.html
+++ b/index.html
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
   <meta content="ED" name="w3c-status">
   <meta content="Bikeshed version 44fb9b41e, updated Mon Oct 21 15:57:35 2024 -0700" name="generator">
   <link href="https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/" rel="canonical">
-  <meta content="d6b0d2cedc94865c7ff6141417b628e7600e767f" name="revision">
+  <meta content="3c506d45dc133046028f8dec18eb8ab77d6e1fbd" name="revision">
   <meta content="dark light" name="color-scheme">
 <style type="text/css">
 body {
@@ -6279,15 +6279,19 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="7.1" id="sctn-registering-a-new-credenti
 the base64url encoding of <code><var>pkOptions</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-challenge" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-challenge②">challenge</a></code></code>.</p>
     <li id="rp-op-registering-a-new-credential-step-origin"><a class="self-link" href="#rp-op-registering-a-new-credential-step-origin"></a> Verify that the value of <code><var>C</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin⑦">origin</a></code></code> is an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/origin.html#concept-origin" id="ref-for-concept-origin①④">origin</a> expected by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤⓪">Relying Party</a>.
   See <a href="#sctn-validating-origin">§ 13.4.9 Validating the origin of a credential</a> for guidance. 
+    <li data-md>
+     <p>If <code><var>C</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-crossorigin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-crossorigin⑦">crossOrigin</a></code></code> is present and set to <code>true</code>,
+verify that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤①">Relying Party</a> expects that this credential would have been created within an iframe
+that is not <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#same-origin-with-its-ancestors" id="ref-for-same-origin-with-its-ancestors④">same-origin with its ancestors</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>If <code><var>C</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin⑨">topOrigin</a></code></code> is present:</p>
      <ol>
       <li data-md>
-       <p>Verify that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤①">Relying Party</a> expects that this credential would have been created within an iframe that is
-not <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#same-origin-with-its-ancestors" id="ref-for-same-origin-with-its-ancestors④">same-origin with its ancestors</a>.</p>
+       <p>Verify that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤②">Relying Party</a> expects that this credential would have been created within an iframe that is
+not <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#same-origin-with-its-ancestors" id="ref-for-same-origin-with-its-ancestors⑤">same-origin with its ancestors</a>.</p>
       <li data-md>
        <p>Verify that the value of <code><var>C</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin①⓪">topOrigin</a></code></code> matches the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/origin.html#concept-origin" id="ref-for-concept-origin①⑤">origin</a> of a page
-that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤②">Relying Party</a> expects to be sub-framed within.
+that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤③">Relying Party</a> expects to be sub-framed within.
 See <a href="#sctn-validating-origin">§ 13.4.9 Validating the origin of a credential</a> for guidance.</p>
      </ol>
     <li data-md>
@@ -6295,30 +6299,30 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="7.1" id="sctn-registering-a-new-credenti
     <li data-md>
      <p>Perform CBOR decoding on the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-authenticatorattestationresponse-attestationobject" id="ref-for-dom-authenticatorattestationresponse-attestationobject⑦">attestationObject</a></code> field of the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#authenticatorattestationresponse" id="ref-for-authenticatorattestationresponse⑦">AuthenticatorAttestationResponse</a></code> structure to obtain the attestation statement format <var>fmt</var>, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-data" id="ref-for-authenticator-data④⑤">authenticator data</a> <var>authData</var>, and the attestation statement <var>attStmt</var>.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>Verify that the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-rpidhash" id="ref-for-authdata-rpidhash②">rpIdHash</a></code> in <var>authData</var> is the SHA-256 hash of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id④③">RP ID</a> expected by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤③">Relying Party</a>.</p>
+     <p>Verify that the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-rpidhash" id="ref-for-authdata-rpidhash②">rpIdHash</a></code> in <var>authData</var> is the SHA-256 hash of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id④③">RP ID</a> expected by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤④">Relying Party</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>If <code><var>options</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialcreationoptions-mediation" id="ref-for-dom-credentialcreationoptions-mediation⑦">mediation</a></code></code> is not set to <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialmediationrequirement-conditional" id="ref-for-dom-credentialmediationrequirement-conditional②⑤">conditional</a></code>,
 verify that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-up" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-up③">UP</a> bit of the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags" id="ref-for-authdata-flags③⑧">flags</a></code> in <var>authData</var> is set.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤④">Relying Party</a> requires <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification④⑥">user verification</a> for this registration,
+     <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤⑤">Relying Party</a> requires <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification④⑥">user verification</a> for this registration,
 verify that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-uv" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-uv①②">UV</a> bit of the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags" id="ref-for-authdata-flags③⑨">flags</a></code> in <var>authData</var> is set.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-be" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-be⑦">BE</a> bit of the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags" id="ref-for-authdata-flags④⓪">flags</a></code> in <var>authData</var> is not set, verify that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-bs" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-bs⑨">BS</a> bit is not set.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤⑤">Relying Party</a> uses the credential’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#backup-eligibility" id="ref-for-backup-eligibility③">backup eligibility</a> to inform its user experience flows and/or policies, evaluate the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-be" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-be⑧">BE</a> bit of the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags" id="ref-for-authdata-flags④①">flags</a></code> in <var>authData</var>.</p>
+     <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤⑥">Relying Party</a> uses the credential’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#backup-eligibility" id="ref-for-backup-eligibility③">backup eligibility</a> to inform its user experience flows and/or policies, evaluate the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-be" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-be⑧">BE</a> bit of the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags" id="ref-for-authdata-flags④①">flags</a></code> in <var>authData</var>.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤⑥">Relying Party</a> uses the credential’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#backup-state" id="ref-for-backup-state③">backup state</a> to inform its user experience flows and/or policies, evaluate the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-bs" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-bs①⓪">BS</a> bit of the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags" id="ref-for-authdata-flags④②">flags</a></code> in <var>authData</var>.</p>
+     <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤⑦">Relying Party</a> uses the credential’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#backup-state" id="ref-for-backup-state③">backup state</a> to inform its user experience flows and/or policies, evaluate the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-bs" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-bs①⓪">BS</a> bit of the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags" id="ref-for-authdata-flags④②">flags</a></code> in <var>authData</var>.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>Verify that the "alg" parameter in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-attestedcredentialdata-credentialpublickey" id="ref-for-authdata-attestedcredentialdata-credentialpublickey⑤">credential public key</a> in <var>authData</var> matches the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialparameters-alg" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialparameters-alg②">alg</a></code> attribute of one of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#list-item" id="ref-for-list-item①②">items</a> in <code><var>pkOptions</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-pubkeycredparams" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-pubkeycredparams⑥">pubKeyCredParams</a></code></code>.</p>
     <li id="reg-ceremony-verify-extension-outputs">
      <a class="self-link" href="#reg-ceremony-verify-extension-outputs"></a> Verify that the values of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-output" id="ref-for-client-extension-output⑥">client extension outputs</a> in <var>clientExtensionResults</var> and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output③">authenticator extension
     outputs</a> in the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-extensions" id="ref-for-authdata-extensions⑦">extensions</a></code> in <var>authData</var> are as expected, considering the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input⑤">client
-    extension input</a> values that were given in <code><var>pkOptions</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions④">extensions</a></code></code> and any specific policy of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤⑦">Relying Party</a> regarding unsolicited extensions, i.e., those that were not specified as part of <code><var>pkOptions</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions⑤">extensions</a></code></code>.
-    In the general case, the meaning of "are as expected" is specific to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤⑧">Relying Party</a> and which extensions are in use. 
-     <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⓪">Client platforms</a> MAY enact local policy that sets additional <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension③">authenticator extensions</a> or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension②">client extensions</a> and thus cause values to appear in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output④">authenticator extension outputs</a> or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-output" id="ref-for-client-extension-output⑦">client extension outputs</a> that were not originally specified as part of <code><var>pkOptions</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions⑥">extensions</a></code></code>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤⑨">Relying Parties</a> MUST be prepared to handle such
-    situations, whether it be to ignore the unsolicited extensions or reject the attestation. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥⓪">Relying Party</a> can make this
+    extension input</a> values that were given in <code><var>pkOptions</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions④">extensions</a></code></code> and any specific policy of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤⑧">Relying Party</a> regarding unsolicited extensions, i.e., those that were not specified as part of <code><var>pkOptions</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions⑤">extensions</a></code></code>.
+    In the general case, the meaning of "are as expected" is specific to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑤⑨">Relying Party</a> and which extensions are in use. 
+     <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⓪">Client platforms</a> MAY enact local policy that sets additional <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension③">authenticator extensions</a> or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension②">client extensions</a> and thus cause values to appear in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output④">authenticator extension outputs</a> or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-output" id="ref-for-client-extension-output⑦">client extension outputs</a> that were not originally specified as part of <code><var>pkOptions</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions⑥">extensions</a></code></code>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥⓪">Relying Parties</a> MUST be prepared to handle such
+    situations, whether it be to ignore the unsolicited extensions or reject the attestation. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥①">Relying Party</a> can make this
     decision based on local policy and the extensions in use.</p>
-     <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> Since all extensions are OPTIONAL for both the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client⑨⑥">client</a> and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②④⑥">authenticator</a>, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥①">Relying Party</a> MUST also be
+     <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> Since all extensions are OPTIONAL for both the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client⑨⑥">client</a> and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②④⑥">authenticator</a>, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥②">Relying Party</a> MUST also be
     prepared to handle cases where none or not all of the requested extensions were acted upon.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>Determine the attestation statement format by performing a USASCII case-sensitive match on <var>fmt</var> against the set of
@@ -6337,9 +6341,9 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="7.1" id="sctn-registering-a-new-credenti
      <a class="self-link" href="#reg-ceremony-assess-trust"></a> Assess the attestation trustworthiness using the outputs of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#verification-procedure" id="ref-for-verification-procedure⑤">verification procedure</a> in <a href="#reg-ceremony-verify-attestation">step 22</a>, as follows: 
      <ul>
       <li data-md>
-       <p>If <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#none" id="ref-for-none④">no attestation</a> was provided, verify that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#none" id="ref-for-none⑤">None</a> attestation is acceptable under <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥②">Relying Party</a> policy.</p>
+       <p>If <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#none" id="ref-for-none④">no attestation</a> was provided, verify that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#none" id="ref-for-none⑤">None</a> attestation is acceptable under <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥③">Relying Party</a> policy.</p>
       <li data-md>
-       <p>If <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#self-attestation" id="ref-for-self-attestation①③">self attestation</a> was used, verify that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#self-attestation" id="ref-for-self-attestation①④">self attestation</a> is acceptable under <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥③">Relying Party</a> policy.</p>
+       <p>If <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#self-attestation" id="ref-for-self-attestation①③">self attestation</a> was used, verify that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#self-attestation" id="ref-for-self-attestation①④">self attestation</a> is acceptable under <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥④">Relying Party</a> policy.</p>
       <li data-md>
        <p>Otherwise, use the X.509 certificates returned as the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-trust-path" id="ref-for-attestation-trust-path②">attestation trust path</a> from the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#verification-procedure" id="ref-for-verification-procedure⑥">verification procedure</a> to verify that the attestation public key either correctly chains up to an acceptable root certificate, or is itself an acceptable certificate
 (i.e., it and the root certificate obtained in <a href="#reg-ceremony-attestation-trust-anchors">step 23</a> may be the same).</p>
@@ -6347,8 +6351,8 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="7.1" id="sctn-registering-a-new-credenti
     <li data-md>
      <p>Verify that the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-attestedcredentialdata-credentialid" id="ref-for-authdata-attestedcredentialdata-credentialid④">credentialId</a></code> is ≤ 1023 bytes. Credential IDs larger than this many bytes SHOULD cause the RP to fail this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony①③">registration ceremony</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>Verify that the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-attestedcredentialdata-credentialid" id="ref-for-authdata-attestedcredentialdata-credentialid⑤">credentialId</a></code> is not yet registered for any user. If the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-attestedcredentialdata-credentialid" id="ref-for-authdata-attestedcredentialdata-credentialid⑥">credentialId</a></code> is already known then the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥④">Relying Party</a> SHOULD fail this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony①④">registration ceremony</a>.</p>
-     <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">NOTE:</span> The rationale for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥⑤">Relying Parties</a> rejecting duplicate <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id③⑧">credential IDs</a> is as follows: <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id③⑨">credential IDs</a> contain sufficient entropy that accidental duplication is very unlikely. However, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-type" id="ref-for-attestation-type①⑥">attestation types</a> other than <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#self-attestation" id="ref-for-self-attestation①⑤">self attestation</a> do not include a self-signature to explicitly prove possession of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-private-key" id="ref-for-credential-private-key①⑤">credential private key</a> at <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration①⑨">registration</a> time. Thus an attacker who has managed to obtain a user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id④⓪">credential ID</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-public-key" id="ref-for-credential-public-key③⓪">credential public key</a> for a site (this could be potentially accomplished in various ways), could attempt to register a victim’s credential as their own at that site. If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥⑥">Relying Party</a> accepts this new registration and replaces the victim’s existing credential registration, and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#discoverable-credential" id="ref-for-discoverable-credential①⑤">credentials are discoverable</a>, then the victim could be forced to sign into the attacker’s account at their next attempt. Data saved to the site by the victim in that state would then be available to the attacker.</p>
+     <p>Verify that the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-attestedcredentialdata-credentialid" id="ref-for-authdata-attestedcredentialdata-credentialid⑤">credentialId</a></code> is not yet registered for any user. If the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-attestedcredentialdata-credentialid" id="ref-for-authdata-attestedcredentialdata-credentialid⑥">credentialId</a></code> is already known then the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥⑤">Relying Party</a> SHOULD fail this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony①④">registration ceremony</a>.</p>
+     <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">NOTE:</span> The rationale for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥⑥">Relying Parties</a> rejecting duplicate <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id③⑧">credential IDs</a> is as follows: <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id③⑨">credential IDs</a> contain sufficient entropy that accidental duplication is very unlikely. However, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-type" id="ref-for-attestation-type①⑥">attestation types</a> other than <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#self-attestation" id="ref-for-self-attestation①⑤">self attestation</a> do not include a self-signature to explicitly prove possession of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-private-key" id="ref-for-credential-private-key①⑤">credential private key</a> at <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration①⑨">registration</a> time. Thus an attacker who has managed to obtain a user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id④⓪">credential ID</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-public-key" id="ref-for-credential-public-key③⓪">credential public key</a> for a site (this could be potentially accomplished in various ways), could attempt to register a victim’s credential as their own at that site. If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥⑦">Relying Party</a> accepts this new registration and replaces the victim’s existing credential registration, and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#discoverable-credential" id="ref-for-discoverable-credential①⑤">credentials are discoverable</a>, then the victim could be forced to sign into the attacker’s account at their next attempt. Data saved to the site by the victim in that state would then be available to the attacker.</p>
     <li id="reg-ceremony-store-credential-record">
      <a class="self-link" href="#reg-ceremony-store-credential-record"></a> If the attestation statement <var>attStmt</var> verified successfully and is found to be trustworthy,
     then create and store a new <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-record" id="ref-for-credential-record①①">credential record</a> in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account③②">user account</a> that was denoted in <code><var>pkOptions</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-user" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-user⑦">user</a></code></code>,
@@ -6360,7 +6364,7 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="7.1" id="sctn-registering-a-new-credenti
       <dt data-md><a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-id" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-id②">id</a>
       <dd data-md>
        <p><code><var>credential</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credential-id" id="ref-for-dom-credential-id①">id</a></code></code> or <code><var>credential</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredential-rawid" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredential-rawid②">rawId</a></code></code>,
-whichever format is preferred by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥⑦">Relying Party</a>.</p>
+whichever format is preferred by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥⑧">Relying Party</a>.</p>
       <dt data-md><a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-publickey" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-publickey">publicKey</a>
       <dd data-md>
        <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-public-key" id="ref-for-credential-public-key③①">credential public key</a> in <var>authData</var>.</p>
@@ -6394,26 +6398,26 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="7.1" id="sctn-registering-a-new-credenti
 This SHOULD be chosen by the user.</p>
        <p>If <code><var>clientExtensionResults</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs-credprops" id="ref-for-dom-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs-credprops">credProps</a></code>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-authenticatordisplayname①">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code></code> is present,
 then its value MAY be offered as a default for this value.
-The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥⑧">Relying Party</a> MAY alternatively derive a default value from the authenticator’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement③⑧">attestation statement</a>, if any.</p>
+The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥⑨">Relying Party</a> MAY alternatively derive a default value from the authenticator’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement③⑧">attestation statement</a>, if any.</p>
      </dl>
     <li data-md>
      <p>If the attestation statement <var>attStmt</var> successfully verified but is not trustworthy per <a href="#reg-ceremony-assess-trust">step 24</a> above,
-the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑥⑨">Relying Party</a> SHOULD fail the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony①⑤">registration ceremony</a>.</p>
-     <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">NOTE:</span> However, if permitted by policy, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦⓪">Relying Party</a> MAY register the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id④①">credential ID</a> and credential public key but treat the
-    credential as one with <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#self-attestation" id="ref-for-self-attestation①⑥">self attestation</a> (see <a href="#sctn-attestation-types">§ 6.5.3 Attestation Types</a>). If doing so, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦①">Relying Party</a> is asserting there
+the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦⓪">Relying Party</a> SHOULD fail the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony①⑤">registration ceremony</a>.</p>
+     <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">NOTE:</span> However, if permitted by policy, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦①">Relying Party</a> MAY register the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id④①">credential ID</a> and credential public key but treat the
+    credential as one with <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#self-attestation" id="ref-for-self-attestation①⑥">self attestation</a> (see <a href="#sctn-attestation-types">§ 6.5.3 Attestation Types</a>). If doing so, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦②">Relying Party</a> is asserting there
     is no cryptographic proof that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑤⑥">public key credential</a> has been generated by a particular <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②④⑦">authenticator</a> model.
     See <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fidosecref" title="FIDO Security Reference">[FIDOSecRef]</a> and <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-uafprotocol" title="FIDO UAF Protocol Specification v1.0">[UAFProtocol]</a> for a more detailed discussion.</p>
    </ol>
-   <p>Verification of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-object" id="ref-for-attestation-object①⑥">attestation objects</a> requires that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦②">Relying Party</a> has a trusted method of determining acceptable trust anchors
+   <p>Verification of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-object" id="ref-for-attestation-object①⑥">attestation objects</a> requires that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦③">Relying Party</a> has a trusted method of determining acceptable trust anchors
 in <a href="#reg-ceremony-attestation-trust-anchors">step 23</a> above.
-Also, if certificates are being used, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦③">Relying Party</a> MUST have access to certificate status information for the
-intermediate CA certificates. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦④">Relying Party</a> MUST also be able to build the attestation certificate chain if the client did not
+Also, if certificates are being used, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦④">Relying Party</a> MUST have access to certificate status information for the
+intermediate CA certificates. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦⑤">Relying Party</a> MUST also be able to build the attestation certificate chain if the client did not
 provide this chain in the attestation information.</p>
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="7.2" id="sctn-verifying-assertion"><span class="secno">7.2. </span><span class="content">Verifying an Authentication Assertion</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-verifying-assertion"></a></h3>
-   <p>In order to perform an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③①">authentication ceremony</a>, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦⑤">Relying Party</a> MUST proceed as follows:</p>
+   <p>In order to perform an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③①">authentication ceremony</a>, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦⑥">Relying Party</a> MUST proceed as follows:</p>
    <ol>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>Let <var>options</var> be a new <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dictdef-credentialrequestoptions" id="ref-for-dictdef-credentialrequestoptions③">CredentialRequestOptions</a></code> structure configured to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦⑥">Relying Party</a>'s needs for the ceremony.
+     <p>Let <var>options</var> be a new <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dictdef-credentialrequestoptions" id="ref-for-dictdef-credentialrequestoptions③">CredentialRequestOptions</a></code> structure configured to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦⑦">Relying Party</a>'s needs for the ceremony.
 Let <var>pkOptions</var> be <code><var>options</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialrequestoptions-publickey" id="ref-for-dom-credentialrequestoptions-publickey④">publicKey</a></code></code>.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>Call <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get③②">navigator.credentials.get()</a></code> and pass <var>options</var> as the argument.
@@ -6460,20 +6464,23 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="7.2" id="sctn-verifying-assertion"><span
     <li data-md>
      <p>Verify that the value of <code><var>C</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-challenge" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-challenge⑦">challenge</a></code></code> equals
 the base64url encoding of <code><var>pkOptions</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-challenge" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-challenge③">challenge</a></code></code>.</p>
-    <li id="rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-origin"><a class="self-link" href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-origin"></a> Verify that the value of <code><var>C</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin⑧">origin</a></code></code> is an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/origin.html#concept-origin" id="ref-for-concept-origin①⑥">origin</a> expected by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦⑦">Relying Party</a>.
+    <li id="rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-origin"><a class="self-link" href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-origin"></a> Verify that the value of <code><var>C</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin⑧">origin</a></code></code> is an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/origin.html#concept-origin" id="ref-for-concept-origin①⑥">origin</a> expected by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦⑧">Relying Party</a>.
   See <a href="#sctn-validating-origin">§ 13.4.9 Validating the origin of a credential</a> for guidance. 
+    <li data-md>
+     <p>If <code><var>C</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-crossorigin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-crossorigin⑧">crossOrigin</a></code></code> is present and set to <code>true</code>,
+verify that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦⑨">Relying Party</a> expects this credential to be used within an iframe that is not <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#same-origin-with-its-ancestors" id="ref-for-same-origin-with-its-ancestors⑥">same-origin with its ancestors</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>If <code><var>C</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin①①">topOrigin</a></code></code> is present:</p>
      <ol>
       <li data-md>
-       <p>Verify that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦⑧">Relying Party</a> expects this credential to be used within an iframe that is not <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#same-origin-with-its-ancestors" id="ref-for-same-origin-with-its-ancestors⑤">same-origin with its ancestors</a>.</p>
+       <p>Verify that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧⓪">Relying Party</a> expects this credential to be used within an iframe that is not <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#same-origin-with-its-ancestors" id="ref-for-same-origin-with-its-ancestors⑦">same-origin with its ancestors</a>.</p>
       <li data-md>
        <p>Verify that the value of <code><var>C</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin①②">topOrigin</a></code></code> matches the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/origin.html#concept-origin" id="ref-for-concept-origin①⑦">origin</a> of a page
-that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑦⑨">Relying Party</a> expects to be sub-framed within.
+that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧①">Relying Party</a> expects to be sub-framed within.
 See <a href="#sctn-validating-origin">§ 13.4.9 Validating the origin of a credential</a> for guidance.</p>
      </ol>
     <li id="rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-rpid-hash">
-     <a class="self-link" href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-rpid-hash"></a> Verify that the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-rpidhash" id="ref-for-authdata-rpidhash③">rpIdHash</a></code> in <var>authData</var> is the SHA-256 hash of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id④④">RP ID</a> expected by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧⓪">Relying Party</a>. 
+     <a class="self-link" href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-rpid-hash"></a> Verify that the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-rpidhash" id="ref-for-authdata-rpidhash③">rpIdHash</a></code> in <var>authData</var> is the SHA-256 hash of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id④④">RP ID</a> expected by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧②">Relying Party</a>. 
      <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> If using the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#appid" id="ref-for-appid①">appid</a> extension, this step needs some special logic. See <a href="#sctn-appid-extension">§ 10.1.1 FIDO AppID Extension (appid)</a> for details.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>Verify that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-up" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-up④">UP</a> bit of the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags" id="ref-for-authdata-flags④⑥">flags</a></code> in <var>authData</var> is set.</p>
@@ -6485,7 +6492,7 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="7.2" id="sctn-verifying-assertion"><span
     <li data-md>
      <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-be" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-be①⓪">BE</a> bit of the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags" id="ref-for-authdata-flags④⑨">flags</a></code> in <var>authData</var> is not set, verify that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-bs" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-bs①②">BS</a> bit is not set.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>If the credential <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#backup-state" id="ref-for-backup-state④">backup state</a> is used as part of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧①">Relying Party</a> business logic or policy,
+     <p>If the credential <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#backup-state" id="ref-for-backup-state④">backup state</a> is used as part of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧③">Relying Party</a> business logic or policy,
 let <var>currentBe</var> and <var>currentBs</var> be the values of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-be" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-be①①">BE</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-bs" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-bs①③">BS</a> bits, respectively,
 of the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags" id="ref-for-authdata-flags⑤⓪">flags</a></code> in <var>authData</var>.
 Compare <var>currentBe</var> and <var>currentBs</var> with <code><var>credentialRecord</var>.<a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-backupeligible" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-backupeligible①">backupEligible</a></code> and <code><var>credentialRecord</var>.<a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-backupstate" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-backupstate①">backupState</a></code>:</p>
@@ -6495,18 +6502,18 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="7.2" id="sctn-verifying-assertion"><span
       <li data-md>
        <p>If <code><var>credentialRecord</var>.<a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-backupeligible" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-backupeligible③">backupEligible</a></code> is not set, verify that <var>currentBe</var> is not set.</p>
       <li data-md>
-       <p>Apply <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧②">Relying Party</a> policy, if any.</p>
+       <p>Apply <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧④">Relying Party</a> policy, if any.</p>
      </ol>
-     <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> See <a href="#sctn-credential-backup">§ 6.1.3 Credential Backup State</a> for examples of how a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧③">Relying Party</a> might process the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-bs" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-bs①④">BS</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags" id="ref-for-authdata-flags⑤①">flag</a> values.</p>
+     <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> See <a href="#sctn-credential-backup">§ 6.1.3 Credential Backup State</a> for examples of how a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧⑤">Relying Party</a> might process the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-bs" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-bs①④">BS</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags" id="ref-for-authdata-flags⑤①">flag</a> values.</p>
     <li id="authn-ceremony-verify-extension-outputs">
      <a class="self-link" href="#authn-ceremony-verify-extension-outputs"></a> Verify that the values of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-output" id="ref-for-client-extension-output⑧">client extension outputs</a> in <var>clientExtensionResults</var> and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output⑤">authenticator extension
     outputs</a> in the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-extensions" id="ref-for-authdata-extensions⑧">extensions</a></code> in <var>authData</var> are as expected, considering the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input⑥">client
-    extension input</a> values that were given in <code><var>pkOptions</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-extensions" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-extensions④">extensions</a></code></code> and any specific policy of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧④">Relying Party</a> regarding unsolicited extensions, i.e., those that were not specified as part of <code><var>pkOptions</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-extensions" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-extensions⑤">extensions</a></code></code>.
-    In the general case, the meaning of "are as expected" is specific to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧⑤">Relying Party</a> and which extensions are in use. 
-     <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤①">Client platforms</a> MAY enact local policy that sets additional <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension④">authenticator extensions</a> or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension③">client extensions</a> and thus cause values to appear in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output⑥">authenticator extension outputs</a> or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-output" id="ref-for-client-extension-output⑨">client extension outputs</a> that were not originally specified as part of <code><var>pkOptions</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-extensions" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-extensions⑥">extensions</a></code></code>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧⑥">Relying Parties</a> MUST be prepared to handle such
-    situations, whether it be to ignore the unsolicited extensions or reject the assertion. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧⑦">Relying Party</a> can make this
+    extension input</a> values that were given in <code><var>pkOptions</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-extensions" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-extensions④">extensions</a></code></code> and any specific policy of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧⑥">Relying Party</a> regarding unsolicited extensions, i.e., those that were not specified as part of <code><var>pkOptions</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-extensions" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-extensions⑤">extensions</a></code></code>.
+    In the general case, the meaning of "are as expected" is specific to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧⑦">Relying Party</a> and which extensions are in use. 
+     <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤①">Client platforms</a> MAY enact local policy that sets additional <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension④">authenticator extensions</a> or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension③">client extensions</a> and thus cause values to appear in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output⑥">authenticator extension outputs</a> or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-output" id="ref-for-client-extension-output⑨">client extension outputs</a> that were not originally specified as part of <code><var>pkOptions</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-extensions" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-extensions⑥">extensions</a></code></code>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧⑧">Relying Parties</a> MUST be prepared to handle such
+    situations, whether it be to ignore the unsolicited extensions or reject the assertion. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧⑨">Relying Party</a> can make this
     decision based on local policy and the extensions in use.</p>
-     <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> Since all extensions are OPTIONAL for both the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client⑨⑦">client</a> and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②④⑧">authenticator</a>, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧⑧">Relying Party</a> MUST also be
+     <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> Since all extensions are OPTIONAL for both the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client⑨⑦">client</a> and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②④⑧">authenticator</a>, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⓪">Relying Party</a> MUST also be
     prepared to handle cases where none or not all of the requested extensions were acted upon.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>Let <var>hash</var> be the result of computing a hash over the <var>cData</var> using SHA-256.</p>
@@ -6532,10 +6539,10 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="7.2" id="sctn-verifying-assertion"><span
           <li data-md>
            <p>An authenticator is malfunctioning.</p>
           <li data-md>
-           <p>A race condition exists where the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑧⑨">Relying Party</a> is processing assertion responses in an order other than the order they were generated at the authenticator.</p>
+           <p>A race condition exists where the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨①">Relying Party</a> is processing assertion responses in an order other than the order they were generated at the authenticator.</p>
          </ul>
-         <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⓪">Relying Parties</a> should evaluate their own operational characteristics and incorporate this information into their risk scoring.
-          Whether the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨①">Relying Party</a> updates <code><var>credentialRecord</var>.<a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-signcount" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-signcount④">signCount</a></code> below in this case, or not, or fails the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③④">authentication ceremony</a> or not, is <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨②">Relying Party</a>-specific.</p>
+         <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨②">Relying Parties</a> should evaluate their own operational characteristics and incorporate this information into their risk scoring.
+          Whether the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨③">Relying Party</a> updates <code><var>credentialRecord</var>.<a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-signcount" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-signcount④">signCount</a></code> below in this case, or not, or fails the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③④">authentication ceremony</a> or not, is <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨④">Relying Party</a>-specific.</p>
          <p>For more information on signature counter considerations, see <a href="#sctn-sign-counter">§ 6.1.1 Signature Counter Considerations</a>.</p>
        </dl>
      </ul>
@@ -6556,7 +6563,7 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="7.2" id="sctn-verifying-assertion"><span
 and <code><var>clientExtensionResults</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs-credprops" id="ref-for-dom-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs-credprops①">credProps</a></code>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-authenticatordisplayname②">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code></code> is present and not equal to <code><var>credentialRecord</var>.<a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname②">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code>,
 then OPTIONALLY offer the user to update <code><var>credentialRecord</var>.<a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname③">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code> to the value of <code><var>clientExtensionResults</var>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs-credprops" id="ref-for-dom-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs-credprops②">credProps</a></code>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-authenticatordisplayname③">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code></code>.</p>
      </ol>
-     <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨③">Relying Party</a> performs additional security checks beyond these WebAuthn <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③⑤">authentication ceremony</a> steps,
+     <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑤">Relying Party</a> performs additional security checks beyond these WebAuthn <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③⑤">authentication ceremony</a> steps,
     the above state updates SHOULD be deferred to after those additional checks are completed successfully.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>If all the above steps are successful, continue with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③⑥">authentication ceremony</a> as appropriate. Otherwise, fail the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③⑦">authentication ceremony</a>.</p>
@@ -6703,8 +6710,8 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="8.2.1" id="sctn-packed-attestation-cert-
     <li data-md>
      <p>If the related attestation root certificate is used for multiple authenticator models, the Extension OID <code>1.3.6.1.4.1.45724.1.1.4</code> (<code>id-fido-gen-ce-aaguid</code>) MUST be present, containing the AAGUID as a 16-byte OCTET STRING.
 The extension MUST NOT be marked as critical.</p>
-     <p>As <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨④">Relying Parties</a> may not know if the attestation root
-certificate is used for multiple authenticator models, it is suggested that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑤">Relying Parties</a> check if the extension
+     <p>As <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑥">Relying Parties</a> may not know if the attestation root
+certificate is used for multiple authenticator models, it is suggested that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑦">Relying Parties</a> check if the extension
 is present, and if it is, then validate that it contains that same AAGUID as presented in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-object" id="ref-for-attestation-object①⑦">attestation object</a>.</p>
      <p>Note that an X.509 Extension encodes the DER-encoding of the value in an OCTET STRING.
 Thus, the AAGUID MUST be wrapped in <i>two</i> OCTET STRINGS to be valid.</p>
@@ -7208,9 +7215,9 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="8.9" id="sctn-compound-attestation"><spa
      <ol>
       <li data-md>
        <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#list-iterate" id="ref-for-list-iterate②①">For each</a> <var>subStmt</var> of <var>attStmt</var>, evaluate the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#verification-procedure" id="ref-for-verification-procedure①③">verification procedure</a> corresponding to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement-format-identifier" id="ref-for-attestation-statement-format-identifier⑤">attestation statement format identifier</a> <code><var>subStmt</var>.fmt</code> with <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#verification-procedure-inputs" id="ref-for-verification-procedure-inputs⑥">verification procedure inputs</a> <var>subStmt</var>, <var>authenticatorData</var> and <var>clientDataHash</var>.</p>
-       <p>If validation fails for one or more <var>subStmt</var>, decide the appropriate result based on <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑥">Relying Party</a> policy.</p>
+       <p>If validation fails for one or more <var>subStmt</var>, decide the appropriate result based on <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑧">Relying Party</a> policy.</p>
       <li data-md>
-       <p>If sufficiently many (as determined by <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑦">Relying Party</a> policy) <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#list-item" id="ref-for-list-item①③">items</a> of <var>attStmt</var> verify successfully,
+       <p>If sufficiently many (as determined by <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑨">Relying Party</a> policy) <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#list-item" id="ref-for-list-item①③">items</a> of <var>attStmt</var> verify successfully,
 return implementation-specific values representing any combination of outputs from successful <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#verification-procedure" id="ref-for-verification-procedure①④">verification procedures</a>.</p>
      </ol>
    </dl>
@@ -7229,7 +7236,7 @@ <h2 class="heading settled" data-level="9" id="sctn-extensions"><span class="sec
      <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-processing" id="ref-for-client-extension-processing⑥">Client extension processing</a> for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension③">registration extensions</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension③">authentication extensions</a>.</p>
    </ul>
    <p>When creating a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⓪">public key credential</a> or requesting an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-assertion" id="ref-for-authentication-assertion①③">authentication assertion</a>, a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑤④">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> can request the use of a set
-of extensions. These extensions will be invoked during the requested operation if they are supported by the client and/or the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-authenticator" id="ref-for-webauthn-authenticator⑨">WebAuthn Authenticator</a>. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑧">Relying Party</a> sends the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input⑦">client extension input</a> for each extension in the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get③④">get()</a></code> call
+of extensions. These extensions will be invoked during the requested operation if they are supported by the client and/or the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-authenticator" id="ref-for-webauthn-authenticator⑨">WebAuthn Authenticator</a>. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⓪">Relying Party</a> sends the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input⑦">client extension input</a> for each extension in the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get③④">get()</a></code> call
 (for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension④">authentication extensions</a>) or <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-create" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-create③①">create()</a></code> call (for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension④">registration extensions</a>) to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client⑨⑨">client</a>.
 The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪⓪">client</a> performs <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-processing" id="ref-for-client-extension-processing⑦">client extension processing</a> for each extension that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤②">client platform</a> supports, and augments the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-data" id="ref-for-client-data①③">client data</a> as specified by each extension, by including the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#extension-identifier" id="ref-for-extension-identifier①⓪">extension identifier</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-output" id="ref-for-client-extension-output①⓪">client extension output</a> values.</p>
    <p>An extension can also be an <dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="authenticator-extension">authenticator extension</dfn>, meaning that the extension involves communication with and
@@ -7249,9 +7256,9 @@ <h2 class="heading settled" data-level="9" id="sctn-extensions"><span class="sec
 Since <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output⑧">authenticator extension output</a> is returned as part of the signed <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-data" id="ref-for-authenticator-data④⑦">authenticator data</a>, authenticator extensions
 MAY also specify an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#unsigned-extension-outputs" id="ref-for-unsigned-extension-outputs">unsigned extension output</a>, e.g. for cases where an output itself depends on <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-data" id="ref-for-authenticator-data④⑧">authenticator data</a>.
 Part of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-processing" id="ref-for-client-extension-processing⑨">client extension processing</a> for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension⑦">authenticator extensions</a> is to use the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output⑨">authenticator extension output</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#unsigned-extension-outputs" id="ref-for-unsigned-extension-outputs①">unsigned extension output</a> as an input to creating the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-output" id="ref-for-client-extension-output①①">client extension output</a>.</p>
-   <p>All <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-extensions" id="ref-for-webauthn-extensions①⓪">WebAuthn Extensions</a> are OPTIONAL for both clients and authenticators. Thus, any extensions requested by a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party②⑨⑨">Relying Party</a> MAY be
+   <p>All <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-extensions" id="ref-for-webauthn-extensions①⓪">WebAuthn Extensions</a> are OPTIONAL for both clients and authenticators. Thus, any extensions requested by a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪①">Relying Party</a> MAY be
 ignored by the client browser or OS and not passed to the authenticator at all, or they MAY be ignored by the authenticator.
-Ignoring an extension is never considered a failure in WebAuthn API processing, so when <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⓪">Relying Parties</a> include extensions with any
+Ignoring an extension is never considered a failure in WebAuthn API processing, so when <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪②">Relying Parties</a> include extensions with any
 API calls, they MUST be prepared to handle cases where some or all of those extensions are ignored.</p>
    <p>All <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-extensions" id="ref-for-webauthn-extensions①①">WebAuthn Extensions</a> MUST be defined in such a way that lack of support for them by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪①">client</a> or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑤⑤">authenticator</a> does not endanger the user’s security or privacy.
 For instance, if an extension requires client processing, it could be defined in a manner that ensures
@@ -7284,7 +7291,7 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="9.2" id="sctn-extension-specification"><
 the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-processing" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-processing③">authenticator extension processing</a> rules, and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#cbor" id="ref-for-cbor①⑤">CBOR</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output①⓪">authenticator extension output</a> value.
 Extensions MAY specify <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#unsigned-extension-outputs" id="ref-for-unsigned-extension-outputs②">unsigned extension outputs</a>.</p>
    <p>Any <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension⑤">client extension</a> that is processed by the client MUST return a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-output" id="ref-for-client-extension-output①③">client extension output</a> value so that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑤⑤">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> knows that the extension was honored by the client. Similarly, any extension that requires authenticator processing MUST return
-an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output①①">authenticator extension output</a> to let the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪①">Relying Party</a> know that the extension was honored by the authenticator. If an
+an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output①①">authenticator extension output</a> to let the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪③">Relying Party</a> know that the extension was honored by the authenticator. If an
 extension does not otherwise require any result values, it SHOULD be defined as returning a JSON Boolean <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-output" id="ref-for-client-extension-output①④">client extension
 output</a> result, set to <code>true</code> to signify that the extension was understood and processed. Likewise, any <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension⑨">authenticator
 extension</a> that does not otherwise require any result values MUST return a value and SHOULD return a CBOR Boolean <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output①②">authenticator extension output</a> result, set to <code>true</code> to signify that the extension was understood and processed.</p>
@@ -7294,7 +7301,7 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="9.3" id="sctn-extension-request-paramete
 in the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get③⑦">get()</a></code> or <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-create" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-create③④">create()</a></code> call,
 while the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#cbor" id="ref-for-cbor①⑥">CBOR</a> <dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="authenticator-extension-input">authenticator extension input</dfn> is
 passed from the client to the authenticator for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension①⓪">authenticator extensions</a> during the processing of these calls.</p>
-   <p>A <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪②">Relying Party</a> simultaneously requests the use of an extension and sets its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input①①">client extension input</a> by including an entry in the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions⑦">extensions</a></code> option to the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-create" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-create③⑤">create()</a></code> or <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get③⑧">get()</a></code> call.
+   <p>A <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪④">Relying Party</a> simultaneously requests the use of an extension and sets its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input①①">client extension input</a> by including an entry in the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-extensions⑦">extensions</a></code> option to the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-create" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-create③⑤">create()</a></code> or <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get③⑧">get()</a></code> call.
 The entry key is the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#extension-identifier" id="ref-for-extension-identifier①③">extension identifier</a> and the value is the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input①②">client extension input</a>.</p>
    <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> Other documents have specified extensions where the extension input does not always use the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#extension-identifier" id="ref-for-extension-identifier①④">extension identifier</a> as the entry key.
 New extensions SHOULD follow the above convention.</p>
@@ -7313,8 +7320,8 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="9.3" id="sctn-extension-request-paramete
 <c- p>});</c->
 </pre>
    <p>Extension definitions MUST specify the valid values for their <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input①③">client extension input</a>. Clients SHOULD ignore extensions with
-an invalid <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input①④">client extension input</a>. If an extension does not require any parameters from the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪③">Relying Party</a>, it SHOULD be defined
-as taking a Boolean client argument, set to <code>true</code> to signify that the extension is requested by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪④">Relying Party</a>.</p>
+an invalid <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input①④">client extension input</a>. If an extension does not require any parameters from the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑤">Relying Party</a>, it SHOULD be defined
+as taking a Boolean client argument, set to <code>true</code> to signify that the extension is requested by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑥">Relying Party</a>.</p>
    <p>Extensions that only affect client processing need not specify <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-input" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-input①⓪">authenticator extension input</a>. Extensions that have
 authenticator processing MUST specify the method of computing the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-input" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-input①①">authenticator extension input</a> from the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension-input" id="ref-for-client-extension-input①⑤">client extension
 input</a>,
@@ -7351,7 +7358,7 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="9.5" id="sctn-authenticator-extension-pr
 as a separate map, keyed with the same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#extension-identifier" id="ref-for-extension-identifier②①">extension identifier</a>. This map only contains entries for authenticator
 extensions that make use of unsigned outputs. Unsigned outputs are useful when extensions output a signature over
 the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-data" id="ref-for-authenticator-data⑤②">authenticator data</a> (because otherwise a signature would have to sign over itself, which isn’t possible) or when
-some extension outputs should not be sent to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑤">Relying Party</a>.</p>
+some extension outputs should not be sent to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑦">Relying Party</a>.</p>
    <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> In <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#unsigned-extension-outputs" id="ref-for-unsigned-extension-outputs④">unsigned extension outputs</a> are returned as a CBOR map in a top-level field named <code>unsignedExtensionOutputs</code> from both <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticatormakecredential" id="ref-for-authenticatormakecredential①⑨">authenticatorMakeCredential</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticatorgetassertion" id="ref-for-authenticatorgetassertion①⑨">authenticatorGetAssertion</a>.</p>
    <p>For each supported extension, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-processing" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-processing④">authenticator extension processing</a> rule for that extension is used create the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-output" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-output①⑤">authenticator extension output</a>, and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#unsigned-extension-outputs" id="ref-for-unsigned-extension-outputs⑤">unsigned extension output</a> if used, from the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension-input" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension-input①⑦">authenticator extension input</a> and possibly also other inputs.
 There MUST NOT be any values returned for ignored extensions.</p>
@@ -7364,11 +7371,11 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1" id="sctn-defined-client-extensions
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.1" id="sctn-appid-extension"><span class="secno">10.1.1. </span><span class="content">FIDO <dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="appid">AppID</dfn> Extension (appid)</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-appid-extension"></a></h4>
    <p>This extension allows <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑤⑦">WebAuthn Relying Parties</a> that have previously registered a
 credential using the legacy FIDO U2F JavaScript API <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fidou2fjavascriptapi" title="FIDO U2F JavaScript API">[FIDOU2FJavaScriptAPI]</a> to request an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion" id="ref-for-assertion④">assertion</a>. The
-FIDO APIs use an alternative identifier for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑥">Relying Parties</a> called an <var>AppID</var> <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-appid" title="FIDO AppID and Facet Specification">[FIDO-APPID]</a>, and any credentials created using those APIs will be <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope①⑧">scoped</a> to
+FIDO APIs use an alternative identifier for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑧">Relying Parties</a> called an <var>AppID</var> <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-appid" title="FIDO AppID and Facet Specification">[FIDO-APPID]</a>, and any credentials created using those APIs will be <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope①⑧">scoped</a> to
 that identifier. Without this extension, they would need to be re-registered in
 order to be <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope①⑨">scoped</a> to an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id④⑦">RP ID</a>.</p>
    <p>In addition to setting the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-authenticationextensionsclientinputs-appid" id="ref-for-dom-authenticationextensionsclientinputs-appid">appid</a></code> extension input,
-using this extension requires some additional processing by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑦">Relying Party</a> in order to allow users to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①③">authenticate</a> using their registered U2F credentials:</p>
+using this extension requires some additional processing by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑨">Relying Party</a> in order to allow users to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①③">authenticate</a> using their registered U2F credentials:</p>
    <ol>
     <li data-md>
      <p>List the desired U2F credentials in the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials②②">allowCredentials</a></code> option
@@ -7391,8 +7398,8 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.1" id="sctn-appid-extension"><span
 credentials created with WebAuthn are not backwards compatible with the FIDO
 JavaScript APIs.</p>
    <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-authenticationextensionsclientinputs-appid" id="ref-for-dom-authenticationextensionsclientinputs-appid②">appid</a></code> should be set to the AppID
-that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑧">Relying Party</a> <em>previously</em> used in the legacy FIDO APIs.
-This might not be the same as the result of translating the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⓪⑨">Relying Party</a>'s WebAuthn <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id⑤⓪">RP ID</a> to the AppID format,
+that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⓪">Relying Party</a> <em>previously</em> used in the legacy FIDO APIs.
+This might not be the same as the result of translating the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①①">Relying Party</a>'s WebAuthn <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id⑤⓪">RP ID</a> to the AppID format,
 e.g., the previously used AppID may have been "https://accounts.example.com"
 but the currently used <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id⑤①">RP ID</a> might be "example.com".</p>
    <dl>
@@ -7439,7 +7446,7 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.1" id="sctn-appid-extension"><span
    <dl>
     <dt data-md>Client extension output
     <dd data-md>
-     <p>Returns the value of <var>output</var>. If true, the <var>AppID</var> was used and thus, when <a href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-rpid-hash">verifying the assertion</a>, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⓪">Relying Party</a> MUST expect the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-rpidhash" id="ref-for-authdata-rpidhash⑤">rpIdHash</a></code> to be the hash of the <var>AppID</var>, not the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id⑤③">RP ID</a>.</p>
+     <p>Returns the value of <var>output</var>. If true, the <var>AppID</var> was used and thus, when <a href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-rpid-hash">verifying the assertion</a>, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①②">Relying Party</a> MUST expect the <code><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-rpidhash" id="ref-for-authdata-rpidhash⑤">rpIdHash</a></code> to be the hash of the <var>AppID</var>, not the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id⑤③">RP ID</a>.</p>
 <pre class="idl highlight def"><c- b>partial</c-> <c- b>dictionary</c-> <a class="idl-code" data-link-type="dictionary" href="#dictdef-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs" id="ref-for-dictdef-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs⑤"><c- g>AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs</c-></a> {
   <a class="idl-code" data-link-type="interface" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#idl-boolean" id="ref-for-idl-boolean⑦"><c- b>boolean</c-></a> <dfn class="dfn-paneled idl-code" data-dfn-for="AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs" data-dfn-type="dict-member" data-export data-type="boolean" id="dom-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs-appid"><code><c- g>appid</c-></code></dfn>;
 };
@@ -7456,7 +7463,7 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.1" id="sctn-appid-extension"><span
    </dl>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.2" id="sctn-appid-exclude-extension"><span class="secno">10.1.2. </span><span class="content">FIDO AppID Exclusion Extension (appidExclude)</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-appid-exclude-extension"></a></h4>
    <p>This registration extension allows <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑤⑧">WebAuthn Relying Parties</a> to exclude authenticators that contain specified credentials that were created with the legacy FIDO U2F JavaScript API <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fidou2fjavascriptapi" title="FIDO U2F JavaScript API">[FIDOU2FJavaScriptAPI]</a>.</p>
-   <p>During a transition from the FIDO U2F JavaScript API, a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①①">Relying Party</a> may have a population of users with legacy credentials already registered. The <a href="#sctn-appid-extension">appid</a> extension allows the sign-in flow to be transitioned smoothly but, when transitioning the registration flow, the <a href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials⑥">excludeCredentials</a> field will not be effective in excluding authenticators with legacy credentials because its contents are taken to be WebAuthn credentials. This extension directs <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤③">client platforms</a> to consider the contents of <a href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials⑦">excludeCredentials</a> as both WebAuthn and legacy FIDO credentials. Note that U2F key handles commonly use <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#base64url-encoding" id="ref-for-base64url-encoding②③">base64url encoding</a> but must be decoded to their binary form when used in <a href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials⑧">excludeCredentials</a>.</p>
+   <p>During a transition from the FIDO U2F JavaScript API, a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①③">Relying Party</a> may have a population of users with legacy credentials already registered. The <a href="#sctn-appid-extension">appid</a> extension allows the sign-in flow to be transitioned smoothly but, when transitioning the registration flow, the <a href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials⑥">excludeCredentials</a> field will not be effective in excluding authenticators with legacy credentials because its contents are taken to be WebAuthn credentials. This extension directs <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤③">client platforms</a> to consider the contents of <a href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials⑦">excludeCredentials</a> as both WebAuthn and legacy FIDO credentials. Note that U2F key handles commonly use <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#base64url-encoding" id="ref-for-base64url-encoding②③">base64url encoding</a> but must be decoded to their binary form when used in <a href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials⑧">excludeCredentials</a>.</p>
    <dl>
     <dt data-md>Extension identifier
     <dd data-md>
@@ -7531,7 +7538,7 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.2" id="sctn-appid-exclude-extension
      </ol>
     <dt data-md>Client extension output
     <dd data-md>
-     <p>Returns the value <code>true</code> to indicate to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①②">Relying Party</a> that the extension was acted upon.</p>
+     <p>Returns the value <code>true</code> to indicate to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①④">Relying Party</a> that the extension was acted upon.</p>
 <pre class="idl highlight def"><c- b>partial</c-> <c- b>dictionary</c-> <a class="idl-code" data-link-type="dictionary" href="#dictdef-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs" id="ref-for-dictdef-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs⑥"><c- g>AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs</c-></a> {
   <a class="idl-code" data-link-type="interface" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#idl-boolean" id="ref-for-idl-boolean⑧"><c- b>boolean</c-></a> <dfn class="dfn-paneled idl-code" data-dfn-for="AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs" data-dfn-type="dict-member" data-export data-type="boolean" id="dom-authenticationextensionsclientoutputs-appidexclude"><code><c- g>appidExclude</c-></code></dfn>;
 };
@@ -7557,7 +7564,7 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.3" id="sctn-authenticator-credentia
      <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①⓪">Registration</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①⓪">authentication</a></p>
     <dt data-md>Client extension input
     <dd data-md>
-     <p>The Boolean value <code>true</code> to indicate that this extension is requested by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①③">Relying Party</a>.</p>
+     <p>The Boolean value <code>true</code> to indicate that this extension is requested by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑤">Relying Party</a>.</p>
 <pre class="idl highlight def"><c- b>partial</c-> <c- b>dictionary</c-> <a class="idl-code" data-link-type="dictionary" href="#dictdef-authenticationextensionsclientinputs" id="ref-for-dictdef-authenticationextensionsclientinputs⑧"><c- g>AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs</c-></a> {
     <a class="idl-code" data-link-type="interface" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#idl-boolean" id="ref-for-idl-boolean⑨"><c- b>boolean</c-></a> <dfn class="dfn-paneled idl-code" data-dfn-for="AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs" data-dfn-type="dict-member" data-export data-type="boolean" id="dom-authenticationextensionsclientinputs-credprops"><code><c- g>credProps</c-></code></dfn>;
 };
@@ -7595,7 +7602,7 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.3" id="sctn-authenticator-credentia
 If <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk③">rk</a></code> is <code>true</code>, the credential is a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#discoverable-credential" id="ref-for-discoverable-credential①⑥">discoverable credential</a>.
 If <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk④">rk</a></code> is <code>false</code>, the credential is a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#server-side-credential" id="ref-for-server-side-credential①②">server-side credential</a>.
 If <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk⑤">rk</a></code> is not present, it is not known whether the credential is a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#discoverable-credential" id="ref-for-discoverable-credential①⑦">discoverable credential</a> or a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#server-side-credential" id="ref-for-server-side-credential①③">server-side credential</a>.</p>
-        <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> some <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑤⑥">authenticators</a> create <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#discoverable-credential" id="ref-for-discoverable-credential①⑧">discoverable credentials</a> even when not requested by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤④">client platform</a>. Because of this, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑤">client platforms</a> may be forced to omit the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk⑥">rk</a></code> property because they lack the assurance to be able to set it to <code>false</code>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①④">Relying Parties</a> should assume that, if the <code>credProps</code> extension is supported, then <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑥">client platforms</a> will endeavour to populate the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk⑦">rk</a></code> property. Therefore a missing <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk⑧">rk</a></code> indicates that the created credential is most likely a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#non-discoverable-credential" id="ref-for-non-discoverable-credential④">non-discoverable credential</a>.</p>
+        <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> some <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑤⑥">authenticators</a> create <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#discoverable-credential" id="ref-for-discoverable-credential①⑧">discoverable credentials</a> even when not requested by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤④">client platform</a>. Because of this, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑤">client platforms</a> may be forced to omit the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk⑥">rk</a></code> property because they lack the assurance to be able to set it to <code>false</code>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑥">Relying Parties</a> should assume that, if the <code>credProps</code> extension is supported, then <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑥">client platforms</a> will endeavour to populate the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk⑦">rk</a></code> property. Therefore a missing <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-rk⑧">rk</a></code> indicates that the created credential is most likely a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#non-discoverable-credential" id="ref-for-non-discoverable-credential④">non-discoverable credential</a>.</p>
        <dt data-md><dfn class="dfn-paneled idl-code" data-dfn-for="CredentialPropertiesOutput" data-dfn-type="dict-member" data-export id="dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-authenticatordisplayname"><code>authenticatorDisplayName</code></dfn>, <span> of type <a data-link-type="idl-name" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#idl-DOMString" id="ref-for-idl-DOMString⑦⑧">DOMString</a></span>
        <dd data-md>
         <p>This OPTIONAL property is a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#human-palatability" id="ref-for-human-palatability⑧">human-palatable</a> description of the credential’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential-source-managing-authenticator" id="ref-for-public-key-credential-source-managing-authenticator①②">managing authenticator</a>,
@@ -7603,17 +7610,17 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.3" id="sctn-authenticator-credentia
         <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪④">client</a> MUST allow the user to choose this value.
 That choice MAY be presented during the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony①⑧">registration</a> or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③⑧">authentication</a> ceremony or MAY be made available outside
 the ceremony, for example in client settings. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪⑤">client</a> MAY reuse the same value
-for multiple credentials with the same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential-source-managing-authenticator" id="ref-for-public-key-credential-source-managing-authenticator①③">managing authenticator</a> across multiple <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑤">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
+for multiple credentials with the same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential-source-managing-authenticator" id="ref-for-public-key-credential-source-managing-authenticator①③">managing authenticator</a> across multiple <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑦">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
         <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪⑥">client</a> MAY query the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑤⑦">authenticator</a>, by some unspecified mechanism, for this
 value. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑤⑧">authenticator</a> MAY allow the user to configure the response to such a
 query. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑤⑨">authenticator</a> vendor MAY provide a default response to such a query.
 The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪⑦">client</a> MAY consider a user-configured response chosen by the user,
 and SHOULD allow the user to modify a vendor-provided default response.</p>
-        <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑥">Relying Party</a> includes an <code><a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname④">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#struct-item" id="ref-for-struct-item①②">item</a> in its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-record" id="ref-for-credential-record①⑧">credential records</a>,
-the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑦">Relying Party</a> MAY offer this <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-authenticatordisplayname⑦">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code> extension output,
+        <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑧">Relying Party</a> includes an <code><a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname④">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#struct-item" id="ref-for-struct-item①②">item</a> in its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-record" id="ref-for-credential-record①⑧">credential records</a>,
+the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑨">Relying Party</a> MAY offer this <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-authenticatordisplayname⑦">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code> extension output,
 if present, as a default value for the <code><a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname⑤">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code> of the new <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-record" id="ref-for-credential-record①⑨">credential record</a> it stores after a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony①⑨">registration ceremony</a>.</p>
         <p>If the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-dom-credentialpropertiesoutput-authenticatordisplayname⑧">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code> extension output from an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony③⑨">authentication ceremony</a> is different from the <code><a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname⑥">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code> of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-record" id="ref-for-credential-record②⓪">credential record</a>,
-the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑧">Relying Party</a> MAY offer the user to update the <code><a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname⑦">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code> of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-record" id="ref-for-credential-record②①">credential record</a>.</p>
+the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⓪">Relying Party</a> MAY offer the user to update the <code><a data-link-type="abstract-op" href="#abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname" id="ref-for-abstract-opdef-credential-record-authenticatordisplayname⑦">authenticatorDisplayName</a></code> of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-record" id="ref-for-credential-record②①">credential record</a>.</p>
       </dl>
      </div>
     <dt data-md>Authenticator extension input
@@ -7627,11 +7634,11 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.3" id="sctn-authenticator-credentia
      <p>None.</p>
    </dl>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.4" id="prf-extension"><span class="secno">10.1.4. </span><span class="content">Pseudo-random function extension (<dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="prf">prf</dfn>)</span><a class="self-link" href="#prf-extension"></a></h4>
-   <p>This <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension⑨">client</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①①">registration extension</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①①">authentication extension</a> allows a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③①⑨">Relying Party</a> to evaluate outputs from a pseudo-random function (PRF) associated with a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#concept-credential" id="ref-for-concept-credential②④">credential</a>. The PRFs provided by this extension map from <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#BufferSource" id="ref-for-BufferSource①⓪">BufferSource</a></code>s of any length to 32-byte <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#BufferSource" id="ref-for-BufferSource①①">BufferSource</a></code>s.</p>
+   <p>This <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension⑨">client</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①①">registration extension</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①①">authentication extension</a> allows a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②①">Relying Party</a> to evaluate outputs from a pseudo-random function (PRF) associated with a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#concept-credential" id="ref-for-concept-credential②④">credential</a>. The PRFs provided by this extension map from <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#BufferSource" id="ref-for-BufferSource①⓪">BufferSource</a></code>s of any length to 32-byte <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#BufferSource" id="ref-for-BufferSource①①">BufferSource</a></code>s.</p>
    <p>As a motivating example, PRF outputs could be used as symmetric keys to encrypt user data. Such encrypted data would be inaccessible without the ability to get assertions from the associated <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#concept-credential" id="ref-for-concept-credential②⑤">credential</a>. By using the provision below to evaluate the PRF at two inputs in a single <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion" id="ref-for-assertion⑥">assertion</a> operation, the encryption key could be periodically rotated during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion" id="ref-for-assertion⑦">assertions</a> by choosing a fresh, random input and reencrypting under the new output. If the evaluation inputs are unpredictable then even an attacker who could satisfy <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤①">user verification</a>, and who had time-limited access to the authenticator, could not learn the encryption key without also knowing the correct PRF input.</p>
    <p>This extension is implemented on top of the <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a> <code>hmac-secret</code> extension. It is a separate <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension①⓪">client extension</a> because <code>hmac-secret</code> requires that inputs and outputs be encrypted in a manner that only the user agent can perform, and to provide separation between uses by WebAuthn and any uses by the underlying platform. This separation is achieved by hashing the provided PRF inputs with a context string to prevent evaluation of the PRFs for arbitrary inputs.</p>
    <p>The <code>hmac-secret</code> extension provides two PRFs per credential: one which is used for requests where <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤②">user verification</a> is performed and another for all other requests. This extension only exposes a single PRF per credential and, when implementing on top of <code>hmac-secret</code>, that PRF MUST be the one used for when <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤③">user verification</a> is performed. This overrides the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#enumdef-userverificationrequirement" id="ref-for-enumdef-userverificationrequirement⑥">UserVerificationRequirement</a></code> if neccessary.</p>
-   <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> this extension may be implemented for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥⓪">authenticators</a> that do not use <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a> so long as the behavior observed by a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⓪">Relying Party</a> is identical.</p>
+   <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> this extension may be implemented for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥⓪">authenticators</a> that do not use <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a> so long as the behavior observed by a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②②">Relying Party</a> is identical.</p>
    <dl>
     <dt data-md>Extension identifier
     <dd data-md>
@@ -7717,7 +7724,7 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.4" id="prf-extension"><span class="
      </ol>
     <dt data-md>Authenticator extension input / processing / output
     <dd data-md>
-     <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#prf" id="ref-for-prf">This extension</a> uses the <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a> <code>hmac-secret</code> extension when communicating with the authenticator. It thus does not specify any direct authenticator interaction for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②①">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
+     <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#prf" id="ref-for-prf">This extension</a> uses the <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a> <code>hmac-secret</code> extension when communicating with the authenticator. It thus does not specify any direct authenticator interaction for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②③">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
     <dt data-md>Client extension output
     <dd data-md>
 <pre class="idl highlight def"><c- b>dictionary</c-> <dfn class="dfn-paneled idl-code" data-dfn-type="dictionary" data-export id="dictdef-authenticationextensionsprfoutputs"><code><c- g>AuthenticationExtensionsPRFOutputs</c-></code></dfn> {
@@ -7938,9 +7945,9 @@ <h5 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.4.2" id="prf-extension-test-vectors
      <p><code>iv</code> in two-input <code>output_enc</code> with PIN protocol 2: Truncated <code>SHA-256(seed || 0x0a)</code></p>
    </ul>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.5" id="sctn-large-blob-extension"><span class="secno">10.1.5. </span><span class="content">Large blob storage extension (<dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="largeblob">largeBlob</dfn>)</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-large-blob-extension"></a></h4>
-   <p>This <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension①①">client</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①④">registration extension</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①④">authentication extension</a> allows a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②②">Relying Party</a> to store opaque data associated with a credential. Since <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥③">authenticators</a> can only store small amounts of data, and most <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②③">Relying Parties</a> are online services that can store arbitrary amounts of state for a user, this is only useful in specific cases. For example, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②④">Relying Party</a> might wish to issue certificates rather than run a centralised authentication service.</p>
-   <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑤">Relying Parties</a> can assume that the opaque data will be compressed when being written to a space-limited device and so need not compress it themselves.</p>
-   <p>Since a certificate system needs to sign over the public key of the credential, and that public key is only available after creation, this extension does not add an ability to write blobs in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①⑤">registration</a> context. However, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑥">Relying Parties</a> SHOULD use the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①⑥">registration extension</a> when creating the credential if they wish to later use the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①⑤">authentication extension</a>.</p>
+   <p>This <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension①①">client</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①④">registration extension</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①④">authentication extension</a> allows a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②④">Relying Party</a> to store opaque data associated with a credential. Since <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥③">authenticators</a> can only store small amounts of data, and most <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑤">Relying Parties</a> are online services that can store arbitrary amounts of state for a user, this is only useful in specific cases. For example, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑥">Relying Party</a> might wish to issue certificates rather than run a centralised authentication service.</p>
+   <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑦">Relying Parties</a> can assume that the opaque data will be compressed when being written to a space-limited device and so need not compress it themselves.</p>
+   <p>Since a certificate system needs to sign over the public key of the credential, and that public key is only available after creation, this extension does not add an ability to write blobs in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①⑤">registration</a> context. However, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑧">Relying Parties</a> SHOULD use the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①⑥">registration extension</a> when creating the credential if they wish to later use the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①⑤">authentication extension</a>.</p>
    <p>Since certificates are sizable relative to the storage capabilities of typical authenticators, user agents SHOULD consider what indications and confirmations are suitable to best guide the user in allocating this limited resource and prevent abuse.</p>
    <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> In order to interoperate, user agents storing large blobs on authenticators using <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a> are expected to use the provisions detailed in that specification for storing <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.1-ps-20210615/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.1-ps-errata-20220621.html#authenticatorLargeBlobs" id="ref-for-authenticatorLargeBlobs">large, per-credential blobs</a>.</p>
    <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#roaming-authenticators" id="ref-for-roaming-authenticators②③">Roaming authenticators</a> that use <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a> as their cross-platform transport protocol only support this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#largeblob" id="ref-for-largeblob">Large Blob</a> extension for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#discoverable-credential" id="ref-for-discoverable-credential①⑨">discoverable credentials</a>,
@@ -7977,10 +7984,10 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.5" id="sctn-large-blob-extension"><
         <p>A DOMString that takes one of the values of <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#enumdef-largeblobsupport" id="ref-for-enumdef-largeblobsupport">LargeBlobSupport</a></code>. (See <a href="#sct-domstring-backwards-compatibility">§ 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types</a>.) Only valid during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①⑧">registration</a>.</p>
        <dt data-md><dfn class="dfn-paneled idl-code" data-dfn-for="AuthenticationExtensionsLargeBlobInputs" data-dfn-type="dict-member" data-export id="dom-authenticationextensionslargeblobinputs-read"><code>read</code></dfn>, <span> of type <a data-link-type="idl-name" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#idl-boolean" id="ref-for-idl-boolean①⑤">boolean</a></span>
        <dd data-md>
-        <p>A boolean that indicates that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑦">Relying Party</a> would like to fetch the previously-written blob associated with the asserted credential. Only valid during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①⑦">authentication</a>.</p>
+        <p>A boolean that indicates that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑨">Relying Party</a> would like to fetch the previously-written blob associated with the asserted credential. Only valid during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①⑦">authentication</a>.</p>
        <dt data-md><dfn class="dfn-paneled idl-code" data-dfn-for="AuthenticationExtensionsLargeBlobInputs" data-dfn-type="dict-member" data-export id="dom-authenticationextensionslargeblobinputs-write"><code>write</code></dfn>, <span> of type <a data-link-type="idl-name" href="https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/#BufferSource" id="ref-for-BufferSource①⑥">BufferSource</a></span>
        <dd data-md>
-        <p>An opaque byte string that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑧">Relying Party</a> wishes to store with the existing credential. Only valid during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①⑧">authentication</a>.</p>
+        <p>An opaque byte string that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⓪">Relying Party</a> wishes to store with the existing credential. Only valid during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension①⑧">authentication</a>.</p>
       </dl>
      </div>
     <dt data-md>Client extension processing (<a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension①⑨">registration</a>)
@@ -8080,7 +8087,7 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="10.1.5" id="sctn-large-blob-extension"><
      </div>
     <dt data-md>Authenticator extension processing
     <dd data-md>
-     <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#largeblob" id="ref-for-largeblob①">This extension</a> directs the user-agent to cause the large blob to be stored on, or retrieved from, the authenticator. It thus does not specify any direct authenticator interaction for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③②⑨">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
+     <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#largeblob" id="ref-for-largeblob①">This extension</a> directs the user-agent to cause the large blob to be stored on, or retrieved from, the authenticator. It thus does not specify any direct authenticator interaction for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③①">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
    </dl>
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="10.2" id="sctn-defined-authenticator-extensions"><span class="secno">10.2. </span><span class="content">Authenticator Extensions</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-defined-authenticator-extensions"></a></h3>
    <p>This section defines extensions that are both <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension①②">client extensions</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator-extension" id="ref-for-authenticator-extension①②">authenticator extensions</a>.</p>
@@ -8796,7 +8803,7 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="12.4" id="sctn-extensions-reg"><span cla
     <li data-md>
      <p>WebAuthn Extension Identifier: largeBlob</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>Description: This <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension①④">client</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension②②">registration extension</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension②①">authentication extension</a> allows a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⓪">Relying Party</a> to store opaque data associated with a credential.</p>
+     <p>Description: This <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-extension" id="ref-for-client-extension①④">client</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-extension" id="ref-for-registration-extension②②">registration extension</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-extension" id="ref-for-authentication-extension②①">authentication extension</a> allows a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③②">Relying Party</a> to store opaque data associated with a credential.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>Specification Document: Section <a href="#sctn-large-blob-extension">§ 10.1.5 Large blob storage extension (largeBlob)</a> of this specification</p>
    </ul>
@@ -8804,15 +8811,15 @@ <h2 class="heading settled" data-level="13" id="sctn-security-considerations"><s
    <p>This specification defines a <a href="#sctn-api">Web API</a> and a cryptographic peer-entity authentication protocol.
 The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#web-authentication-api" id="ref-for-web-authentication-api①⑦">Web Authentication API</a> allows Web developers (i.e., "authors") to utilize the Web Authentication protocol in their <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②②">registration</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①⑤">authentication</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①③">ceremonies</a>.
 The entities comprising the Web Authentication protocol endpoints are user-controlled <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-authenticator" id="ref-for-webauthn-authenticator①⓪">WebAuthn Authenticators</a> and a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑥⑤">WebAuthn Relying Party</a>'s
-computing environment hosting the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③①">Relying Party</a>'s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#web-application" id="ref-for-web-application⑥">web application</a>.
-In this model, the user agent, together with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-client" id="ref-for-webauthn-client②③">WebAuthn Client</a>, comprise an intermediary between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥⑦">authenticators</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③②">Relying Parties</a>.
-Additionally, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥⑧">authenticators</a> can <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation" id="ref-for-attestation②④">attest</a> to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③③">Relying Parties</a> as to their provenance.</p>
+computing environment hosting the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③③">Relying Party</a>'s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#web-application" id="ref-for-web-application⑥">web application</a>.
+In this model, the user agent, together with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-client" id="ref-for-webauthn-client②③">WebAuthn Client</a>, comprise an intermediary between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥⑦">authenticators</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③④">Relying Parties</a>.
+Additionally, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥⑧">authenticators</a> can <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation" id="ref-for-attestation②④">attest</a> to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑤">Relying Parties</a> as to their provenance.</p>
    <p>At this time, this specification does not feature detailed security considerations. However, the <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fidosecref" title="FIDO Security Reference">[FIDOSecRef]</a> document provides a security analysis which is overall applicable to this specification.
 Also, the <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fidoauthnrsecreqs" title="FIDO Authenticator Security Requirements">[FIDOAuthnrSecReqs]</a> document suite provides useful information about <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑥⑨">authenticator</a> security characteristics.</p>
    <p>The below subsections comprise the current Web Authentication-specific security considerations.
 They are divided by audience;
 general security considerations are direct subsections of this section,
-while security considerations specifically for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑦⓪">authenticator</a>, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪⑨">client</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③④">Relying Party</a> implementers
+while security considerations specifically for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑦⓪">authenticator</a>, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①⓪⑨">client</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑥">Relying Party</a> implementers
 are grouped into respective subsections.</p>
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="13.1" id="sctn-credentialIdSecurity"><span class="secno">13.1. </span><span class="content">Credential ID Unsigned</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-credentialIdSecurity"></a></h3>
    <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id④⑦">credential ID</a> accompanying an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-assertion" id="ref-for-authentication-assertion①④">authentication assertion</a> is not signed.
@@ -8833,7 +8840,7 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="13.2" id="sctn-client-authenticator-prox
 then the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①①⑤">client</a> has to trust the third party to
 enforce the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②①">scope</a> restrictions and control access to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑦⑧">authenticator</a>.
 Failure to do either could result in
-a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑤">Relying Party</a> receiving <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-assertion" id="ref-for-authentication-assertion①⑤">authentication assertions</a> valid for other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑥">Relying Parties</a>,
+a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑦">Relying Party</a> receiving <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-assertion" id="ref-for-authentication-assertion①⑤">authentication assertions</a> valid for other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑧">Relying Parties</a>,
 or in a malicious user gaining access to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-assertion" id="ref-for-authentication-assertion①⑥">authentication assertions</a> for other users.</p>
    <p>If designing a solution where the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑦⑨">authenticator</a> does not need to be physically close to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①①⑥">client</a>,
 or where <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①①⑦">client</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧⓪">authenticator</a> do not communicate directly,
@@ -8855,38 +8862,38 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.3.2" id="sctn-ca-compromise"><span cl
 Authenticator manufacturer may need to ship a firmware update and inject new <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-private-key" id="ref-for-attestation-private-key⑤">attestation private keys</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-certificate" id="ref-for-attestation-certificate①①">certificates</a> into already
 manufactured <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-authenticator" id="ref-for-webauthn-authenticator①⑥">WebAuthn Authenticators</a>, if the exposure was due to a firmware flaw. (The process by which this happens is out of
 scope for this specification.) If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-authenticator" id="ref-for-webauthn-authenticator①⑦">WebAuthn Authenticator</a> manufacturer does not have this capability, then it may not be
-possible for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑦">Relying Parties</a> to trust any further <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement④⓪">attestation statements</a> from the affected <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-authenticator" id="ref-for-webauthn-authenticator①⑧">WebAuthn Authenticators</a>.</p>
-   <p>See also the related security consideration for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑧">Relying Parties</a> in <a href="#sctn-revoked-attestation-certificates">§ 13.4.5 Revoked Attestation Certificates</a>.</p>
-   <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4" id="sctn-security-considerations-rp"><span class="secno">13.4. </span><span class="content">Security considerations for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑨">Relying Parties</a></span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-security-considerations-rp"></a></h3>
+possible for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③③⑨">Relying Parties</a> to trust any further <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement④⓪">attestation statements</a> from the affected <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-authenticator" id="ref-for-webauthn-authenticator①⑧">WebAuthn Authenticators</a>.</p>
+   <p>See also the related security consideration for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⓪">Relying Parties</a> in <a href="#sctn-revoked-attestation-certificates">§ 13.4.5 Revoked Attestation Certificates</a>.</p>
+   <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4" id="sctn-security-considerations-rp"><span class="secno">13.4. </span><span class="content">Security considerations for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④①">Relying Parties</a></span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-security-considerations-rp"></a></h3>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.1" id="sctn-rp-benefits"><span class="secno">13.4.1. </span><span class="content">Security Benefits for WebAuthn Relying Parties</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-rp-benefits"></a></h4>
    <p>The main benefits offered to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑥⑧">WebAuthn Relying Parties</a> by this specification include:</p>
    <ol>
     <li data-md>
      <p>Users and accounts can be secured using widely compatible, easy-to-use multi-factor authentication.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⓪">Relying Party</a> does not need to provision <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧④">authenticator</a> hardware to its users. Instead, each user can independently obtain
-any conforming <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧⑤">authenticator</a> and use that same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧⑥">authenticator</a> with any number of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④①">Relying Parties</a>. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④②">Relying Party</a> can optionally
+     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④②">Relying Party</a> does not need to provision <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧④">authenticator</a> hardware to its users. Instead, each user can independently obtain
+any conforming <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧⑤">authenticator</a> and use that same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧⑥">authenticator</a> with any number of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④③">Relying Parties</a>. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④④">Relying Party</a> can optionally
 enforce requirements on <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧⑦">authenticators</a>' security properties by inspecting the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement④①">attestation statements</a> returned from the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧⑧">authenticators</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony④②">Authentication ceremonies</a> are resistant to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186">man-in-the-middle attacks</a>.
 Regarding <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②②">registration ceremonies</a>, see <a href="#sctn-attestation-limitations">§ 13.4.4 Attestation Limitations</a>, below.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④③">Relying Party</a> can automatically support multiple types of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤⑦">user verification</a> - for example PIN, biometrics and/or future
+     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑤">Relying Party</a> can automatically support multiple types of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤⑦">user verification</a> - for example PIN, biometrics and/or future
 methods - with little or no code change, and can let each user decide which they prefer to use via their choice of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑧⑨">authenticator</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④④">Relying Party</a> does not need to store additional secrets in order to gain the above benefits.</p>
+     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑥">Relying Party</a> does not need to store additional secrets in order to gain the above benefits.</p>
    </ol>
-   <p>As stated in the <a href="#sctn-conforming-relying-parties">Conformance</a> section, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑤">Relying Party</a> MUST behave as described in <a href="#sctn-rp-operations">§ 7 WebAuthn Relying Party Operations</a> to obtain all of the above security benefits. However, one notable use case that departs slightly from this is described below in <a href="#sctn-attestation-limitations">§ 13.4.4 Attestation Limitations</a>.</p>
+   <p>As stated in the <a href="#sctn-conforming-relying-parties">Conformance</a> section, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑦">Relying Party</a> MUST behave as described in <a href="#sctn-rp-operations">§ 7 WebAuthn Relying Party Operations</a> to obtain all of the above security benefits. However, one notable use case that departs slightly from this is described below in <a href="#sctn-attestation-limitations">§ 13.4.4 Attestation Limitations</a>.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.2" id="sctn-seccons-visibility"><span class="secno">13.4.2. </span><span class="content">Visibility Considerations for Embedded Usage</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-seccons-visibility"></a></h4>
-   <p>Simplistic use of WebAuthn in an embedded context, e.g., within <code><a data-link-type="element" href="https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/iframe-embed-object.html#the-iframe-element" id="ref-for-the-iframe-element③">iframe</a></code>s as described in <a href="#sctn-iframe-guidance">§ 5.10 Using Web Authentication within iframe elements</a>, may make users vulnerable to <dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="ui-redressing">UI Redressing</dfn> attacks, also known as "<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clickjacking">Clickjacking</a>". This is where an attacker overlays their own UI on top of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑥">Relying Party</a>'s intended UI and attempts to trick the user into performing unintended actions with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑦">Relying Party</a>. For example, using these techniques, an attacker might be able to trick users into purchasing items, transferring money, etc.</p>
-   <p>Even though WebAuthn-specific UI is typically handled by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑦">client platform</a> and thus is not vulnerable to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ui-redressing" id="ref-for-ui-redressing①">UI Redressing</a>, it is likely important for an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑧">Relying Party</a> having embedded WebAuthn-wielding content to ensure that their content’s UI is visible to the user. An emerging means to do so is by observing the status of the experimental <a href="https://w3c.github.io/IntersectionObserver/v2/">Intersection Observer v2</a>'s <code>isVisible</code> attribute. For example, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑨">Relying Party</a>'s script running in the embedded context could pre-emptively load itself in a popup window if it detects <code>isVisble</code> being set to <code>false</code>, thus side-stepping any occlusion of their content.</p>
+   <p>Simplistic use of WebAuthn in an embedded context, e.g., within <code><a data-link-type="element" href="https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/iframe-embed-object.html#the-iframe-element" id="ref-for-the-iframe-element③">iframe</a></code>s as described in <a href="#sctn-iframe-guidance">§ 5.10 Using Web Authentication within iframe elements</a>, may make users vulnerable to <dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="ui-redressing">UI Redressing</dfn> attacks, also known as "<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clickjacking">Clickjacking</a>". This is where an attacker overlays their own UI on top of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑧">Relying Party</a>'s intended UI and attempts to trick the user into performing unintended actions with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③④⑨">Relying Party</a>. For example, using these techniques, an attacker might be able to trick users into purchasing items, transferring money, etc.</p>
+   <p>Even though WebAuthn-specific UI is typically handled by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑦">client platform</a> and thus is not vulnerable to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ui-redressing" id="ref-for-ui-redressing①">UI Redressing</a>, it is likely important for an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⓪">Relying Party</a> having embedded WebAuthn-wielding content to ensure that their content’s UI is visible to the user. An emerging means to do so is by observing the status of the experimental <a href="https://w3c.github.io/IntersectionObserver/v2/">Intersection Observer v2</a>'s <code>isVisible</code> attribute. For example, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤①">Relying Party</a>'s script running in the embedded context could pre-emptively load itself in a popup window if it detects <code>isVisble</code> being set to <code>false</code>, thus side-stepping any occlusion of their content.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.3" id="sctn-cryptographic-challenges"><span class="secno">13.4.3. </span><span class="content">Cryptographic Challenges</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-cryptographic-challenges"></a></h4>
    <p>As a cryptographic protocol, Web Authentication is dependent upon randomized challenges
 to avoid replay attacks. Therefore, the values of both <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dictdef-publickeycredentialcreationoptions" id="ref-for-dictdef-publickeycredentialcreationoptions①②">PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions</a></code>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-challenge" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-challenge③">challenge</a></code> and <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dictdef-publickeycredentialrequestoptions" id="ref-for-dictdef-publickeycredentialrequestoptions①②">PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions</a></code>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-challenge" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-challenge④">challenge</a></code> MUST be randomly generated
-by <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⓪">Relying Parties</a> in an environment they trust (e.g., on the server-side), and the
+by <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤②">Relying Parties</a> in an environment they trust (e.g., on the server-side), and the
 returned <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-challenge" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-challenge⑧">challenge</a></code> value in the client’s
 response MUST match what was generated. This SHOULD be done in a fashion that does not rely
-upon a client’s behavior, e.g., the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤①">Relying Party</a> SHOULD store the challenge temporarily
+upon a client’s behavior, e.g., the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤③">Relying Party</a> SHOULD store the challenge temporarily
 until the operation is complete. Tolerating a mismatch will compromise the security
 of the protocol.</p>
    <p>Challenges SHOULD be valid for a duration similar to the
@@ -8899,88 +8906,88 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.4" id="sctn-attestation-limitations
 may allow the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑥⑨">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> to derive assurances about various <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨⓪">authenticator</a> qualities.
 For example, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨①">authenticator</a> model, or how it stores and protects <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-private-key" id="ref-for-credential-private-key①⑦">credential private keys</a>.
 However, it is important to note that an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement④③">attestation statement</a>, on its own,
-provides no means for a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤②">Relying Party</a> to verify that an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-object" id="ref-for-attestation-object①⑧">attestation object</a> was generated
+provides no means for a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤④">Relying Party</a> to verify that an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-object" id="ref-for-attestation-object①⑧">attestation object</a> was generated
 by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨②">authenticator</a> the user intended, and not by a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186①">man-in-the-middle attacker</a>.
-For example, such an attacker could use malicious code injected into <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤③">Relying Party</a> script.
-The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤④">Relying Party</a> must therefore rely on other means, e.g., TLS and related technologies,
+For example, such an attacker could use malicious code injected into <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑤">Relying Party</a> script.
+The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑥">Relying Party</a> must therefore rely on other means, e.g., TLS and related technologies,
 to protect the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-object" id="ref-for-attestation-object①⑨">attestation object</a> from <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186②">man-in-the-middle attacks</a>.</p>
    <p>Under the assumption that a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②③">registration ceremony</a> is completed securely, and that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨③">authenticator</a> maintains
 confidentiality of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-private-key" id="ref-for-credential-private-key①⑧">credential private key</a>, subsequent <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony④③">authentication ceremonies</a> using that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥①">public key
 credential</a> are resistant to tampering by <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186③">man-in-the-middle attacks</a>.</p>
    <p>The discussion above holds for all <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-type" id="ref-for-attestation-type②④">attestation types</a>. In all cases it is possible for a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186④">man-in-the-middle attacker</a> to replace the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#publickeycredential" id="ref-for-publickeycredential③②">PublicKeyCredential</a></code> object, including the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement④④">attestation statement</a> and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-public-key" id="ref-for-credential-public-key③⑥">credential public key</a> to be registered, and subsequently tamper with future <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-assertion" id="ref-for-authentication-assertion①⑦">authentication assertions</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②③">scoped</a> for the
-same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑤">Relying Party</a> and passing through the same attacker.</p>
-   <p>Such an attack would potentially be detectable; since the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑥">Relying Party</a> has registered the attacker’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-public-key" id="ref-for-credential-public-key③⑦">credential public key</a> rather
-than the user’s, the attacker must tamper with all subsequent <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony④④">authentication ceremonies</a> with that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑦">Relying Party</a>: unscathed
+same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑦">Relying Party</a> and passing through the same attacker.</p>
+   <p>Such an attack would potentially be detectable; since the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑧">Relying Party</a> has registered the attacker’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-public-key" id="ref-for-credential-public-key③⑦">credential public key</a> rather
+than the user’s, the attacker must tamper with all subsequent <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony④④">authentication ceremonies</a> with that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑨">Relying Party</a>: unscathed
 ceremonies will fail, potentially revealing the attack.</p>
-   <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-type" id="ref-for-attestation-type②⑤">Attestation types</a> other than <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#self-attestation" id="ref-for-self-attestation①⑨">Self Attestation</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#none" id="ref-for-none⑧">None</a> can increase the difficulty of such attacks, since <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑧">Relying Parties</a> can possibly display <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨④">authenticator</a> information, e.g., model designation, to the user. An attacker might therefore need to use
-a genuine <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨⑤">authenticator</a> of the same model as the user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨⑥">authenticator</a>, or the user might notice that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑤⑨">Relying Party</a> reports
+   <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-type" id="ref-for-attestation-type②⑤">Attestation types</a> other than <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#self-attestation" id="ref-for-self-attestation①⑨">Self Attestation</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#none" id="ref-for-none⑧">None</a> can increase the difficulty of such attacks, since <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⓪">Relying Parties</a> can possibly display <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨④">authenticator</a> information, e.g., model designation, to the user. An attacker might therefore need to use
+a genuine <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨⑤">authenticator</a> of the same model as the user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨⑥">authenticator</a>, or the user might notice that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥①">Relying Party</a> reports
 a different <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨⑦">authenticator</a> model than the user expects.</p>
    <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> All variants of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186⑤">man-in-the-middle attacks</a> described above are more difficult for an attacker to mount
 than a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186⑥">man-in-the-middle attack</a> against conventional password authentication.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.5" id="sctn-revoked-attestation-certificates"><span class="secno">13.4.5. </span><span class="content">Revoked Attestation Certificates</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-revoked-attestation-certificates"></a></h4>
-   <p>If <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-certificate" id="ref-for-attestation-certificate①②">attestation certificate</a> validation fails due to a revoked intermediate attestation CA certificate, and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⓪">Relying Party</a>'s policy
-requires rejecting the registration/authentication request in these situations, then it is RECOMMENDED that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥①">Relying Party</a> also
+   <p>If <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-certificate" id="ref-for-attestation-certificate①②">attestation certificate</a> validation fails due to a revoked intermediate attestation CA certificate, and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥②">Relying Party</a>'s policy
+requires rejecting the registration/authentication request in these situations, then it is RECOMMENDED that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥③">Relying Party</a> also
 un-registers (or marks with a trust level equivalent to "<a data-link-type="dfn" href="#self-attestation" id="ref-for-self-attestation②⓪">self attestation</a>") <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥②">public key credentials</a> that were registered
 after the CA compromise date using an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-certificate" id="ref-for-attestation-certificate①③">attestation certificate</a> chaining up to the same intermediate CA. It is thus RECOMMENDED
-that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥②">Relying Parties</a> remember intermediate attestation CA certificates during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②③">registration</a> in order to un-register
+that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥④">Relying Parties</a> remember intermediate attestation CA certificates during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②③">registration</a> in order to un-register
 related <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥③">public key credentials</a> if the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②④">registration</a> was performed after revocation of such certificates.</p>
    <p>See also the related security consideration for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨⑧">authenticators</a> in <a href="#sctn-ca-compromise">§ 13.3.2 Attestation Certificate and Attestation Certificate CA Compromise</a>.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.6" id="sctn-credential-loss-key-mobility"><span class="secno">13.4.6. </span><span class="content">Credential Loss and Key Mobility</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-credential-loss-key-mobility"></a></h4>
    <p>This specification defines no protocol for backing up <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-private-key" id="ref-for-credential-private-key①⑨">credential private keys</a>, or for sharing them between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator②⑨⑨">authenticators</a>.
 In general, it is expected that a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-private-key" id="ref-for-credential-private-key②⓪">credential private key</a> never leaves the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⓪">authenticator</a> that created it. Losing an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪①">authenticator</a> therefore, in general, means losing all <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥④">credentials</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#bound-credential" id="ref-for-bound-credential①⑤">bound</a> to the
-lost <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪②">authenticator</a>, which could lock the user out of an account if the user has only one <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⑤">credential</a> registered with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥③">Relying Party</a>. Instead of backing up or sharing private keys, the Web Authentication API allows registering
+lost <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪②">authenticator</a>, which could lock the user out of an account if the user has only one <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⑤">credential</a> registered with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑤">Relying Party</a>. Instead of backing up or sharing private keys, the Web Authentication API allows registering
 multiple <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⑥">credentials</a> for the same user. For example, a user might register <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#platform-credential" id="ref-for-platform-credential②">platform credentials</a> on
 frequently used <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-device" id="ref-for-client-device④⑤">client devices</a>, and one or more <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#roaming-credential" id="ref-for-roaming-credential①">roaming credentials</a> for use as backup and with new or rarely used <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-device" id="ref-for-client-device④⑥">client
 devices</a>.</p>
-   <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥④">Relying Parties</a> SHOULD allow and encourage users to register multiple <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⑦">credentials</a> to the same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account③⑥">user account</a>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑤">Relying Parties</a> SHOULD make use of the <code><code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials③">excludeCredentials</a></code></code> and <code><code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-user" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-user⑧">user</a></code>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialuserentity-id" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialuserentity-id①⓪">id</a></code></code> options to ensure that these
+   <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑥">Relying Parties</a> SHOULD allow and encourage users to register multiple <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⑦">credentials</a> to the same <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account③⑥">user account</a>. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑦">Relying Parties</a> SHOULD make use of the <code><code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials③">excludeCredentials</a></code></code> and <code><code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-user" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-user⑧">user</a></code>.<code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialuserentity-id" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialuserentity-id①⓪">id</a></code></code> options to ensure that these
 different <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⑧">credentials</a> are <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#bound-credential" id="ref-for-bound-credential①⑥">bound</a> to different <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪③">authenticators</a>.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.7" id="sctn-unprotected-account-detection"><span class="secno">13.4.7. </span><span class="content">Unprotected account detection</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-unprotected-account-detection"></a></h4>
    <p><em>This section is not normative.</em></p>
-   <p>This security consideration applies to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑥">Relying Parties</a> that support <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony④⑤">authentication ceremonies</a> with a non-<a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#list-empty" id="ref-for-list-empty⑦">empty</a> <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials②⑧">allowCredentials</a></code> argument as the first authentication step.
+   <p>This security consideration applies to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑧">Relying Parties</a> that support <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony④⑤">authentication ceremonies</a> with a non-<a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#list-empty" id="ref-for-list-empty⑦">empty</a> <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials②⑧">allowCredentials</a></code> argument as the first authentication step.
 For example, if using authentication with <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#server-side-credential" id="ref-for-server-side-credential①⑤">server-side credentials</a> as the first authentication step.</p>
    <p>In this case the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials②⑨">allowCredentials</a></code> argument risks leaking information
 about which <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account③⑦">user accounts</a> have WebAuthn credentials registered and which do not,
 which may be a signal of account protection strength.
 For example, say an attacker can initiate an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony④⑥">authentication ceremony</a> by providing only a username,
-and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑦">Relying Party</a> responds with a non-empty <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③⓪">allowCredentials</a></code> for some <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account③⑧">user accounts</a>,
+and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑨">Relying Party</a> responds with a non-empty <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③⓪">allowCredentials</a></code> for some <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account③⑧">user accounts</a>,
 and with failure or a password challenge for other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account③⑨">user accounts</a>.
 The attacker can then conclude that the latter <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account④⓪">user accounts</a> likely do not require a WebAuthn <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion" id="ref-for-assertion①①">assertion</a> for successful authentication,
 and thus focus an attack on those likely weaker accounts.</p>
    <p>This issue is similar to the one described in <a href="#sctn-username-enumeration">§ 14.6.2 Username Enumeration</a> and <a href="#sctn-credential-id-privacy-leak">§ 14.6.3 Privacy leak via credential IDs</a>, and can be mitigated in similar ways.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.8" id="sctn-code-injection"><span class="secno">13.4.8. </span><span class="content">Code injection attacks</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-code-injection"></a></h4>
-   <p>Any malicious code executing on an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised" id="ref-for-determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised⑦">origin</a> within the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②④">scope</a> of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑧">Relying Party</a>'s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⑨">public key credentials</a> has the potential to invalidate any and all security guarantees WebAuthn may provide. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-client" id="ref-for-webauthn-client②④">WebAuthn Clients</a> only expose the WebAuthn API in <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/webappapis.html#secure-context" id="ref-for-secure-context①">secure contexts</a>,
-which mitigates the most basic attacks but SHOULD be combined with additional precautions by <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑥⑨">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
+   <p>Any malicious code executing on an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised" id="ref-for-determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised⑦">origin</a> within the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②④">scope</a> of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⓪">Relying Party</a>'s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑥⑨">public key credentials</a> has the potential to invalidate any and all security guarantees WebAuthn may provide. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-client" id="ref-for-webauthn-client②④">WebAuthn Clients</a> only expose the WebAuthn API in <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/webappapis.html#secure-context" id="ref-for-secure-context①">secure contexts</a>,
+which mitigates the most basic attacks but SHOULD be combined with additional precautions by <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦①">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
    <p>Code injection can happen in several ways;
 this section attempts to point out some likely scenarios and suggest suitable mitigations,
 but is not an exhaustive list.</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>Malicous code could be injected by a third-party script included by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⓪">Relying Party</a>,
+     <p>Malicous code could be injected by a third-party script included by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦②">Relying Party</a>,
 either intentionally or due to a security vulnerability in the third party.</p>
-     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦①">Relying Party</a> therefore SHOULD limit the amount of third-party script included on the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised" id="ref-for-determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised⑧">origins</a> within the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②⑤">scope</a> of its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#concept-credential" id="ref-for-concept-credential②⑧">credentials</a>.</p>
-     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦②">Relying Party</a> SHOULD use Content Security Policy <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-csp2" title="Content Security Policy Level 2">[CSP2]</a>,
+     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦③">Relying Party</a> therefore SHOULD limit the amount of third-party script included on the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised" id="ref-for-determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised⑧">origins</a> within the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②⑤">scope</a> of its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#concept-credential" id="ref-for-concept-credential②⑧">credentials</a>.</p>
+     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦④">Relying Party</a> SHOULD use Content Security Policy <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-csp2" title="Content Security Policy Level 2">[CSP2]</a>,
 and/or other appropriate technologies available at the time, to limit what script can run on its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised" id="ref-for-determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised⑨">origins</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>Malicious code could, by the credential <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②⑥">scope</a> rules, be hosted on a subdomain of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id⑤⑤">RP ID</a>.
 For example, user-submitted code hosted on <code>usercontent.example.org</code> could exercise any <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#concept-credential" id="ref-for-concept-credential②⑨">credentials</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②⑦">scoped</a> to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id⑤⑥">RP ID</a> <code>example.org</code>.
-If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦③">Relying Party</a> allows a subdomain <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin⑨">origin</a></code> when <a href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-origin">verifying the assertion</a>,
+If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑤">Relying Party</a> allows a subdomain <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin⑨">origin</a></code> when <a href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-origin">verifying the assertion</a>,
 malicious users could use this to launch a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-186" id="ref-for-page-186⑦">man-in-the-middle attack</a> to obtain valid <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-assertion" id="ref-for-authentication-assertion①⑧">authentication assertions</a> and impersonate the victims of the attack.</p>
-     <p>Therefore, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦④">Relying Party</a> by default SHOULD NOT allow a subdomain <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①⓪">origin</a></code> when <a href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-origin">verifying the assertion</a>.
-If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑤">Relying Party</a> needs to allow a subdomain <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①①">origin</a></code>,
-then the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑥">Relying Party</a> MUST NOT serve untrusted code on any allowed subdomain of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised" id="ref-for-determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised①⓪">origins</a> within the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②⑧">scope</a> of its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⓪">public key credentials</a>.</p>
+     <p>Therefore, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑥">Relying Party</a> by default SHOULD NOT allow a subdomain <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①⓪">origin</a></code> when <a href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-origin">verifying the assertion</a>.
+If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑦">Relying Party</a> needs to allow a subdomain <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①①">origin</a></code>,
+then the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑧">Relying Party</a> MUST NOT serve untrusted code on any allowed subdomain of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised" id="ref-for-determines-the-set-of-origins-on-which-the-public-key-credential-may-be-exercised①⓪">origins</a> within the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②⑧">scope</a> of its <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⓪">public key credentials</a>.</p>
    </ul>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.9" id="sctn-validating-origin"><span class="secno">13.4.9. </span><span class="content">Validating the origin of a credential</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-validating-origin"></a></h4>
    <p>When <a href="#rp-op-registering-a-new-credential-step-origin">registering a credential</a> and
 when <a href="#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-origin">verifying an assertion</a>,
-the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑦">Relying Party</a> MUST validate the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①②">origin</a></code> member of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-data" id="ref-for-client-data①④">client data</a>.</p>
-   <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑧">Relying Party</a> MUST NOT accept unexpected values of <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①③">origin</a></code>,
+the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑨">Relying Party</a> MUST validate the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①②">origin</a></code> member of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-data" id="ref-for-client-data①④">client data</a>.</p>
+   <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⓪">Relying Party</a> MUST NOT accept unexpected values of <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①③">origin</a></code>,
 as doing so could allow a malicious website to obtain valid <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#concept-credential" id="ref-for-concept-credential③⓪">credentials</a>.
 Although the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope②⑨">scope</a> of WebAuthn credentials prevents their use on domains
 outside the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id⑤⑦">RP ID</a> they were registered for,
-the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑦⑨">Relying Party</a>'s origin validation serves as an additional layer of protection
+the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧①">Relying Party</a>'s origin validation serves as an additional layer of protection
 in case a faulty <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪④">authenticator</a> fails to enforce credential <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope③⓪">scope</a>.
 See also <a href="#sctn-code-injection">§ 13.4.8 Code injection attacks</a> for discussion of potentially malicious subdomains.</p>
-   <p>Validation MAY be performed by exact string matching or any other method as needed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⓪">Relying Party</a>.
+   <p>Validation MAY be performed by exact string matching or any other method as needed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧②">Relying Party</a>.
 For example:</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
@@ -8999,11 +9006,11 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="13.4.9" id="sctn-validating-origin"><spa
      <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> See <a href="#sctn-code-injection">§ 13.4.8 Code injection attacks</a> for a discussion of the risks of allowing any subdomain of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#rp-id" id="ref-for-rp-id⑥①">RP ID</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>A web application with a companion native application might allow <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin①⑨">origin</a></code> to be an operating system dependent
-identifier for the native application. For example, such a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧①">Relying Party</a> might require that <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin②⓪">origin</a></code> exactly equals some element of the list <code>["https://example.org", "example-os:appid:204ffa1a5af110ac483f131a1bef8a841a7adb0d8d135908bbd964ed05d2653b"]</code>.</p>
+identifier for the native application. For example, such a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧③">Relying Party</a> might require that <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-origin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-origin②⓪">origin</a></code> exactly equals some element of the list <code>["https://example.org", "example-os:appid:204ffa1a5af110ac483f131a1bef8a841a7adb0d8d135908bbd964ed05d2653b"]</code>.</p>
    </ul>
    <p>Similar considerations apply when validating the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin①③">topOrigin</a></code> member of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-data" id="ref-for-client-data①⑤">client data</a>.
-When <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin①④">topOrigin</a></code> is present, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧②">Relying Party</a> MUST validate that its value is expected.
-This validation MAY be performed by exact string matching or any other method as needed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧③">Relying Party</a>.
+When <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin" id="ref-for-dom-collectedclientdata-toporigin①④">topOrigin</a></code> is present, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧④">Relying Party</a> MUST validate that its value is expected.
+This validation MAY be performed by exact string matching or any other method as needed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑤">Relying Party</a>.
 For example:</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
@@ -9021,7 +9028,7 @@ <h2 class="heading settled" data-level="14" id="sctn-privacy-considerations"><sp
    <p>The privacy principles in <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-privacy-principles" title="FIDO Privacy Principles">[FIDO-Privacy-Principles]</a> also apply to this specification.</p>
    <p>This section is divided by audience;
 general privacy considerations are direct subsections of this section,
-while privacy considerations specifically for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⑤">authenticator</a>, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①①⑧">client</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧④">Relying Party</a> implementers
+while privacy considerations specifically for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⑤">authenticator</a>, <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①①⑧">client</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑥">Relying Party</a> implementers
 are grouped into respective subsections.</p>
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="14.1" id="sctn-privacy-attacks"><span class="secno">14.1. </span><span class="content">De-anonymization Prevention Measures</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-privacy-attacks"></a></h3>
    <p><em>This section is not normative.</em></p>
@@ -9035,53 +9042,53 @@ <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="14.1" id="sctn-privacy-attacks"><span cl
      <p>These are registered by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑦⓪">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> and subsequently used by the user to prove possession of the corresponding <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-private-key" id="ref-for-credential-private-key②①">credential
 private key</a>. They are also visible to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①①⑨">client</a> in the communication with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⑥">authenticator</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>The user’s identities specific to each <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑤">Relying Party</a>, e.g., usernames and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-handle" id="ref-for-user-handle②⑤">user handles</a>.</p>
-     <p>These identities are obviously used by each <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑥">Relying Party</a> to identify a user in their system. They are also visible to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①②⓪">client</a> in the communication with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⑦">authenticator</a>.</p>
+     <p>The user’s identities specific to each <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑦">Relying Party</a>, e.g., usernames and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-handle" id="ref-for-user-handle②⑤">user handles</a>.</p>
+     <p>These identities are obviously used by each <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑧">Relying Party</a> to identify a user in their system. They are also visible to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①②⓪">client</a> in the communication with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⑦">authenticator</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>The user’s biometric characteristic(s), e.g., fingerprints or facial recognition data <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-isobiometricvocabulary" title="Information technology — Vocabulary — Biometrics">[ISOBiometricVocabulary]</a>.</p>
-     <p>This is optionally used by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⑧">authenticator</a> to perform <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤⑧">user verification</a>. It is not revealed to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑦">Relying Party</a>, but in
+     <p>This is optionally used by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⑧">authenticator</a> to perform <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤⑧">user verification</a>. It is not revealed to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑨">Relying Party</a>, but in
 the case of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#platform-authenticators" id="ref-for-platform-authenticators③①">platform authenticators</a>, it might be visible to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①②①">client</a> depending on the implementation.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>The models of the user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③⓪⑨">authenticators</a>, e.g., product names.</p>
-     <p>This is exposed in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement④⑤">attestation statement</a> provided to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑧">Relying Party</a> during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②⑤">registration</a>. It is also visible to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①②②">client</a> in the communication with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⓪">authenticator</a>.</p>
+     <p>This is exposed in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-statement" id="ref-for-attestation-statement④⑤">attestation statement</a> provided to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⓪">Relying Party</a> during <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②⑤">registration</a>. It is also visible to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①②②">client</a> in the communication with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⓪">authenticator</a>.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>The identities of the user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①①">authenticators</a>, e.g., serial numbers.</p>
-     <p>This is possibly used by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①②③">client</a> to enable communication with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①②">authenticator</a>, but is not exposed to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑧⑨">Relying Party</a>.</p>
+     <p>This is possibly used by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①②③">client</a> to enable communication with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①②">authenticator</a>, but is not exposed to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨①">Relying Party</a>.</p>
    </ul>
-   <p>Some of the above information is necessarily shared with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⓪">Relying Party</a>. The following sections describe the measures taken to
-prevent malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨①">Relying Parties</a> from using it to discover a user’s personal identity.</p>
+   <p>Some of the above information is necessarily shared with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨②">Relying Party</a>. The following sections describe the measures taken to
+prevent malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨③">Relying Parties</a> from using it to discover a user’s personal identity.</p>
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="14.2" id="sctn-non-correlatable-credentials"><span class="secno">14.2. </span><span class="content">Anonymous, Scoped, Non-correlatable <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦①">Public Key Credentials</a></span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-non-correlatable-credentials"></a></h3>
    <p><em>This section is not normative.</em></p>
    <p>Although <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤①">Credential IDs</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-public-key" id="ref-for-credential-public-key③⑨">credential public keys</a> are necessarily shared with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑦①">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> to enable strong
-authentication, they are designed to be minimally identifying and not shared between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨②">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
+authentication, they are designed to be minimally identifying and not shared between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨④">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
      <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤②">Credential IDs</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-public-key" id="ref-for-credential-public-key④⓪">credential public keys</a> are meaningless in isolation, as they only identify <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-key-pair" id="ref-for-credential-key-pair⑥">credential key pairs</a> and not users directly.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>Each <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦②">public key credential</a> is strictly <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope③①">scoped</a> to a specific <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨③">Relying Party</a>, and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①②④">client</a> ensures that its existence is not
-revealed to other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨④">Relying Parties</a>. A malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑤">Relying Party</a> thus cannot ask the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①②⑤">client</a> to reveal a user’s other identities.</p>
+     <p>Each <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦②">public key credential</a> is strictly <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#scope" id="ref-for-scope③①">scoped</a> to a specific <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑤">Relying Party</a>, and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①②④">client</a> ensures that its existence is not
+revealed to other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑥">Relying Parties</a>. A malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑦">Relying Party</a> thus cannot ask the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①②⑤">client</a> to reveal a user’s other identities.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①②⑥">client</a> also ensures that the existence of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦③">public key credential</a> is not revealed to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑥">Relying Party</a> without <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-consent" id="ref-for-user-consent②⑦">user
-consent</a>. This is detailed further in <a href="#sctn-make-credential-privacy">§ 14.5.1 Registration Ceremony Privacy</a> and <a href="#sctn-assertion-privacy">§ 14.5.2 Authentication Ceremony Privacy</a>. A malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑦">Relying Party</a> thus cannot silently identify a user, even if the user has a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦④">public key credential</a> registered and available.</p>
+     <p>The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①②⑥">client</a> also ensures that the existence of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦③">public key credential</a> is not revealed to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑧">Relying Party</a> without <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-consent" id="ref-for-user-consent②⑦">user
+consent</a>. This is detailed further in <a href="#sctn-make-credential-privacy">§ 14.5.1 Registration Ceremony Privacy</a> and <a href="#sctn-assertion-privacy">§ 14.5.2 Authentication Ceremony Privacy</a>. A malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑨">Relying Party</a> thus cannot silently identify a user, even if the user has a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦④">public key credential</a> registered and available.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①③">Authenticators</a> ensure that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤③">credential IDs</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-public-key" id="ref-for-credential-public-key④①">credential public keys</a> of different <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⑤">public key credentials</a> are
-not correlatable as belonging to the same user. A pair of malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑧">Relying Parties</a> thus cannot correlate users between their
+not correlatable as belonging to the same user. A pair of malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⓪">Relying Parties</a> thus cannot correlate users between their
 systems without additional information, e.g., a willfully reused username or e-mail address.</p>
     <li data-md>
-     <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①④">Authenticators</a> ensure that their <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-certificate" id="ref-for-attestation-certificate①④">attestation certificates</a> are not unique enough to identify a single <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⑤">authenticator</a> or a small group of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⑥">authenticators</a>. This is detailed further in <a href="#sctn-attestation-privacy">§ 14.4.1 Attestation Privacy</a>. A pair of malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party③⑨⑨">Relying Parties</a> thus cannot correlate users between their systems by tracking individual <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⑦">authenticators</a>.</p>
+     <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①④">Authenticators</a> ensure that their <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-certificate" id="ref-for-attestation-certificate①④">attestation certificates</a> are not unique enough to identify a single <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⑤">authenticator</a> or a small group of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⑥">authenticators</a>. This is detailed further in <a href="#sctn-attestation-privacy">§ 14.4.1 Attestation Privacy</a>. A pair of malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪①">Relying Parties</a> thus cannot correlate users between their systems by tracking individual <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⑦">authenticators</a>.</p>
    </ul>
    <p>Additionally, a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-side-discoverable-public-key-credential-source" id="ref-for-client-side-discoverable-public-key-credential-source⑧">client-side discoverable public key credential source</a> can optionally include a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-handle" id="ref-for-user-handle②⑥">user
-handle</a> specified by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⓪">Relying Party</a>. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⑥">credential</a> can then be used to both identify and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①⑥">authenticate</a> the user.
-This means that a privacy-conscious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪①">Relying Party</a> can allow creation of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account④①">user account</a> without a traditional username,
-further improving non-correlatability between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪②">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
+handle</a> specified by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪②">Relying Party</a>. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⑥">credential</a> can then be used to both identify and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①⑥">authenticate</a> the user.
+This means that a privacy-conscious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪③">Relying Party</a> can allow creation of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account④①">user account</a> without a traditional username,
+further improving non-correlatability between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪④">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="14.3" id="sctn-biometric-privacy"><span class="secno">14.3. </span><span class="content">Authenticator-local <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#biometric-recognition" id="ref-for-biometric-recognition④">Biometric Recognition</a></span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-biometric-privacy"></a></h3>
    <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#biometric-authenticator" id="ref-for-biometric-authenticator①">Biometric authenticators</a> perform the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#biometric-recognition" id="ref-for-biometric-recognition⑤">biometric recognition</a> internally in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⑧">authenticator</a> - though for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#platform-authenticators" id="ref-for-platform-authenticators③②">platform
 authenticators</a> the biometric data might also be visible to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①②⑦">client</a>, depending on the implementation. Biometric data is
-not revealed to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑦②">WebAuthn Relying Party</a>; it is used only locally to perform <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤⑨">user verification</a> authorizing the creation and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②⑥">registration</a> of, or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①⑦">authentication</a> using, a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⑦">public key credential</a>. A malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪③">Relying Party</a> therefore cannot discover the
-user’s personal identity via biometric data, and a security breach at a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪④">Relying Party</a> cannot expose biometric data for an attacker to
-use for forging logins at other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑤">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
-   <p>In the case where a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑥">Relying Party</a> requires <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#biometric-recognition" id="ref-for-biometric-recognition⑥">biometric recognition</a>, this is performed locally by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#biometric-authenticator" id="ref-for-biometric-authenticator②">biometric authenticator</a> perfoming <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑥⓪">user verification</a> and then signaling the result by setting the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-uv" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-uv①⑦">UV</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags" id="ref-for-authdata-flags⑤⑦">flag</a> in the signed <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion" id="ref-for-assertion①②">assertion</a> response,
-instead of revealing the biometric data itself to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑦">Relying Party</a>.</p>
+not revealed to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑦②">WebAuthn Relying Party</a>; it is used only locally to perform <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑤⑨">user verification</a> authorizing the creation and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②⑥">registration</a> of, or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①⑦">authentication</a> using, a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⑦">public key credential</a>. A malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑤">Relying Party</a> therefore cannot discover the
+user’s personal identity via biometric data, and a security breach at a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑥">Relying Party</a> cannot expose biometric data for an attacker to
+use for forging logins at other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑦">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
+   <p>In the case where a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑧">Relying Party</a> requires <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#biometric-recognition" id="ref-for-biometric-recognition⑥">biometric recognition</a>, this is performed locally by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#biometric-authenticator" id="ref-for-biometric-authenticator②">biometric authenticator</a> perfoming <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑥⓪">user verification</a> and then signaling the result by setting the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags-uv" id="ref-for-authdata-flags-uv①⑦">UV</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authdata-flags" id="ref-for-authdata-flags⑤⑦">flag</a> in the signed <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#assertion" id="ref-for-assertion①②">assertion</a> response,
+instead of revealing the biometric data itself to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑨">Relying Party</a>.</p>
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="14.4" id="sctn-privacy-considerations-authenticator"><span class="secno">14.4. </span><span class="content">Privacy considerations for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③①⑨">authenticators</a></span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-privacy-considerations-authenticator"></a></h3>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.4.1" id="sctn-attestation-privacy"><span class="secno">14.4.1. </span><span class="content">Attestation Privacy</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-attestation-privacy"></a></h4>
    <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-certificate" id="ref-for-attestation-certificate①⑤">Attestation certificates</a> and <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#attestation-key-pair" id="ref-for-attestation-key-pair⑦">attestation key pairs</a> can be used to track users
@@ -9117,35 +9124,35 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.4.2" id="sctn-pii-privacy"><span clas
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="14.5" id="sctn-privacy-considerations-client"><span class="secno">14.5. </span><span class="content">Privacy considerations for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①③⓪">clients</a></span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-privacy-considerations-client"></a></h3>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.5.1" id="sctn-make-credential-privacy"><span class="secno">14.5.1. </span><span class="content">Registration Ceremony Privacy</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-make-credential-privacy"></a></h4>
    <p>In order to protect users from being identified without <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-consent" id="ref-for-user-consent②⑧">consent</a>, implementations of the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredential-create-slot" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredential-create-slot①②">[[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors)</a></code> method need to take care to not leak information that
-could enable a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑦③">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> to distinguish between these cases, where "excluded" means that at least one of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⑧">credentials</a> listed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑧">Relying Party</a> in <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials④">excludeCredentials</a></code> is <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#bound-credential" id="ref-for-bound-credential①⑦">bound</a> to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③②">authenticator</a>:</p>
+could enable a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑦③">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> to distinguish between these cases, where "excluded" means that at least one of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⑧">credentials</a> listed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⓪">Relying Party</a> in <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials④">excludeCredentials</a></code> is <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#bound-credential" id="ref-for-bound-credential①⑦">bound</a> to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③②">authenticator</a>:</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
      <p>No <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③③">authenticators</a> are present.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>At least one <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③④">authenticator</a> is present, and at least one present <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③⑤">authenticator</a> is excluded.</p>
    </ul>
-   <p>If the above cases are distinguishable, information is leaked by which a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④⓪⑨">Relying Party</a> could identify the user by probing for
+   <p>If the above cases are distinguishable, information is leaked by which a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①①">Relying Party</a> could identify the user by probing for
 which <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑦⑨">credentials</a> are available. For example, one such information leak is if the client returns a
-failure response as soon as an excluded <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③⑥">authenticator</a> becomes available. In this case - especially if the excluded <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③⑦">authenticator</a> is a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#platform-authenticators" id="ref-for-platform-authenticators③③">platform authenticator</a> - the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⓪">Relying Party</a> could detect that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①④">ceremony</a> was canceled
+failure response as soon as an excluded <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③⑥">authenticator</a> becomes available. In this case - especially if the excluded <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③⑦">authenticator</a> is a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#platform-authenticators" id="ref-for-platform-authenticators③③">platform authenticator</a> - the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①②">Relying Party</a> could detect that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①④">ceremony</a> was canceled
 before the user could feasibly have canceled it manually, and thus conclude that at least one of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑧⓪">credentials</a> listed in the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-excludecredentials⑤">excludeCredentials</a></code> parameter is available to the user.</p>
    <p>The above is not a concern, however, if the user has <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-consent" id="ref-for-user-consent②⑨">consented</a> to create a new credential before a
 distinguishable error is returned, because in this case the user has confirmed intent to share the information that would be
 leaked.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.5.2" id="sctn-assertion-privacy"><span class="secno">14.5.2. </span><span class="content">Authentication Ceremony Privacy</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-assertion-privacy"></a></h4>
    <p>In order to protect users from being identified without <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-consent" id="ref-for-user-consent③⓪">consent</a>, implementations of the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredential-discoverfromexternalsource-slot" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredential-discoverfromexternalsource-slot①⑤">[[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors)</a></code> method need to take care to not
-leak information that could enable a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑦④">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> to distinguish between these cases, where "named" means that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑧①">credential</a> is listed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①①">Relying Party</a> in <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③①">allowCredentials</a></code>:</p>
+leak information that could enable a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑦④">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> to distinguish between these cases, where "named" means that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑧①">credential</a> is listed by the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①③">Relying Party</a> in <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③①">allowCredentials</a></code>:</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
      <p>A named <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑧②">credential</a> is not available.</p>
     <li data-md>
      <p>A named <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑧③">credential</a> is available, but the user does not <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-consent" id="ref-for-user-consent③①">consent</a> to use it.</p>
    </ul>
-   <p>If the above cases are distinguishable, information is leaked by which a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①②">Relying Party</a> could identify the user by probing
+   <p>If the above cases are distinguishable, information is leaked by which a malicious <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①④">Relying Party</a> could identify the user by probing
 for which <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑧④">credentials</a> are available.
 For example, one such information leak may happen if the client displays instructions and controls
 for canceling or proceeding with the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony④⑧">authentication ceremony</a> only after discovering an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③⑧">authenticator</a> that <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#contains" id="ref-for-contains③">contains</a> a named <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#concept-credential" id="ref-for-concept-credential③④">credential</a>.
-In this case, if the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①③">Relying Party</a> is aware of this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①③①">client</a> behavior,
-the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①④">Relying Party</a> could detect that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①⑤">ceremony</a> was canceled by the user and not the timeout, and thus conclude that at least
+In this case, if the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑤">Relying Party</a> is aware of this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client" id="ref-for-client①③①">client</a> behavior,
+the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑥">Relying Party</a> could detect that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①⑤">ceremony</a> was canceled by the user and not the timeout, and thus conclude that at least
 one of the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#public-key-credential" id="ref-for-public-key-credential⑧⑤">credentials</a> listed in the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③②">allowCredentials</a></code> parameter is
 available to the user.</p>
    <p>This concern may be addressed by displaying controls allowing the user to cancel an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony④⑨">authentication ceremony</a> at any time,
@@ -9157,39 +9164,39 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.5.3" id="sctn-os-account-privacy"><sp
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.5.4" id="sctn-disclosing-client-capabilities"><span class="secno">14.5.4. </span><span class="content">Disclosing Client Capabilities</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-disclosing-client-capabilities"></a></h4>
    <p>The <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredential-getclientcapabilities" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredential-getclientcapabilities④">getClientCapabilities</a></code> method assists <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑦⑤">WebAuthn Relying Parties</a> in crafting registration and authentication experiences which have a high chance of success with the client and/or user.</p>
    <p>The client’s support or lack of support of a WebAuthn capability may pose a fingerprinting risk. Client implementations MAY wish to limit capability disclosures based on client policy and/or user consent.</p>
-   <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="14.6" id="sctn-privacy-considerations-rp"><span class="secno">14.6. </span><span class="content">Privacy considerations for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑤">Relying Parties</a></span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-privacy-considerations-rp"></a></h3>
+   <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="14.6" id="sctn-privacy-considerations-rp"><span class="secno">14.6. </span><span class="content">Privacy considerations for <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑦">Relying Parties</a></span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-privacy-considerations-rp"></a></h3>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.6.1" id="sctn-user-handle-privacy"><span class="secno">14.6.1. </span><span class="content">User Handle Contents</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-user-handle-privacy"></a></h4>
    <p>Since the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-handle" id="ref-for-user-handle②⑧">user handle</a> is not considered personally identifying information in <a href="#sctn-pii-privacy">§ 14.4.2 Privacy of personally identifying information Stored in Authenticators</a>,
 and since <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③③⑨">authenticators</a> MAY reveal <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-handle" id="ref-for-user-handle②⑨">user handles</a> without first performing <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑥④">user verification</a>,
-the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑥">Relying Party</a> MUST NOT include personally identifying information, e.g., e-mail
+the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑧">Relying Party</a> MUST NOT include personally identifying information, e.g., e-mail
 addresses or usernames, in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-handle" id="ref-for-user-handle③⓪">user handle</a>. This includes hash values of personally identifying information, unless the hash
-function is <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-258" id="ref-for-page-258">salted</a> with <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-258" id="ref-for-page-258①">salt</a> values private to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑦">Relying Party</a>, since hashing does not prevent probing for guessable input
+function is <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-258" id="ref-for-page-258">salted</a> with <a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949#page-258" id="ref-for-page-258①">salt</a> values private to the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑨">Relying Party</a>, since hashing does not prevent probing for guessable input
 values. It is RECOMMENDED to let the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-handle" id="ref-for-user-handle③①">user handle</a> be 64 random bytes, and store this value in the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account④②">user account</a>.</p>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.6.2" id="sctn-username-enumeration"><span class="secno">14.6.2. </span><span class="content">Username Enumeration</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-username-enumeration"></a></h4>
    <p>While initiating a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②④">registration</a> or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony⑤⓪">authentication ceremony</a>, there is a risk that the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑦⑥">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> might leak sensitive
-information about its registered users. For example, if a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑧">Relying Party</a> uses e-mail addresses as usernames and an attacker attempts to
-initiate an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①⑧">authentication</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①⑥">ceremony</a> for "alex.mueller@example.com" and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④①⑨">Relying Party</a> responds with a failure, but then
+information about its registered users. For example, if a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⓪">Relying Party</a> uses e-mail addresses as usernames and an attacker attempts to
+initiate an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication" id="ref-for-authentication①⑧">authentication</a> <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①⑥">ceremony</a> for "alex.mueller@example.com" and the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②①">Relying Party</a> responds with a failure, but then
 successfully initiates an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony⑤①">authentication ceremony</a> for "j.doe@example.com", then the attacker can conclude that "j.doe@example.com"
-is registered and "alex.mueller@example.com" is not. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⓪">Relying Party</a> has thus leaked the possibly sensitive information that
-"j.doe@example.com" has a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account④③">user account</a> at this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②①">Relying Party</a>.</p>
-   <p>The following is a non-normative, non-exhaustive list of measures the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②②">Relying Party</a> may implement to mitigate or prevent information
+is registered and "alex.mueller@example.com" is not. The <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②②">Relying Party</a> has thus leaked the possibly sensitive information that
+"j.doe@example.com" has a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-account" id="ref-for-user-account④③">user account</a> at this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②③">Relying Party</a>.</p>
+   <p>The following is a non-normative, non-exhaustive list of measures the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②④">Relying Party</a> may implement to mitigate or prevent information
 leakage due to such an attack:</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
      <p>For <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②⑤">registration ceremonies</a>:</p>
      <ul>
       <li data-md>
-       <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②③">Relying Party</a> uses <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②④">Relying Party</a>-specific usernames to identify users:</p>
+       <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑤">Relying Party</a> uses <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑥">Relying Party</a>-specific usernames to identify users:</p>
        <ul>
         <li data-md>
          <p>When initiating a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②⑥">registration ceremony</a>, disallow registration of usernames that are syntactically valid e-mail
 addresses.</p>
-         <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> The motivation for this suggestion is that in this case the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑤">Relying Party</a> probably has no choice but to fail the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②⑦">registration ceremony</a> if the user attempts to register a username that is already registered, and an information
+         <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> The motivation for this suggestion is that in this case the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑦">Relying Party</a> probably has no choice but to fail the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②⑦">registration ceremony</a> if the user attempts to register a username that is already registered, and an information
 leak might therefore be unavoidable. By disallowing e-mail addresses as usernames, the impact of the leakage can be
-mitigated since it will be less likely that a user has the same username at this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑥">Relying Party</a> as at other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑦">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
+mitigated since it will be less likely that a user has the same username at this <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑧">Relying Party</a> as at other <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑨">Relying Parties</a>.</p>
        </ul>
       <li data-md>
-       <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑧">Relying Party</a> uses e-mail addresses to identify users:</p>
+       <p>If the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⓪">Relying Party</a> uses e-mail addresses to identify users:</p>
        <ul>
         <li data-md>
          <p>When initiating a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②⑧">registration ceremony</a>, interrupt the user interaction after the e-mail address is supplied and
@@ -9209,7 +9216,7 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.6.2" id="sctn-username-enumeration"><
 ceremony by invoking <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-credential-management/#dom-credentialscontainer-get" id="ref-for-dom-credentialscontainer-get④⓪">navigator.credentials.get()</a></code> using a syntactically valid <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dictdef-publickeycredentialrequestoptions" id="ref-for-dictdef-publickeycredentialrequestoptions①③">PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions</a></code> object that is populated with plausible imaginary values.</p>
        <p>This approach could also be used to mitigate information leakage via <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③③">allowCredentials</a></code>;
 see <a href="#sctn-unprotected-account-detection">§ 13.4.7 Unprotected account detection</a> and <a href="#sctn-credential-id-privacy-leak">§ 14.6.3 Privacy leak via credential IDs</a>.</p>
-       <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> The username may be "provided" in various <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④②⑨">Relying Party</a>-specific fashions: login form, session cookie, etc.</p>
+       <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> The username may be "provided" in various <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③①">Relying Party</a>-specific fashions: login form, session cookie, etc.</p>
        <p class="note" role="note"><span class="marker">Note:</span> If returned imaginary values noticeably differ from actual ones, clever attackers may be able to discern them and
     thus be able to test for existence of actual accounts. Examples of noticeably different values include if the values
     are always the same for all username inputs, or are different in repeated attempts with the same username input. The <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③④">allowCredentials</a></code> member could therefore be populated with pseudo-random values
@@ -9226,17 +9233,17 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.6.2" id="sctn-username-enumeration"><
    </ul>
    <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.6.3" id="sctn-credential-id-privacy-leak"><span class="secno">14.6.3. </span><span class="content">Privacy leak via credential IDs</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-credential-id-privacy-leak"></a></h4>
    <p><em>This section is not normative.</em></p>
-   <p>This privacy consideration applies to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⓪">Relying Parties</a> that support <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony⑤⑤">authentication ceremonies</a> with a non-<a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#list-empty" id="ref-for-list-empty⑧">empty</a> <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③⑤">allowCredentials</a></code> argument as the first authentication step.
+   <p>This privacy consideration applies to <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③②">Relying Parties</a> that support <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony⑤⑤">authentication ceremonies</a> with a non-<a data-link-type="dfn" href="https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/#list-empty" id="ref-for-list-empty⑧">empty</a> <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③⑤">allowCredentials</a></code> argument as the first authentication step.
 For example, if using authentication with <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#server-side-credential" id="ref-for-server-side-credential①⑥">server-side credentials</a> as the first authentication step.</p>
    <p>In this case the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③⑥">allowCredentials</a></code> argument risks leaking personally identifying information,
-since it exposes the user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤④">credential IDs</a> to an unauthenticated caller. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤⑤">Credential IDs</a> are designed to not be correlatable between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③①">Relying Parties</a>,
+since it exposes the user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤④">credential IDs</a> to an unauthenticated caller. <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤⑤">Credential IDs</a> are designed to not be correlatable between <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③③">Relying Parties</a>,
 but the length of a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤⑥">credential ID</a> might be a hint as to what type of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③④①">authenticator</a> created it.
-It is likely that a user will use the same username and set of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③④②">authenticators</a> for several <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③②">Relying Parties</a>,
+It is likely that a user will use the same username and set of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③④②">authenticators</a> for several <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③④">Relying Parties</a>,
 so the number of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤⑦">credential IDs</a> in <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③⑦">allowCredentials</a></code> and their lengths
 might serve as a global correlation handle to de-anonymize the user.
 Knowing a user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑤⑧">credential IDs</a> also makes it possible to confirm guesses about the user’s identity
 given only momentary physical access to one of the user’s <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③④③">authenticators</a>.</p>
-   <p>In order to prevent such information leakage, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③③">Relying Party</a> could for example:</p>
+   <p>In order to prevent such information leakage, the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⑤">Relying Party</a> could for example:</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
      <p>Perform a separate authentication step,
@@ -9248,15 +9255,15 @@ <h4 class="heading settled" data-level="14.6.3" id="sctn-credential-id-privacy-l
    </ul>
    <p>If the above prevention measures are not available,
 i.e., if <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-allowcredentials③⑨">allowCredentials</a></code> needs to be exposed given only a username,
-the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③④">Relying Party</a> could mitigate the privacy leak using the same approach of returning imaginary <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑥⓪">credential IDs</a> as discussed in <a href="#sctn-username-enumeration">§ 14.6.2 Username Enumeration</a>.</p>
+the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⑥">Relying Party</a> could mitigate the privacy leak using the same approach of returning imaginary <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑥⓪">credential IDs</a> as discussed in <a href="#sctn-username-enumeration">§ 14.6.2 Username Enumeration</a>.</p>
    <p>When <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#signal-methods" id="ref-for-signal-methods⑥">signalling</a> that a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑥①">credential id</a> was not recognized,
 the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#webauthn-relying-party" id="ref-for-webauthn-relying-party⑦⑦">WebAuthn Relying Party</a> SHOULD use the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredential-signalunknowncredential" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredential-signalunknowncredential⑤">signalUnknownCredential(options)</a></code> method instead of the <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredential-signalallacceptedcredentials" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredential-signalallacceptedcredentials⑦">signalAllAcceptedCredentials(options)</a></code> method to avoid
 exposing <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#credential-id" id="ref-for-credential-id⑥②">credential IDs</a> to an unauthenticated caller.</p>
    <h2 class="heading settled" data-level="15" id="sctn-accessiblility-considerations"><span class="secno">15. </span><span class="content">Accessibility Considerations</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-accessiblility-considerations"></a></h2>
    <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#user-verification" id="ref-for-user-verification⑥⑤">User verification</a>-capable <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authenticator" id="ref-for-authenticator③④④">authenticators</a>, whether <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#roaming-authenticators" id="ref-for-roaming-authenticators②⑥">roaming</a> or <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#platform-authenticators" id="ref-for-platform-authenticators③⑥">platform</a>, should offer users more than one user verification method.  For example, both fingerprint sensing and PIN entry. This allows for fallback to other user verification means if the selected one is not working for some reason. Note that in the case of <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#roaming-authenticators" id="ref-for-roaming-authenticators②⑦">roaming authenticators</a>, the authenticator and platform might work together to provide a user verification method such as PIN entry <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-fido-ctap" title="Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)">[FIDO-CTAP]</a>.</p>
-   <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⑤">Relying Parties</a>, at <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②⑦">registration</a> time, SHOULD provide affordances for users to complete future <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authorization-gesture" id="ref-for-authorization-gesture②⑨">authorization gestures</a> correctly. This could involve naming the authenticator, choosing a picture to associate with the device, or entering freeform text instructions (e.g., as a reminder-to-self).</p>
+   <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⑦">Relying Parties</a>, at <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration" id="ref-for-registration②⑦">registration</a> time, SHOULD provide affordances for users to complete future <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authorization-gesture" id="ref-for-authorization-gesture②⑨">authorization gestures</a> correctly. This could involve naming the authenticator, choosing a picture to associate with the device, or entering freeform text instructions (e.g., as a reminder-to-self).</p>
    <h3 class="heading settled" data-level="15.1" id="sctn-timeout-recommended-range"><span class="secno">15.1. </span><span class="content">Recommended Range for Ceremony Timeouts</span><a class="self-link" href="#sctn-timeout-recommended-range"></a></h3>
-   <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①⑧">Ceremonies</a> relying on timing, e.g., a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②⑨">registration ceremony</a> (see <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-timeout" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-timeout④">timeout</a></code>) or an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony⑤⑦">authentication ceremony</a> (see <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-timeout" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-timeout④">timeout</a></code>), ought to follow <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-wcag21" title="Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1">[WCAG21]</a>'s <a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG21/#enough-time">Guideline 2.2 Enough Time</a>. If a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑧">client platform</a> determines that a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⑥">Relying Party</a>-supplied timeout does not appropriately adhere to the latter <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-wcag21" title="Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1">[WCAG21]</a> guidelines, then the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑨">client platform</a> MAY adjust the timeout accordingly.</p>
+   <p><a data-link-type="dfn" href="#ceremony" id="ref-for-ceremony①⑧">Ceremonies</a> relying on timing, e.g., a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#registration-ceremony" id="ref-for-registration-ceremony②⑨">registration ceremony</a> (see <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-timeout" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialcreationoptions-timeout④">timeout</a></code>) or an <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#authentication-ceremony" id="ref-for-authentication-ceremony⑤⑦">authentication ceremony</a> (see <code class="idl"><a data-link-type="idl" href="#dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-timeout" id="ref-for-dom-publickeycredentialrequestoptions-timeout④">timeout</a></code>), ought to follow <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-wcag21" title="Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1">[WCAG21]</a>'s <a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG21/#enough-time">Guideline 2.2 Enough Time</a>. If a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑧">client platform</a> determines that a <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#relying-party" id="ref-for-relying-party④③⑧">Relying Party</a>-supplied timeout does not appropriately adhere to the latter <a data-link-type="biblio" href="#biblio-wcag21" title="Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1">[WCAG21]</a> guidelines, then the <a data-link-type="dfn" href="#client-platform" id="ref-for-client-platform⑤⑨">client platform</a> MAY adjust the timeout accordingly.</p>
    <p>The <dfn class="dfn-paneled" data-dfn-type="dfn" data-noexport id="recommended-range-and-default-for-a-webauthn-ceremony-timeout">recommended range and default for a WebAuthn ceremony timeout</dfn> is as follows:</p>
    <ul>
     <li data-md>
@@ -11410,7 +11417,7 @@ <h2 class="no-num no-ref heading settled" id="issues-index"><span class="content
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@@ -11985,7 +11992,7 @@ <h2 class="no-num no-ref heading settled" id="issues-index"><span class="content
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 "registration-ceremony": {"dfnID":"registration-ceremony","dfnText":"Registration Ceremony","external":false,"refSections":[{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2463"}],"title":"4. Terminology"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2464"}],"title":"5.1. PublicKeyCredential Interface"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2465"}],"title":"5.4.5. Authenticator Attachment Enumeration (enum AuthenticatorAttachment)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2466"}],"title":"5.8.7. Client Capability Enumeration (enum ClientCapability)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2467"}],"title":"5.8.8. User-agent Hints Enumeration (enum PublicKeyCredentialHint)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2468"}],"title":"6.1. Authenticator Data"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2460\u24ea"}],"title":"6.1.3. Credential Backup State"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2460\u2460"}],"title":"7. WebAuthn Relying Party Operations"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2460\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2460\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2460\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2460\u2464"}],"title":"7.1. Registering a New Credential"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2460\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2460\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2460\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2460\u2468"}],"title":"10.1.3. Credential Properties Extension (credProps)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2461\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2461\u2460"}],"title":"10.1.4.1. Test vectors: Web Authentication API"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2461\u2461"}],"title":"13.4.1. Security Benefits for WebAuthn Relying Parties"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2461\u2462"}],"title":"13.4.4. Attestation Limitations"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2461\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2461\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2461\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2461\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2461\u2467"}],"title":"14.6.2. Username Enumeration"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-ceremony\u2461\u2468"}],"title":"15.1. Recommended Range for Ceremony Timeouts"}],"url":"#registration-ceremony"},
 "registration-extension": {"dfnID":"registration-extension","dfnText":"registration\nextension","external":false,"refSections":[{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension"}],"title":"5.1.3. Create a New Credential - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) Internal Method"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2460"}],"title":"5.7. WebAuthn Extensions Inputs and Outputs"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2466"}],"title":"9. WebAuthn Extensions"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2467"}],"title":"10.1.2. FIDO AppID Exclusion Extension (appidExclude)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2460\u24ea"}],"title":"10.1.3. Credential Properties Extension (credProps)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2460\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2460\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2460\u2462"}],"title":"10.1.4. Pseudo-random function extension (prf)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2460\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2460\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2460\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2460\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2460\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2460\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2461\u24ea"}],"title":"10.1.5. Large blob storage extension (largeBlob)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2461\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-registration-extension\u2461\u2461"}],"title":"12.4. WebAuthn Extension Identifier Registrations"}],"url":"#registration-extension"},
-"relying-party": {"dfnID":"relying-party","dfnText":"Relying Party","external":false,"refSections":[{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466"}],"title":"1. Introduction"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464"}],"title":"1.1. Specification Roadmap"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465"}],"title":"1.2.3. New Device Registration"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466"}],"title":"1.2.4. Other Use Cases and Configurations"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460"}],"title":"1.3.1. Registration"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463"}],"title":"1.3.2. Registration Specifically with User-Verifying Platform Authenticator"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468"}],"title":"1.3.3. Authentication"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460"}],"title":"1.3.5. Decommissioning"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461"}],"title":"2.1.1. Enumerations as DOMString types"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2461"}],"title":"4. Terminology"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2468"}],"title":"5. Web Authentication API"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2463"}],"title":"5.1. PublicKeyCredential Interface"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u24ea"}],"title":"5.1.3. Create a New Credential - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) Internal Method"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2463"}],"title":"5.1.4. Use an Existing Credential to Make an Assertion"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2465"}],"title":"5.1.4.2. Issuing a Credential Request to an Authenticator"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2466"}],"title":"5.1.6. Availability of User-Verifying Platform Authenticator - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable() Method"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2468"}],"title":"5.1.7. Availability of client capabilities - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s getClientCapabilities() Method"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2460"}],"title":"5.1.10.3. signalAllAcceptedCredentials(options)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2461"}],"title":"5.2. Authenticator Responses (interface AuthenticatorResponse)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2463"}],"title":"5.2.1. Information About Public Key Credential (interface AuthenticatorAttestationResponse)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2460"}],"title":"5.2.1.1. Easily accessing credential data"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2461"}],"title":"5.4. Options for Credential Creation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2468"}],"title":"5.4.1. Public Key Entity Description (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialEntity)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2460"}],"title":"5.4.2. Relying Party Parameters for Credential Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2465"}],"title":"5.4.3. User Account Parameters for Credential Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2468"}],"title":"5.4.4. Authenticator Selection Criteria (dictionary AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2461"}],"title":"5.4.5. Authenticator Attachment Enumeration (enum AuthenticatorAttachment)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2467"}],"title":"5.4.6. Resident Key Requirement Enumeration (enum ResidentKeyRequirement)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2465"}],"title":"5.4.7. Attestation Conveyance Preference Enumeration (enum AttestationConveyancePreference)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2464"}],"title":"5.5. Options for Assertion Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2465"}],"title":"5.7.3. Authentication Extensions Authenticator Inputs (CDDL type AuthenticationExtensionsAuthenticatorInputs)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2460"}],"title":"5.8.1. Client Data Used in WebAuthn Signatures (dictionary CollectedClientData)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2461"}],"title":"5.8.4. Authenticator Transport Enumeration (enum AuthenticatorTransport)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2464"}],"title":"5.8.6. User Verification Requirement Enumeration (enum UserVerificationRequirement)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2465"}],"title":"5.8.7. Client Capability Enumeration (enum ClientCapability)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2462"}],"title":"5.8.8. User-agent Hints Enumeration (enum PublicKeyCredentialHint)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2463"}],"title":"5.10. Using Web Authentication within iframe elements"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2464"}],"title":"5.11. Using Web Authentication across related origins"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u24ea"}],"title":"6. WebAuthn Authenticator Model"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2460"}],"title":"6.1. Authenticator Data"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2465"}],"title":"6.1.1. Signature Counter Considerations"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2460"}],"title":"6.1.3. Credential Backup State"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2461"}],"title":"6.2. Authenticator Taxonomy"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2464"}],"title":"6.2.2. Credential Storage Modality"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2467"}],"title":"6.2.3. Authentication Factor Capability"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2464"}],"title":"6.3.2. The authenticatorMakeCredential Operation"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2467"}],"title":"6.3.3. The authenticatorGetAssertion Operation"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2468"}],"title":"6.4. String Handling"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u24ea"}],"title":"6.4.1.1. String Truncation by Clients"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2467"}],"title":"6.5. Attestation"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2462"}],"title":"6.5.3. Attestation Types"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2466"}],"title":"7. 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Verifying an Authentication Assertion"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2464"}],"title":"8.2.1. Certificate Requirements for Packed Attestation Statements"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2466"}],"title":"8.9. Compound Attestation Statement Format"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u24ea"}],"title":"9. WebAuthn Extensions"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2460"}],"title":"9.2. Defining Extensions"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2463"}],"title":"9.3. Extending Request Parameters"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2464"}],"title":"9.5. 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Cryptographic Challenges"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2468"}],"title":"13.4.4. Attestation Limitations"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2461"}],"title":"13.4.5. Revoked Attestation Certificates"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2464"}],"title":"13.4.6. Credential Loss and Key Mobility"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2466"}],"title":"13.4.7. Unprotected account detection"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2465"}],"title":"13.4.8. Code injection attacks"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2462"}],"title":"13.4.9. Validating the origin of a credential"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2463"}],"title":"14. Privacy Considerations"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2460"}],"title":"14.1. De-anonymization Prevention Measures"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2461"}],"title":"14.2. Anonymous, Scoped, Non-correlatable Public Key Credentials"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2466"}],"title":"14.3. 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+"relying-party": {"dfnID":"relying-party","dfnText":"Relying Party","external":false,"refSections":[{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466"}],"title":"1. Introduction"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464"}],"title":"1.1. Specification Roadmap"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465"}],"title":"1.2.3. New Device Registration"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466"}],"title":"1.2.4. Other Use Cases and Configurations"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460"}],"title":"1.3.1. Registration"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463"}],"title":"1.3.2. Registration Specifically with User-Verifying Platform Authenticator"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468"}],"title":"1.3.3. Authentication"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460"}],"title":"1.3.5. Decommissioning"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461"}],"title":"2.1.1. Enumerations as DOMString types"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2464\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2465\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2466\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2461"}],"title":"4. Terminology"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2467\u2468"}],"title":"5. Web Authentication API"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2463"}],"title":"5.1. PublicKeyCredential Interface"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2468\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u24ea"}],"title":"5.1.3. Create a New Credential - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) Internal Method"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2463"}],"title":"5.1.4. Use an Existing Credential to Make an Assertion"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2465"}],"title":"5.1.4.2. Issuing a Credential Request to an Authenticator"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2466"}],"title":"5.1.6. Availability of User-Verifying Platform Authenticator - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable() Method"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u24ea\u2468"}],"title":"5.1.7. Availability of client capabilities - PublicKeyCredential\u2019s getClientCapabilities() Method"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2460"}],"title":"5.1.10.3. signalAllAcceptedCredentials(options)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2461"}],"title":"5.2. Authenticator Responses (interface AuthenticatorResponse)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2463"}],"title":"5.2.1. Information About Public Key Credential (interface AuthenticatorAttestationResponse)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2460\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2460"}],"title":"5.2.1.1. Easily accessing credential data"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2461\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2461"}],"title":"5.4. Options for Credential Creation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2462\u2468"}],"title":"5.4.1. Public Key Entity Description (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialEntity)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2460"}],"title":"5.4.2. Relying Party Parameters for Credential Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2465"}],"title":"5.4.3. User Account Parameters for Credential Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2463\u2468"}],"title":"5.4.4. Authenticator Selection Criteria (dictionary AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2461"}],"title":"5.4.5. Authenticator Attachment Enumeration (enum AuthenticatorAttachment)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2467"}],"title":"5.4.6. Resident Key Requirement Enumeration (enum ResidentKeyRequirement)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2464\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2465"}],"title":"5.4.7. Attestation Conveyance Preference Enumeration (enum AttestationConveyancePreference)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2465\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2464"}],"title":"5.5. Options for Assertion Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2465"}],"title":"5.7.3. Authentication Extensions Authenticator Inputs (CDDL type AuthenticationExtensionsAuthenticatorInputs)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2466\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2460"}],"title":"5.8.1. Client Data Used in WebAuthn Signatures (dictionary CollectedClientData)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2461"}],"title":"5.8.4. Authenticator Transport Enumeration (enum AuthenticatorTransport)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2464"}],"title":"5.8.6. User Verification Requirement Enumeration (enum UserVerificationRequirement)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2465"}],"title":"5.8.7. Client Capability Enumeration (enum ClientCapability)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2467\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2462"}],"title":"5.8.8. User-agent Hints Enumeration (enum PublicKeyCredentialHint)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2463"}],"title":"5.10. Using Web Authentication within iframe elements"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2464"}],"title":"5.11. Using Web Authentication across related origins"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2460\u2468\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u24ea"}],"title":"6. WebAuthn Authenticator Model"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2460"}],"title":"6.1. Authenticator Data"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2465"}],"title":"6.1.1. Signature Counter Considerations"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u24ea\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2460"}],"title":"6.1.3. Credential Backup State"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2461"}],"title":"6.2. Authenticator Taxonomy"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2464"}],"title":"6.2.2. Credential Storage Modality"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2467"}],"title":"6.2.3. Authentication Factor Capability"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2460\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2464"}],"title":"6.3.2. The authenticatorMakeCredential Operation"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2467"}],"title":"6.3.3. The authenticatorGetAssertion Operation"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2461\u2468"}],"title":"6.4. String Handling"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u24ea"}],"title":"6.4.1.1. String Truncation by Clients"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2467"}],"title":"6.5. Attestation"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2462\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2462"}],"title":"6.5.3. Attestation Types"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2466"}],"title":"7. WebAuthn Relying Party Operations"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2463\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2464\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2465\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2464"}],"title":"7.1. Registering a New Credential"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2466\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2467\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2464"}],"title":"7.2. Verifying an Authentication Assertion"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2466"}],"title":"8.2.1. Certificate Requirements for Packed Attestation Statements"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2461\u2468\u2468"}],"title":"8.9. Compound Attestation Statement Format"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2461"}],"title":"9. WebAuthn Extensions"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2462"}],"title":"9.2. Defining Extensions"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2465"}],"title":"9.3. Extending Request Parameters"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2466"}],"title":"9.5. Authenticator Extension Processing"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u24ea\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2461"}],"title":"10.1.1. FIDO AppID Extension (appid)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2463"}],"title":"10.1.2. FIDO AppID Exclusion Extension (appidExclude)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2460\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u24ea"}],"title":"10.1.3. Credential Properties Extension (credProps)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2462"}],"title":"10.1.4. Pseudo-random function extension (prf)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2461\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2460"}],"title":"10.1.5. Large blob storage extension (largeBlob)"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2461"}],"title":"12.4. WebAuthn Extension Identifier Registrations"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2465"}],"title":"13. Security Considerations"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2467"}],"title":"13.2. Physical Proximity between Client and Authenticator"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2462\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u24ea"}],"title":"13.3.2. Attestation Certificate and Attestation Certificate CA Compromise"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2460"}],"title":"13.4. Security considerations for Relying Parties"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2466"}],"title":"13.4.1. Security Benefits for WebAuthn Relying Parties"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2463\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2460"}],"title":"13.4.2. Visibility Considerations for Embedded Usage"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2462"}],"title":"13.4.3. Cryptographic Challenges"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2464\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2460"}],"title":"13.4.4. Attestation Limitations"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2463"}],"title":"13.4.5. Revoked Attestation Certificates"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2466"}],"title":"13.4.6. Credential Loss and Key Mobility"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2465\u2468"}],"title":"13.4.7. Unprotected account detection"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2467"}],"title":"13.4.8. Code injection attacks"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2466\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2464"}],"title":"13.4.9. Validating the origin of a credential"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2465"}],"title":"14. Privacy Considerations"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2467\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2462"}],"title":"14.1. De-anonymization Prevention Measures"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2462\u2468\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2463"}],"title":"14.2. Anonymous, Scoped, Non-correlatable Public Key Credentials"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u24ea\u2468"}],"title":"14.3. Authenticator-local Biometric Recognition"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2461"}],"title":"14.5.1. Registration Ceremony Privacy"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2465"}],"title":"14.5.2. Authentication Ceremony Privacy"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2466"}],"title":"14.6. Privacy considerations for Relying Parties"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2460\u2468"}],"title":"14.6.1. User Handle Contents"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2465"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2466"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2467"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2461\u2468"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u24ea"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2460"}],"title":"14.6.2. Username Enumeration"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2461"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2462"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2463"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2464"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2465"}],"title":"14.6.3. Privacy leak via credential IDs"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2466"}],"title":"15. Accessibility Considerations"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party\u2463\u2462\u2467"}],"title":"15.1. Recommended Range for Ceremony Timeouts"}],"url":"#relying-party"},
 "relying-party-identifier": {"dfnID":"relying-party-identifier","dfnText":"Relying Party Identifier","external":false,"refSections":[{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party-identifier"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party-identifier\u2460"},{"id":"ref-for-relying-party-identifier\u2461"}],"title":"4. Terminology"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party-identifier\u2462"}],"title":"5. Web Authentication API"},{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-relying-party-identifier\u2463"}],"title":"6.3.5. The silentCredentialDiscovery operation"}],"url":"#relying-party-identifier"},
 "remove-all-credentials": {"dfnID":"remove-all-credentials","dfnText":"Remove All Credentials","external":false,"refSections":[{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-remove-all-credentials"}],"title":"11.8. Remove All Credentials"}],"url":"#remove-all-credentials"},
 "remove-credential": {"dfnID":"remove-credential","dfnText":"Remove Credential","external":false,"refSections":[{"refs":[{"id":"ref-for-remove-credential"}],"title":"11.7. Remove Credential"}],"url":"#remove-credential"},