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Revise same-origin as ancestor requirements #1001

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apowers313 opened this issue Jul 18, 2018 · 8 comments
Closed

Revise same-origin as ancestor requirements #1001

apowers313 opened this issue Jul 18, 2018 · 8 comments

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@apowers313
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Picking up where we left off on w3c/webappsec-credential-management#3 and related to #873 and #911...

There is a need by some relying parties to be able to use WebAuthn in child browsing contexts (e.g. - iframes, child windows, etc.). Currently WebAuthn requires sameOriginWithAncestors which prevents these use cases.

@equalsJeffH had put together an initial proposal on how this might work and presented it during a meeting and we didn't hear anyone complain.

@apowers313
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Not putting this in the spec until L2 means that certain relying party use cases (which seem to be important for adoption) won't be implementable for at least a year.

Any chance we could do this for L1?

@ve7jtb
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ve7jtb commented Jul 18, 2018

Talking to Jeff, there are WebAppSec dependencies to get this to work securely.

While I think we all want this to work, just removing the restriction in WebAutn is not sufficient to have it work securely.

We should try to sort this out so that at least not block it working once the other parts come together. That, however, may be difficult to capture in spec language.

@mikewest
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@equalsJeffH: What are the WebAppSec dependencies? Can y'all not just accept sameOriginWithAncestors == false?

@equalsJeffH
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equalsJeffH commented Jul 18, 2018

@mikewest - are arbitrary cross-origin mashups presently secure? If we were to "just accept sameOriginWithAncestors == false", would we not be handing webauthn Relying Parties a footgun? I may be behind the times and need to be educated....

i.e., IIUC, if we accept sameOriginWithAncestors == false, we ought to do the things handwavily listed here:

https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1sK9hhI0y25iioyLGMKwdhtpe-sVRV7Ln4pMHR2JXApw/edit#slide=id.g3ad57c9b5b_0_13

...Yes?

Is IntersectionObserver2 still just a "proposal"?

It seems to me that RPs would be well served by being able to invoke something like " Compute whether a Target is unoccluded, untransformed, unfiltered, and opaque"...

Do we know what the exact list of things we need to add to the webauthn spec in order to not hand RPs a footgun?

WDYT?

thanks!

@rlin1
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rlin1 commented Oct 22, 2018

We might want to add a note to the security considerations to point to intersection observer 2 (io2).

@rlin1
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rlin1 commented Oct 22, 2018

See also #969

@jcjones
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jcjones commented Oct 22, 2018

We might want to add a note to the security considerations to point to intersection observer 2 (io2).

Opened #1105

@jcjones
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jcjones commented Oct 22, 2018

This is now considered to be effectively a duplicate of #911, which all parties agreed to implement in Level 2, so closing this in favor of #911.

@jcjones jcjones closed this as completed Oct 22, 2018
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