Tool for red teamers to decode keys and master keys from side channel information. Released at DEF CON 28.
See a live version of the tool here: https://ggrsecurity.com/personal/~bgraydon/keyspace/
Listen to the talk here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=suN0IsifTyY
Talk Q&A: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vgP4p87Gx_M
First tell the software how many pins the lock has, and how many depths are available per pin. Then, click on the various tabs below that to add rules to the system. One rule that applies to almost all pin tumbler locks is the MACS.
| Brand | Depths | Pins | Notes, Other Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
| Schlage | 10, Labelled 0-9 | 5 or 6 | MACS of 7. 2-step usually used. 5 pin most common. IC system uses extended 7th pin. |
| Kwikset | 6, Labelled 1-6 | 5 | MACS of 4. |
| Sargent | 10, Labelled 1-9 then 0 deepest | 5 or 6 | MACS of 7. 6 pin most common. IC system uses collar in pins 3 and 4. |
| Corbin | 6, Labelled 1-6 | 5, 6 or 7 | MACS of 7. 6 pin most common. IC system uses collar in pins 2, 3, 4 and 5. |
| BEST A2 | 10, Labelled 0-9 | 6 or 7 | MACS of 9. 2-step always used. 7 pin most common. IC system uses collar in all pin stacks. |
| BEST A4 | 6, Labelled 0-5 | 6 or 7 | MACS of 5. 2-step never used. 7 pin most common. IC system uses collar in all pin stacks. |
| Yale | 10, Labelled 0-9 | 5 or 6 | MACS of 7. IC control key uses extended 7th pin cut to a 1 depth. |
| Medeco | 6, Labelled 1-6 | 5 or 6 | MACS of 2, 3 or 4. IC system uses collar in pins 3 and 4. |
| Mul-T-Lock | 5 (inner, 1-5), 4 (outer, A-D) | 5 | No MACS pin-pin, can't have outer C with inner 1 or D with 1 or 2. |
| Abloy Classic | 6 | 5-11 | No MACS. Bitting must be key-retaining. |
| Abloy Protec | 6 | 9 or 11 | No MACS. |
| Tubular | 8 | 7 | No MACS. |
The most common problem encountered is the application hanging due to a large computation. Rules that restrict each pin stack independantly of one another allow the key space to be calculated on a pin-by-pin basis, rather than expanding it out into the full n^k possibilities. Rules that have one pin stack dependant on others are much slower, and are identified by an hour-glass symbol on the "add rule" button. Try to reduce the key space as much as possible with rules without the hour glass notation before using the hour glass ones to narrow it to the final space.
To help with speed, you may also lower the number of pins or depths while experimenting, and then increase it back to the real number to do your final calculation.
If the problem doesn't seem to be due to slow computation, press "F12" to open the debugger console, and see if any Javascript errors show up. If so, contact me with the error text and I'll get it fixed.
Try out some examples to get you started. Click "Import a System & Rules" at the bottom and import one of the following JSON examples:
S&G Environmental Keyspace:
{"numPins":3,"numDepths":3,"lockType":"pin","labelOffset":"1","rules":[{"name":"retain"}]}
Schlage construction keyed system with known change keys:
{"numPins":5,"numDepths":10,"lockType":"pin","labelOffset":"0","rules":[{"name":"CK","code":"33983","file":false,"twostep":true,"rotateConst":false,"space":false,"minSpace":null,"angle":true,"depth":true},{"name":"CK","code":"59545","file":false,"twostep":true,"rotateConst":false,"space":false,"minSpace":null,"angle":true,"depth":true},{"name":"CMK","depth":4,"pins":"1","MACS":7},{"name":"MACS","MACS":7}]}
Sargent lock with coloured pins visible:
{"numPins":6,"numDepths":10,"lockType":"pin","labelOffset":"1","rules":[{"name":"colourPin","colourPinKeySys":1,"colourPinSet":0,"pinColours":["PLAIN","GREEN","PLAIN","GREEN","PLAIN","PURPLE"]},{"name":"shear","shears":["1","","1","","",""],"nonMK":false,"cache":{"p_shears":[[0],[],[0],[2],[3],[]]}},{"name":"MACS","MACS":7}]}
Medeco 12-cut IC System with pin 1 high cut:
{"numPins":6,"numDepths":6,"lockType":"medeco2","labelOffset":"1","rules":[{"name":"IC","depth":3,"pins":"3,4","MACS":2},{"name":"MACS","MACS":2},{"name":"onehigh","within":1},{"name":"shear","shears":["1","","","","",""],"nonMK":false,"cache":{"p_shears":[[0],[],[],[],[],[]]}}]}
Medeco Sidebar Rights Amplification:
{"numPins":6,"numDepths":6,"lockType":"medeco2","labelOffset":"1","rules":[{"name":"CK","code":"D K K M S QD","file":false,"twostep":false,"rotateConst":false,"space":false,"minSpace":null,"angle":true,"depth":true},{"name":"shear","shears":["1","3","4","5","3","4"],"nonMK":false,"cache":{"p_shears":[[0],[2],[3],[4],[2],[3]]}},{"name":"CK","code":"2K 6S 5K 3B 5S 3Q","file":false,"twostep":false,"rotateConst":false,"space":false,"minSpace":null,"angle":true,"depth":true},{"name":"CK","code":"4D 4K 3D 2M 1K 3D","file":false,"twostep":false,"rotateConst":false,"space":false,"minSpace":null,"angle":true,"depth":true}]}
[1] J. Weyers, Showing Keys in Public – What Could Possibly Go Wrong?: Hackers on Planet Earth, July 18-20, 2014, New York City, NY, USA. Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=brJMBtO9qTc
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