upstream: add a "no-touch-required" option for authorized_keys and

a similar extension for certificates. This option disables the default
requirement that security key signatures attest that the user touched their
key to authorize them.

feedback deraadt, ok markus

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f1fb56151ba68d55d554d0f6d3d4dba0cf1a452e

auth-options.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.89 2019/09/13 04:36:43 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.90 2019/11/25 00:54:23 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller <[email protected]>
  *
@@ -96,7 +96,10 @@ cert_option_list(struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *oblob,
 		    name, sshbuf_len(data));
 		found = 0;
 		if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0) {
-			if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) {
+			if (strcmp(name, "no-touch-required") == 0) {
+				opts->no_require_user_presence = 1;
+				found = 1;
+			} else if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) {
 				opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
 				found = 1;
 			} else if (strcmp(name,
@@ -347,6 +350,8 @@ sshauthopt_parse(const char *opts, const char **errstrp)
 			ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = r == 1;
 		} else if ((r = opt_flag("x11-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
 			ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = r == 1;
+		} else if ((r = opt_flag("touch-required", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
+			ret->no_require_user_presence = r != 1; /* NB. flip */
 		} else if ((r = opt_flag("pty", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
 			ret->permit_pty_flag = r == 1;
 		} else if ((r = opt_flag("user-rc", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
@@ -567,14 +572,15 @@ sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary,
 			goto alloc_fail;
 	}
 
-	/* Flags are logical-AND (i.e. must be set in both for permission) */
-#define OPTFLAG(x) ret->x = (primary->x == 1) && (additional->x == 1)
-	OPTFLAG(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
-	OPTFLAG(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
-	OPTFLAG(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
-	OPTFLAG(permit_pty_flag);
-	OPTFLAG(permit_user_rc);
-#undef OPTFLAG
+#define OPTFLAG_AND(x) ret->x = (primary->x == 1) && (additional->x == 1)
+	/* Permissive flags are logical-AND (i.e. must be set in both) */
+	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
+	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
+	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
+	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_pty_flag);
+	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_user_rc);
+	OPTFLAG_AND(no_require_user_presence);
+#undef OPTFLAG_AND
 
 	/* Earliest expiry time should win */
 	if (primary->valid_before != 0)
@@ -643,6 +649,7 @@ sshauthopt_copy(const struct sshauthopt *orig)
 	OPTSCALAR(cert_authority);
 	OPTSCALAR(force_tun_device);
 	OPTSCALAR(valid_before);
+	OPTSCALAR(no_require_user_presence);
 #undef OPTSCALAR
 #define OPTSTRING(x) \
 	do { \
@@ -765,15 +772,19 @@ sshauthopt_serialise(const struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *m,
 {
 	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 
-	/* Flag and simple integer options */
+	/* Flag options */
 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_pty_flag)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_user_rc)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->restricted)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->cert_authority)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, opts->valid_before)) != 0)
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->no_require_user_presence)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* Simple integer options */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, opts->valid_before)) != 0)
 		return r;
 
 	/* tunnel number can be negative to indicate "unset" */
@@ -817,6 +828,7 @@ sshauthopt_deserialise(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshauthopt **optsp)
 	if ((opts = calloc(1, sizeof(*opts))) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 
+	/* Flag options */
 #define OPT_FLAG(x) \
 	do { \
 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &f)) != 0) \
@@ -830,8 +842,10 @@ sshauthopt_deserialise(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshauthopt **optsp)
 	OPT_FLAG(permit_user_rc);
 	OPT_FLAG(restricted);
 	OPT_FLAG(cert_authority);
+	OPT_FLAG(no_require_user_presence);
 #undef OPT_FLAG
 
+	/* Simple integer options */
 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &opts->valid_before)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 

auth-options.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.28 2019/07/09 04:15:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.29 2019/11/25 00:54:23 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller <[email protected]>
@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ struct sshauthopt {
 	 */
 	char *required_from_host_cert;
 	char *required_from_host_keys;
+
+	/* Key requires user presence asserted */
+	int no_require_user_presence;
 };
 
 struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_new(void);

auth.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.142 2019/10/16 06:05:39 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.143 2019/11/25 00:54:23 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ auth_log_authopts(const char *loc, const struct sshauthopt *opts, int do_remote)
 
 	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", opts->force_tun_device);
 	/* Try to keep this alphabetically sorted */
-	snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "key options:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
+	snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "key options:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
 	    opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ? " agent-forwarding" : "",
 	    opts->force_command == NULL ? "" : " command",
 	    do_env ?  " environment" : "",
@@ -1018,7 +1018,8 @@ auth_log_authopts(const char *loc, const struct sshauthopt *opts, int do_remote)
 	    opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : " tun=",
 	    opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : buf,
 	    opts->permit_user_rc ? " user-rc" : "",
-	    opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag ? " x11-forwarding" : "");
+	    opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag ? " x11-forwarding" : "",
+	    opts->no_require_user_presence ? " no-touch-required" : "");
 
 	debug("%s: %s", loc, msg);
 	if (do_remote)

auth2-pubkey.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.96 2019/11/25 00:52:46 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.97 2019/11/25 00:54:23 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -225,7 +225,8 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
 			    __func__, sig_details->sk_counter,
 			    sig_details->sk_flags);
 			req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
-			    PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED);
+			    PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
+			    !authopts->no_require_user_presence;
 			if (req_presence && (sig_details->sk_flags &
 			    SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
 				error("public key %s signature for %s%s from "

monitor.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.203 2019/11/25 00:52:46 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.204 2019/11/25 00:54:23 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <[email protected]>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <[email protected]>
@@ -1440,7 +1440,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
 
 	if (ret == 0 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY && sig_details != NULL) {
 		req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
-		    PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED);
+		    PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
+		    !key_opts->no_require_user_presence;
 		if (req_presence &&
 		    (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
 			error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "

ssh-keygen.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.176 2019/11/18 23:16:49 naddy Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.177 2019/11/25 00:54:23 djm Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <[email protected]>
 .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <[email protected]>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 18 2019 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 25 2019 $
 .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -534,6 +534,14 @@ by
 .It Ic permit-X11-forwarding
 Allows X11 forwarding.
 .Pp
+.It Ic no-touch-required
+Do not require signatures made using this key require demonstration
+of user presence (e.g. by having the user touch the key).
+This option only makes sense for the Security Key algorithms
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+and
+.Cm ed25519-sk .
+.Pp
 .It Ic source-address Ns = Ns Ar address_list
 Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid.
 The

ssh-keygen.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.370 2019/11/25 00:51:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.371 2019/11/25 00:54:23 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <[email protected]>
  * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <[email protected]>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -120,11 +120,12 @@ static u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0;
 static u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL;
 
 /* Certificate options */
-#define CERTOPT_X_FWD	(1)
-#define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD	(1<<1)
-#define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD	(1<<2)
-#define CERTOPT_PTY		(1<<3)
-#define CERTOPT_USER_RC	(1<<4)
+#define CERTOPT_X_FWD				(1)
+#define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD			(1<<1)
+#define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD			(1<<2)
+#define CERTOPT_PTY				(1<<3)
+#define CERTOPT_USER_RC				(1<<4)
+#define CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE	(1<<5)
 #define CERTOPT_DEFAULT	(CERTOPT_X_FWD|CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD| \
 			 CERTOPT_PORT_FWD|CERTOPT_PTY|CERTOPT_USER_RC)
 static u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT;
@@ -1665,6 +1666,9 @@ prepare_options_buf(struct sshbuf *c, int which)
 	if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
 	    (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0)
 		add_flag_option(c, "permit-user-rc");
+	if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 &&
+	    (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE) != 0)
+		add_flag_option(c, "no-touch-required");
 	if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 &&
 	    certflags_src_addr != NULL)
 		add_string_option(c, "source-address", certflags_src_addr);
@@ -1967,6 +1971,10 @@ add_cert_option(char *opt)
 		certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_USER_RC;
 	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0)
 		certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_USER_RC;
+	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "touch-required") == 0)
+		certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE;
+	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-touch-required") == 0)
+		certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE;
 	else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) {
 		val = opt + 14;
 		if (*val == '\0')
@@ -2020,9 +2028,10 @@ show_options(struct sshbuf *optbuf, int in_critical)
 		    strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 ||
 		    strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 ||
 		    strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 ||
-		    strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0))
+		    strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(name, "no-touch-required") == 0)) {
 			printf("\n");
-		else if (in_critical &&
+		} else if (in_critical &&
 		    (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 ||
 		    strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0)) {
 			if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(option, &arg, NULL)) != 0)

sshd.8

@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.306 2019/11/18 04:55:02 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 18 2019 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.307 2019/11/25 00:54:23 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 25 2019 $
 .Dt SSHD 8
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -627,6 +627,13 @@ option.
 Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the
 .Cm restrict
 option.
+.It Cm no-touch-required
+Do not require demonstration of user presence
+for signatures made using this key.
+This option only makes sense for the Security Key algorithms
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+and
+.Cm ed25519-sk .
 .It Cm restrict
 Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11 forwarding,
 as well as disabling PTY allocation
@@ -670,6 +677,8 @@ restrict,command="uptime" ssh-rsa AAAA1C8...32Tv==
 [email protected]
 restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa AAAA1f8...IrrC5==
 [email protected]
+no-touch-required [email protected] AAAAInN...Ko==
+[email protected]
 .Ed
 .Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
 The