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g11tech committed Mar 13, 2024
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6 changes: 3 additions & 3 deletions EIPS/eip-2935.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ At the start of processing any block where `block.timestamp >= FORK_TIMESTAMP` (
```python
def process_block_hash_history(block :Block, state: State):
if block.timestamp >= FORK_TIMESTAMP:
state.insert_slot(HISTORY_STORAGE_ADDRESS, block.number-1 % HISTORY_SERVE_WINDOW , block.parent.hash)
state.insert_slot(HISTORY_STORAGE_ADDRESS, (block.number-1) % HISTORY_SERVE_WINDOW , block.parent.hash)

# If this is the first fork block, add the parent's direct 255 ancestors as well
if block.parent.timestamp < FORK_TIMESTAMP:
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ Very similar ideas were proposed before in [EIP-210](./eip-210.md) et al. This E
2. Writing the EIP in EVM code
3. Serial unbounded storage of hashes for a deep access to the history

However after weighing pros and cons, we decided to go with just a limited ring buffer to only serve the requiste `HISTORY_SERVE_WINDOW` as [EIP 4788](./eip04788) and beacon state accumulators allow (albit a bit more complex) proof against any ancestor since merge.
However after weighing pros and cons, we decided to go with just a limited ring buffer to only serve the requiste `HISTORY_SERVE_WINDOW` as [EIP-4788](./eip-4788.md) and beacon state accumulators allow (albit a bit more complex) proof against any ancestor since merge.

Second concern was how to best transition the BLOCKHASH resolution logic post fork by:

Expand All @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ TBD

## Security Considerations

Having contracts (system or otherwise) with hot update paths (branches) poses a risk of "branch" poisioning attracks where one could sprinkle trivial amounts of eth around these hot paths (branches). But it has been deemed that cost of attack would escalate significantly to cause any meaningful slow down of state root updates.
Having contracts (system or otherwise) with hot update paths (branches) poses a risk of "branch" poisioning attacks where attacker could sprinkle trivial amounts of eth around these hot paths (branches). But it has been deemed that cost of attack would escalate significantly to cause any meaningful slow down of state root updates.

## Copyright

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