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framework to be used by RAG for pipeline #164
framework to be used by RAG for pipeline #164
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Bringing in a new dependency always introduces risks related to building that package (and its dependencies) downstream, as well as license compliance, long term supportability, etc. Those aren't unique to this package, but it would be good to see them addressed here anyway to show that a thorough vetting was done of the package, and its dependencies.
For example, is any part of the haystack-ai dependency list GPL or AGPL? Is its license compatible with the Instructlab license?
Does it, and all of its dependencies, appear to be actively maintained by more than one maintainer?
Are those maintainers responsive to requests to review PRs, especially for CVEs?
Is the project following good practices for releasing, including tagging releases, publishing source packages, and using trusted publishing automation?
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@cooktheryan this type of analysis is fairly routine for OSPO. I'd recommend reaching out to @lhawthorn
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Thanks for your comments.
None of Haystack's dependencies (jinja2, lazy-imports, more-itertools, networkx, numpy, openai, pandas, posthog, python-dateutil, pyyaml, requests, tenacity, tqdm, typing-extensions) are GPL/AGPL. All of them are Apache, MIT, BSD or PSFL.
Haystack is licensed under Apache 2.0. What else makes it compatible or non-compatible with InstructLab?
Haystack is very actively maintained and supported. As for active maintenance of the dependencies, I didn't check them all but most are very well-known and widely used libraries. Moreover, many of them are also on the dependency list of the alternatives to Haystack.
Haystack releases tagged versions. They do not publish to Github Packages.
Could you please elaborate what is considered "trusted publishing automation" and whether there are any additional releasing practices we need to verify?
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That would be good information to include in the body of the document.
For trusted publisher, I mean https://docs.pypi.org/trusted-publishers/. We've recently seen an instance of a package in the AI ecosystem where that trusted publishing was set up incorrectly, which led to a third-party having the ability to not only trigger releases but to inject malicious code into multiple versions of source packages. ultralytics/ultralytics#18027 for reference.
Downstream, we're building from source packages, but if we can't trust those source packages we would not want to consume the dependency.
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Got it, thanks for the clarification. It looks like Haystack indeed satisfies the requirements for trusted publishing with this Github Actions workflow.
We'll make sure to include the details from this thread in the document.