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Update status of KIP-81 and KIP-82 to FINAL #133

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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions KIPs/kip-81.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
---
kip: 81
title: Implementing the on-chain governance voting method
author: Yeri<[email protected]>, Daniel<[email protected]>, Aidan<aidan.kwon@krustuniverse.com>, Ollie<[email protected]>, Eddie<eddie.kim0@krustuniverse.com>
author: Yeri (@yeri-lee), Daniel (@dcground), Aidan (@aidan-kwon), Ollie (@blukat29), Eddie<eddie.kim0@klaytn.foundation>
discussion-to: https://govforum.klaytn.foundation/t/kgp-1-implementing-the-on-chain-governance-voting-method/18
status: Draft
status: Final
type: Standards Track
category: Core
created: 2022-09-19
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6 changes: 3 additions & 3 deletions KIPs/kip-82.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
---
kip: 82
title: A new GC reward structure due to abolition of the Gini coefficient
author: Yeri<[email protected]>, Daniel<[email protected]>, Aidan<aidan.kwon@krustuniverse.com>, Ollie<[email protected]>, Sam<[email protected]>, Uno<uno.lee@krustuniverse.com>, Eddie<eddie.kim0@krustuniverse.com>
author: Yeri (@yeri-lee), Daniel (@dcground), Aidan (@aidan-kwon), Ollie (@blukat29), Sam (@smseo), Uno<uno.lee@klaytn.foundation>, Eddie<eddie.kim0@klaytn.foundation>
discussion-to: https://govforum.klaytn.foundation/t/kgp-2-a-new-gc-reward-structure-to-abolition-of-the-gini-coefficient/21
status: Draft
status: Final
type: Standards Track
category: Core
created: 2022-09-21
Expand All @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ A renewal of the Governance Council(GC) reward structure due to abolition of the
In addition to traditional enterprises, Klaytn is expanding the Governance Council (GC) by bringing DAOs in response to the growth of nontraditional entities. Such a change in the GC ecosystem will restructure the entire Klaytn governance structure. Abolishing the current block proposal selection method based on the Gini coefficient and staking quantity, the new reward program alleviates the problem of providing insufficient compensation for the network contribution and block verification due to lack of staking. The instability of certain nodes with high staking amounts can result in poor network stability as a whole. The renewed structure provides 20% of GC rewards to block proposers and the rest to the stakers. This form is to reward the participants for providing network stability with node operation and financial contribution.

## Motivation
Klaytn has been compensating GC with block proposal rewards based on the quantity of staking and the Gini coefficient. This included rewards incurred by minting and gas fee generated by transactions. As mentioned in the [Klaytn 2.0 Lightpaper](https://klaytn.foundation/wp-content/uploads/Lightpaper.pdf), Klaytn is abolishing the Gini coefficient since this measure demotivates members from staking. Discontinuation of the Gini coefficient increases the risk to network stability due to the expanding reliance on certain nodes. This change ultimately calls for the revision of block proposer selection and reward structure. In an effort to enhance individual voting power and promote ultimate decentralization, we aim to accomplish the following changes:
Klaytn has been compensating GC with block proposal rewards based on the quantity of staking and the Gini coefficient. This included rewards incurred by minting and gas fee generated by transactions. As mentioned in the [Klaytn 2.0](https://docs.klaytn.foundation/misc/klaytn2), Klaytn is abolishing the Gini coefficient since this measure demotivates members from staking. Discontinuation of the Gini coefficient increases the risk to network stability due to the expanding reliance on certain nodes. This change ultimately calls for the revision of block proposer selection and reward structure. In an effort to enhance individual voting power and promote ultimate decentralization, we aim to accomplish the following changes:
- Ameliorate the risk that block creation depends on larger staker nodes
- Associate GC reward with the growth of the Klaytn ecosystem

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