-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 385
Price Estimation
The potential capitalization, and therefore potential unit price, of Bitcoin is estimated in various ways. A common approach is to imagine Bitcoin replacing all state money or even gross world product. Other approaches that use models of past price to predict future price are economically irrational and therefore not considered here. The presumption of Bitcoin as global reserve currency is dismissed for reasons discussed in Reserve Currency Fallacy. The effects of speculative hoarding on price are not considered based on the Catallactic disproof of speculation as a determinant of price.
Given that Bitcoin is money and not credit, the "money" approach is a more rational starting assumption. Yet without a clear understanding of the essential distinction between money and credit, this approach is often flawed in practice. As shown in Credit Expansion Fallacy, Bitcoin cannot limit credit expansion. If it eliminated credit expansion (hypothetically), there would be no production whatsoever and it would be worth nothing. The most rational starting assumption regarding credit expansion, is that Bitcoin is reserved at the same rate as other monies. The rate of credit expansion is driven by human time preference alone, so this is an assumption that production is therefore consistent with historical norms.
Let us consider five possible choices for "money" replacement by Bitcoin:
- Tangible money.
- Base money (M0).
- Bank credit (M3-M0).
- All credit (bank, debt, equity).
- Gross product.
Using tangible money ("vault cash") only is an irrational approach. The money that is accounted for as a money equivalent must also be included if one is to consider tangible money, since they are of the same supply. Central banks print and coin tangible money when required, against a base of "obligations" to do so, and all credit in the money is expanded against this base. This concept is discussed in State Banking Principle. Using credit is also an irrational approach, since Bitcoin is not credit. As a money it is used to settle credit obligations. This concept is discussed in Debt Loop Fallacy. So of course using any combination of money and credit (such as M1, M2 or M3, as these include M0) is irrational by the same reasoning. Gross product is similarly unjustifiable for substitution as it is neither money nor credit.
However, for the sake of comparison, let us estimate each of the five options listed above. Base values for the following table are U.S. Dollar amounts borrowed from Credit Expansion Fallacy. These are expanded by an estimate of relative size of the the world economy by equity market capitalization. The U.S. market is approximately 40% of global markets. Therefore these values exceed U.S. numbers by a factor of 1/40%. This favors simplicity over precision, as the only objective is to demonstrate a rational method of estimation. The amount of Bitcoin assumed is 18,952,500 given 95% mined (~10 years future) and 5% lost (e.g. Satoshi lost private keys).
Valuations are based on 2019 numbers though Bitcoin inflation is based on 2029. This implies that values should be higher based on the assumption of economic growth and U.S. Dollar monetary inflation. The latter can be eliminated by considering this a constant 2019 dollar projection. Assuming 2% annual real economic growth compounded for 10 years, the 2029 values have been increased by ~22%.
Substitute | Size (2019) | USD/BTC (2029) |
---|---|---|
Tangible money | $4,347,460,000,000 | $279,852 |
Base money | $8,187,102,500,000 | $527,016 |
Bank credit | $36,018,735,000,000 | $2,318,578 |
All credit | $236,812,492,891,206 | $15,243,965 |
Gross product | $80,270,000,000,000 | $5,167,097 |
The global base money replacement estimate is $527,016. Now we consider the base assumption, of replacement of all money. Bitcoin offers no security against state prohibition of its use in trade. Under the assumption that states intend to retain seigniorage and censorship, we might multiply by the fraction of the global black market, which is estimated to be ~28% of the global market. The base money estimate includes all market activity in the money (credit estimates do not). At 100% replacement for estimated black market trade the price is $146,194. However given the assumption that state monies are in exclusive use in the white market, we cannot assume 100% of black market activity in Bitcoin. There is no obvious basis for estimating this proportion, but at 50% the price would be $73,097 in 2019 dollars.
This estimate does not consider the stability property of Bitcoin. Given the scope of trade replaced at the level of 50% of the black market, it is possible that trade would be forced into monetary substitutes well before the price estimated above can be reached. Therefore the above estimate should be considered an upper bound under the given assumptions.
Users | Developers | License | Copyright © 2011-2024 libbitcoin developers
- Home
- manifesto
- libbitcoin.info
- Libbitcoin Institute
- Freenode (IRC)
- Mailing List
- Slack Channel
- Build Libbitcoin
- Comprehensive Overview
- Developer Documentation
- Tutorials (aaronjaramillo)
- Bitcoin Unraveled
-
Cryptoeconomics
- Foreword by Amir Taaki
- Value Proposition
- Axiom of Resistance
- Money Taxonomy
- Pure Bank
- Production and Consumption
- Labor and Leisure
- Custodial Risk Principle
- Dedicated Cost Principle
- Depreciation Principle
- Expression Principle
- Inflation Principle
- Other Means Principle
- Patent Resistance Principle
- Risk Sharing Principle
- Reservation Principle
- Scalability Principle
- Subjective Inflation Principle
- Consolidation Principle
- Fragmentation Principle
- Permissionless Principle
- Public Data Principle
- Social Network Principle
- State Banking Principle
- Substitution Principle
- Cryptodynamic Principles
- Censorship Resistance Property
- Consensus Property
- Stability Property
- Utility Threshold Property
- Zero Sum Property
- Threat Level Paradox
- Miner Business Model
- Qualitative Security Model
- Proximity Premium Flaw
- Variance Discount Flaw
- Centralization Risk
- Pooling Pressure Risk
- ASIC Monopoly Fallacy
- Auditability Fallacy
- Balance of Power Fallacy
- Blockchain Fallacy
- Byproduct Mining Fallacy
- Causation Fallacy
- Cockroach Fallacy
- Credit Expansion Fallacy
- Debt Loop Fallacy
- Decoupled Mining Fallacy
- Dumping Fallacy
- Empty Block Fallacy
- Energy Exhaustion Fallacy
- Energy Store Fallacy
- Energy Waste Fallacy
- Fee Recovery Fallacy
- Genetic Purity Fallacy
- Full Reserve Fallacy
- Halving Fallacy
- Hoarding Fallacy
- Hybrid Mining Fallacy
- Ideal Money Fallacy
- Impotent Mining Fallacy
- Inflation Fallacy
- Inflationary Quality Fallacy
- Jurisdictional Arbitrage Fallacy
- Lunar Fallacy
- Network Effect Fallacy
- Prisoner's Dilemma Fallacy
- Private Key Fallacy
- Proof of Cost Fallacy
- Proof of Memory Façade
- Proof of Stake Fallacy
- Proof of Work Fallacy
- Regression Fallacy
- Relay Fallacy
- Replay Protection Fallacy
- Reserve Currency Fallacy
- Risk Free Return Fallacy
- Scarcity Fallacy
- Selfish Mining Fallacy
- Side Fee Fallacy
- Split Credit Expansion Fallacy
- Stock to Flow Fallacy
- Thin Air Fallacy
- Time Preference Fallacy
- Unlendable Money Fallacy
- Fedcoin Objectives
- Hearn Error
- Collectible Tautology
- Price Estimation
- Savings Relation
- Speculative Consumption
- Spam Misnomer
- Efficiency Paradox
- Split Speculator Dilemma
- Bitcoin Labels
- Brand Arrogation
- Reserve Definition
- Maximalism Definition
- Shitcoin Definition
- Glossary
- Console Applications
- Development Libraries
- Maintainer Information
- Miscellaneous Articles