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terrform: Add patch to resolve CVE-2023-48795
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@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@ | ||
From 9d2ee975ef9fe627bf0a6f01c1f69e8ef1d4f05d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | ||
From: Roland Shoemaker <[email protected]> | ||
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 12:06:18 -0800 | ||
Subject: [PATCH] ssh: implement strict KEX protocol changes | ||
MIME-Version: 1.0 | ||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 | ||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit | ||
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Implement the "strict KEX" protocol changes, as described in section | ||
1.9 of the OpenSSH PROTOCOL file (as of OpenSSH version 9.6/9.6p1). | ||
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Namely this makes the following changes: | ||
* Both the server and the client add an additional algorithm to the | ||
initial KEXINIT message, indicating support for the strict KEX mode. | ||
* When one side of the connection sees the strict KEX extension | ||
algorithm, the strict KEX mode is enabled for messages originating | ||
from the other side of the connection. If the sequence number for | ||
the side which requested the extension is not 1 (indicating that it | ||
has already received non-KEXINIT packets), the connection is | ||
terminated. | ||
* When strict kex mode is enabled, unexpected messages during the | ||
handshake are considered fatal. Additionally when a key change | ||
occurs (on the receipt of the NEWKEYS message) the message sequence | ||
numbers are reset. | ||
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Thanks to Fabian Bäumer, Marcus Brinkmann, and Jörg Schwenk from Ruhr | ||
University Bochum for reporting this issue. | ||
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Fixes CVE-2023-48795 | ||
Fixes golang/go#64784 | ||
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Change-Id: I96b53afd2bd2fb94d2b6f2a46a5dacf325357604 | ||
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/550715 | ||
Reviewed-by: Nicola Murino <[email protected]> | ||
Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <[email protected]> | ||
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <[email protected]> | ||
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <[email protected]> | ||
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <[email protected]> | ||
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <[email protected]> | ||
--- | ||
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go | 59 +++++++++++++++++++-- | ||
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go | 32 +++++++++-- | ||
2 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) | ||
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diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go | ||
index 653dc4d..e7d4545 100644 | ||
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go | ||
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go | ||
@@ -34,6 +34,16 @@ type keyingTransport interface { | ||
// direction will be effected if a msgNewKeys message is sent | ||
// or received. | ||
prepareKeyChange(*algorithms, *kexResult) error | ||
+ | ||
+ // setStrictMode sets the strict KEX mode, notably triggering | ||
+ // sequence number resets on sending or receiving msgNewKeys. | ||
+ // If the sequence number is already > 1 when setStrictMode | ||
+ // is called, an error is returned. | ||
+ setStrictMode() error | ||
+ | ||
+ // setInitialKEXDone indicates to the transport that the initial key exchange | ||
+ // was completed | ||
+ setInitialKEXDone() | ||
} | ||
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// handshakeTransport implements rekeying on top of a keyingTransport | ||
@@ -94,6 +104,10 @@ type handshakeTransport struct { | ||
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// The session ID or nil if first kex did not complete yet. | ||
sessionID []byte | ||
+ | ||
+ // strictMode indicates if the other side of the handshake indicated | ||
+ // that we should be following the strict KEX protocol restrictions. | ||
+ strictMode bool | ||
} | ||
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type pendingKex struct { | ||
@@ -201,7 +215,10 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) readLoop() { | ||
close(t.incoming) | ||
break | ||
} | ||
- if p[0] == msgIgnore || p[0] == msgDebug { | ||
+ // If this is the first kex, and strict KEX mode is enabled, | ||
+ // we don't ignore any messages, as they may be used to manipulate | ||
+ // the packet sequence numbers. | ||
+ if !(t.sessionID == nil && t.strictMode) && (p[0] == msgIgnore || p[0] == msgDebug) { | ||
continue | ||
} | ||
t.incoming <- p | ||
@@ -432,6 +449,11 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) readOnePacket(first bool) ([]byte, error) { | ||
return successPacket, nil | ||
} | ||
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+const ( | ||
+ kexStrictClient = "[email protected]" | ||
+ kexStrictServer = "[email protected]" | ||
+) | ||
+ | ||
// sendKexInit sends a key change message. | ||
func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error { | ||
t.mu.Lock() | ||
@@ -445,7 +467,6 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error { | ||
} | ||
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msg := &kexInitMsg{ | ||
- KexAlgos: t.config.KeyExchanges, | ||
CiphersClientServer: t.config.Ciphers, | ||
CiphersServerClient: t.config.Ciphers, | ||
MACsClientServer: t.config.MACs, | ||
@@ -455,6 +476,13 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error { | ||
} | ||
io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, msg.Cookie[:]) | ||
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+ // We mutate the KexAlgos slice, in order to add the kex-strict extension algorithm, | ||
+ // and possibly to add the ext-info extension algorithm. Since the slice may be the | ||
+ // user owned KeyExchanges, we create our own slice in order to avoid using user | ||
+ // owned memory by mistake. | ||
+ msg.KexAlgos = make([]string, 0, len(t.config.KeyExchanges)+2) // room for kex-strict and ext-info | ||
+ msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, t.config.KeyExchanges...) | ||
+ | ||
isServer := len(t.hostKeys) > 0 | ||
if isServer { | ||
for _, k := range t.hostKeys { | ||
@@ -474,17 +502,24 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error { | ||
msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, keyFormat) | ||
} | ||
} | ||
+ | ||
+ if t.sessionID == nil { | ||
+ msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, kexStrictServer) | ||
+ } | ||
} else { | ||
msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = t.hostKeyAlgorithms | ||
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// As a client we opt in to receiving SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO so we know what | ||
// algorithms the server supports for public key authentication. See RFC | ||
// 8308, Section 2.1. | ||
+ // | ||
+ // We also send the strict KEX mode extension algorithm, in order to opt | ||
+ // into the strict KEX mode. | ||
if firstKeyExchange := t.sessionID == nil; firstKeyExchange { | ||
- msg.KexAlgos = make([]string, 0, len(t.config.KeyExchanges)+1) | ||
- msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, t.config.KeyExchanges...) | ||
msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, "ext-info-c") | ||
+ msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, kexStrictClient) | ||
} | ||
+ | ||
} | ||
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packet := Marshal(msg) | ||
@@ -581,6 +616,13 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error { | ||
return err | ||
} | ||
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+ if t.sessionID == nil && ((isClient && contains(serverInit.KexAlgos, kexStrictServer)) || (!isClient && contains(clientInit.KexAlgos, kexStrictClient))) { | ||
+ t.strictMode = true | ||
+ if err := t.conn.setStrictMode(); err != nil { | ||
+ return err | ||
+ } | ||
+ } | ||
+ | ||
// We don't send FirstKexFollows, but we handle receiving it. | ||
// | ||
// RFC 4253 section 7 defines the kex and the agreement method for | ||
@@ -615,7 +657,8 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error { | ||
return err | ||
} | ||
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- if t.sessionID == nil { | ||
+ firstKeyExchange := t.sessionID == nil | ||
+ if firstKeyExchange { | ||
t.sessionID = result.H | ||
} | ||
result.SessionID = t.sessionID | ||
@@ -632,6 +675,12 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error { | ||
return unexpectedMessageError(msgNewKeys, packet[0]) | ||
} | ||
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+ if firstKeyExchange { | ||
+ // Indicates to the transport that the first key exchange is completed | ||
+ // after receiving SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS. | ||
+ t.conn.setInitialKEXDone() | ||
+ } | ||
+ | ||
return nil | ||
} | ||
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diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go | ||
index acf5a21..4df45fc 100644 | ||
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go | ||
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go | ||
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ type transport struct { | ||
rand io.Reader | ||
isClient bool | ||
io.Closer | ||
+ | ||
+ strictMode bool | ||
+ initialKEXDone bool | ||
} | ||
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// packetCipher represents a combination of SSH encryption/MAC | ||
@@ -73,6 +76,18 @@ type connectionState struct { | ||
pendingKeyChange chan packetCipher | ||
} | ||
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+func (t *transport) setStrictMode() error { | ||
+ if t.reader.seqNum != 1 { | ||
+ return errors.New("ssh: sequence number != 1 when strict KEX mode requested") | ||
+ } | ||
+ t.strictMode = true | ||
+ return nil | ||
+} | ||
+ | ||
+func (t *transport) setInitialKEXDone() { | ||
+ t.initialKEXDone = true | ||
+} | ||
+ | ||
// prepareKeyChange sets up key material for a keychange. The key changes in | ||
// both directions are triggered by reading and writing a msgNewKey packet | ||
// respectively. | ||
@@ -111,11 +126,12 @@ func (t *transport) printPacket(p []byte, write bool) { | ||
// Read and decrypt next packet. | ||
func (t *transport) readPacket() (p []byte, err error) { | ||
for { | ||
- p, err = t.reader.readPacket(t.bufReader) | ||
+ p, err = t.reader.readPacket(t.bufReader, t.strictMode) | ||
if err != nil { | ||
break | ||
} | ||
- if len(p) == 0 || (p[0] != msgIgnore && p[0] != msgDebug) { | ||
+ // in strict mode we pass through DEBUG and IGNORE packets only during the initial KEX | ||
+ if len(p) == 0 || (t.strictMode && !t.initialKEXDone) || (p[0] != msgIgnore && p[0] != msgDebug) { | ||
break | ||
} | ||
} | ||
@@ -126,7 +142,7 @@ func (t *transport) readPacket() (p []byte, err error) { | ||
return p, err | ||
} | ||
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-func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader) ([]byte, error) { | ||
+func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader, strictMode bool) ([]byte, error) { | ||
packet, err := s.packetCipher.readCipherPacket(s.seqNum, r) | ||
s.seqNum++ | ||
if err == nil && len(packet) == 0 { | ||
@@ -139,6 +155,9 @@ func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader) ([]byte, error) { | ||
select { | ||
case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange: | ||
s.packetCipher = cipher | ||
+ if strictMode { | ||
+ s.seqNum = 0 | ||
+ } | ||
default: | ||
return nil, errors.New("ssh: got bogus newkeys message") | ||
} | ||
@@ -169,10 +188,10 @@ func (t *transport) writePacket(packet []byte) error { | ||
if debugTransport { | ||
t.printPacket(packet, true) | ||
} | ||
- return t.writer.writePacket(t.bufWriter, t.rand, packet) | ||
+ return t.writer.writePacket(t.bufWriter, t.rand, packet, t.strictMode) | ||
} | ||
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-func (s *connectionState) writePacket(w *bufio.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error { | ||
+func (s *connectionState) writePacket(w *bufio.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte, strictMode bool) error { | ||
changeKeys := len(packet) > 0 && packet[0] == msgNewKeys | ||
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err := s.packetCipher.writeCipherPacket(s.seqNum, w, rand, packet) | ||
@@ -187,6 +206,9 @@ func (s *connectionState) writePacket(w *bufio.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet [] | ||
select { | ||
case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange: | ||
s.packetCipher = cipher | ||
+ if strictMode { | ||
+ s.seqNum = 0 | ||
+ } | ||
default: | ||
panic("ssh: no key material for msgNewKeys") | ||
} | ||
-- | ||
2.25.1 | ||
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ | ||
Summary: Infrastructure as code deployment management tool | ||
Name: terraform | ||
Version: 1.3.2 | ||
Release: 19%{?dist} | ||
Release: 20%{?dist} | ||
License: MPLv2.0 | ||
Vendor: Microsoft Corporation | ||
Distribution: Mariner | ||
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@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ Patch2: CVE-2024-6257.patch | |
Patch3: CVE-2024-6104.patch | ||
Patch4: CVE-2022-32149.patch | ||
Patch5: CVE-2023-4782.patch | ||
Patch6: CVE-2023-48795.patch | ||
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%global debug_package %{nil} | ||
%define our_gopath %{_topdir}/.gopath | ||
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@@ -66,6 +67,9 @@ install -p -m 755 -t %{buildroot}%{_bindir} ./terraform | |
%{_bindir}/terraform | ||
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%changelog | ||
* Thu Nov 28 2024 Sumedh Sharma <[email protected]> - 1.3.2-20 | ||
- Add patch to resolve CVE-2023-48795. | ||
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* Thu Oct 10 2024 Sumedh Sharma <[email protected]> - 1.3.2-19 | ||
- Add patch to resolve CVE-2023-4782 & CVE-2022-32149 | ||
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