genkeys, yggdrasilctl: Use pledge(2) on OpenBSD #1193
Conversation
The simplest tool first: genkeys only does standard I/O, nothing else.
The CLI is simple, but parses config files and communicates over the network with arbitrary endpoints. Limit system operations to that is needed before doing anything and drop all priviledges after config file and socket handling is done, i.e. do parse and speak over the network completely unprivileged.
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Rebased onto develop. @neilalexander any thoughts on the general direction of adding pledge and unveil to yggdrasil? It would be code effectively running only on OpenBSD, but it being there should help developers on other OSes applying similar security mechanisms, e.g. Linux/seccomp or FreeBSD/capsicum. |
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In principle I'm not opposed but I am a little bit concerned about absorbing more and more platform-specific code for platforms that neither I nor Arceliar run or can easily test. If you're volunteering to maintain OpenBSD-specific code on an on-going basis, that's a different story. |
That's expected, hence my asking before investing my time and yours upstream, only to keep work as local patches after all because of stuff like this.
Sure, I'll gladly put the had on for any OpenBSD-specific bits in yggdrasil, if that helps. I've already ported it and am actively maintaining it; it still lives in jasperla/openbsd-wip until I'm confident enough that everything will work as expected for OpenBSD users, at which point I'll send my port out for review and import it into openbsd/ports proper. All my PRs so far came out of that, making stuff "just work" on my nodes. |
I missed that we already had a heavily outdated net/yggdrasil-go port at 0.5.3, so I just polished and updated that and took maintainership to take care of it in the future. |
Such as https://github.com/yggdrasil-network/yggdrasil-go/pull/927/files#r1826606055 The lack of serialisation between goroutines makes them race against each other. |
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@neilalexander Is this something you'd consider merging upstream? If not, I'll carry local patches in the OpenBSD port and drop these PRs. If so, then perhaps merge this one and refine, i.e. tighten security, in follow-up ones? |
Restrict system operations of CLI tools with https://man.openbsd.org/pledge.2.
https://pkg.go.dev/suah.dev/protect abstracts the OS specific code, i.e. is a NOOP on non-OpenBSD systems.
This PR is to gauge upstream interest in this direction; my OpenBSD port of yggdrasil already pledges the daemon,
resulting in minimal runtime privileges, but there are still a few rough edges:
https://github.com/jasperla/openbsd-wip/blob/master/net/yggdrasil/patches/patch-cmd_yggdrasil_main_go#L80