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further changes
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vivek-arte committed Nov 5, 2024
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7 changes: 1 addition & 6 deletions rendered/zip-0227.html
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<span class="math">\(\mathsf{issued\_assets(AssetBase).final}\)</span>
to
<span class="math">\(1\)</span>
in the global state immediately after the block in which this transaction occurs.</li>
in the global state.</li>
<li>(Replay Protection) If issue bundle is present, the fees MUST be greater than zero.</li>
</ul>
</section>
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<li>We limit the size of the
<span class="math">\(\mathsf{asset\_desc}\)</span>
string to 512 bytes as it is a reasonable size to store metadata about the Asset, for example in JSON format.</li>
<li>We require a check whether the
<span class="math">\(\mathsf{finalize}\)</span>
flag only has been set in a previous block rather than a previous transaction in the same block. In other words, we only update the
<span class="math">\(\mathsf{issued\_assets}\)</span>
map at the block boundary. This is in keeping with the current property which allows for a miner to reorder transactions in a block without changing the meaning, which we aim to preserve.</li>
<li>We require non-zero fees in the presence of an issue bundle, in order to preclude the possibility of a transaction containing only an issue bundle. If a transaction includes only an issue bundle, the SIGHASH transaction hash would be computed solely based on the issue bundle. A duplicate bundle would have the same SIGHASH transaction hash, potentially allowing for a replay attack.</li>
</ul>
<section id="concrete-applications"><h3><span class="section-heading">Concrete Applications</span><span class="section-anchor"> <a rel="bookmark" href="#concrete-applications"><img width="24" height="24" class="section-anchor" src="assets/images/section-anchor.png" alt=""></a></span></h3>
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3 changes: 1 addition & 2 deletions zips/zip-0227.rst
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Expand Up @@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ If all of the above checks pass, do the following:
- Add :math:`\mathsf{cm}` to the Merkle tree of note commitments.
- Increase the value of :math:`\mathsf{issued\_assets(AssetBase).balance}` by the value of the note, :math:`\mathsf{v}`.

- If :math:`\mathsf{finalize} = 1\!`, set :math:`\mathsf{issued\_assets(AssetBase).final}` to :math:`1` in the global state immediately after the block in which this transaction occurs.
- If :math:`\mathsf{finalize} = 1\!`, set :math:`\mathsf{issued\_assets(AssetBase).final}` to :math:`1` in the global state.

- (Replay Protection) If issue bundle is present, the fees MUST be greater than zero.

Expand All @@ -382,7 +382,6 @@ The following is a list of rationale for different decisions made in the proposa
- information to be committed by the issuer, though not enforceable by the protocol.

- We limit the size of the :math:`\mathsf{asset\_desc}` string to 512 bytes as it is a reasonable size to store metadata about the Asset, for example in JSON format.
- We require a check whether the :math:`\mathsf{finalize}` flag only has been set in a previous block rather than a previous transaction in the same block. In other words, we only update the :math:`\mathsf{issued\_assets}` map at the block boundary. This is in keeping with the current property which allows for a miner to reorder transactions in a block without changing the meaning, which we aim to preserve.
- We require non-zero fees in the presence of an issue bundle, in order to preclude the possibility of a transaction containing only an issue bundle. If a transaction includes only an issue bundle, the SIGHASH transaction hash would be computed solely based on the issue bundle. A duplicate bundle would have the same SIGHASH transaction hash, potentially allowing for a replay attack.

Concrete Applications
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