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Minutes 09 Nov 2023

Paul Albertella edited this page Nov 30, 2023 · 1 revision
  • Host: Paul Albertella
  • Participants: Pete Brink, Sebastian Hetze, Igor Stoppa, Daniel Krippner

Agenda:

  • 'Next Steps' from Munich Workshop [1]
    • Igor's 'Checklist of known issues' initiative
    • Establish document review & publication workflow
    • Build index of past ELISA results
    • Basil requirements tool
  • Vice-chair for OSEP?
    • Suggested new role for ELISA WGs
    • Serve as proxy for WG chair when unavailable
  • 'Proven in use' PR from Sebastian [2]
    • Review status

Discussion

Pete: Re: review and publication workflow - most important purpose of processes in a safety context is minimisation of systematic error

  • Igor: Does this not require a model of what is causing the systematic error
  • Pete: Assumption is that if software is wrong, that is because we specified it or designed it wrong (or inadequately)
  • Igor: Absence of formal design does not mean absence of design, it means that the design is articulated in different ways (e.g. read the code!)
    • It could be argued that code-as-design is good, because it minimises the potential disconnect between design and implementation
    • Best way to convey information about software will be audience-dependent
  • Igor: If we discuss something at a level of abstraction too far removed from the subject, it can be difficult for participants to understand the challenges

Igor: I am working on a summary (60+ page) of Linux kernel interactions with ARM64 hardware

  • Will include a list of known issues
  • Not claiming to be comprehensive, but a good starting point

Expect it to be released under a CC or equivalent licence to allow it to be referenced and re-used

  • Could be a useful frame or reference for discussion about e.g. interference
  • Also working on a template for safety requirements that hopes to publish

Paul: Having a list of known issues / limitations is a starting point

  • Some of these may be disqualifying for certain safety-related applications
  • Some of these may require kernel design changes to resolve or even mitigate

Igor: Tried to write this document in a way that Linux kernel developers can engage with

  • Important for them to understand this, and why users (like us) have problems with some aspects of the Linux design
  • e.g. effective separation of subsystems could enable work to happen, driven by the needs of critical system developers, that contributes back to the kernel
  • May require some architectural changes to the kernel

Also requires changes to expectations about kernel development process - what documentation, testing is required for a change to be acceptable, and what documentation needs to exist for existing functionality.

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